DEBT IN INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM

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June, 1996*

*We thank Ron Anderson, Avinash Dixit, Hayne Leland, Rajnish Mehra and Pierre Mella-Barral for helpful conversations. Some of the work for this project was accomplished while Fries was working in the Research Department of the IMF and Miller and Perraudin were visiting scholars in the Fund's Research and European I Departments, respectively. We thank the Fund for its hospitality. Research grants to Perraudin from the Newton Trust, INQUIRE (UK), and the ESRC are gratefully acknowledged. Correspondence concerning this paper should be addressed to William Perraudin, Department of Economics, Birkbeck College, 7-15, Gresse Street, London WIP 1PA, United Kingdom, telephone 44-171-631 6404, email 100757.130@COMUSERVE.COM.
Abstract

This paper shows (i) how entry and exit of firms in a competitive industry affect the valuation of securities and optimal capital structure, and (ii) how, given a trade-off between the tax advantages and agency costs, a firm will optimally adjust its leverage level after it is set up. We derive simple pricing expressions for corporate debt in which the price elasticity of demand for industry output plays a crucial role. When a firm optimally adjusts its leverage over time, we show that total firm value comprises the value of discounted cash-flows assuming fixed capital structure plus a continuum of options for marginal increases in debt.
Valuation theory in financial economics is generally concerned with obtaining restrictions on the joint distribution of asset returns from assumptions on payoffs or preferences. Few attempts have been made to link the pricing of securities to characteristics of the factor and product markets in which firms operate. Making such a link is difficult because it requires explicit modelling of a full industry equilibrium.

The impact of debt in industry equilibrium with imperfectly competitive firms has been investigated in a series of papers by Brander and Lewis (1986,1988) and Maksimovic (1988,1990). These papers focus primarily on the way in which debt financing may enable firms to commit to particular ex post behavior in imperfectly competitive markets. Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) also study debt and industry equilibrium but are mainly concerned with agency costs. With the exception of Maksimovic (1988), all these models are static and it is not obvious how they could be employed for pricing.

In this paper, we study the interaction between bond pricing, industry equilibrium and optimal capital structure. In particular, we derive explicit solutions for the value of corporate bonds that depend in a simple, transparent manner on the elasticity of demand for total industry output. We also show how firms will optimally adjust their leverage levels, both when they are set up and subsequently. In the process, we obtain a dynamic theory of optimal leverage.

Valuing debt without allowing for dynamic adjustments in leverage appears quite restrictive. In the absence of leverage adjustment costs and restrictive covenants on existing debt, firms may wish to adjust their debt levels on a continuous basis. Brennan and Schwartz (1984) model such behavior. Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989a,1989b) analyze optimal periodic adjustments of leverage when recapitalization costs are proportional to bonds issued. As the work of Kane, Marcus and MacDonald (1984,1985) shows, the residual value of the firm in the event of bankruptcy or when debt falls due depends on the ability of the firm’s owners to adjust the level of leverage at that point.

Our treatment of releverage behavior resembles that of Fischer, Heinkel and Zech-
ner in that we examine optimal changes in leverage in the presence of adjustment costs. However, the cost structure we assume is quite different from theirs since we suppose that hold-out problems or possibly legal restrictions make it prohibitively expensive to reduce leverage, but that increases in debt are costless. Roe (1987) documents how hard it is to renegotiate public bond issues in the US outside formal bankruptcy proceedings.\(^1\)

The approach we take in this paper builds on recent work by Leahy (1993). Leahy shows how Dixit’s (1989) continuous time real investment model may be extended to study a competitive industry equilibrium with entry and exit by firms triggered by output price movements. Leahy’s model, like that of Dixit, assumes pure equity financing of the firm. For industries in which expenditure on fixed capital is important, this assumption seems unattractive. Differences between corporate and personal tax rates together with bankruptcy costs will in principle make financial structure matter for firm valuation.

Section 1 of the paper sets out a simple model of a single firm which finances an irreversible investment with a mixture of debt and equity. We demonstrate in this context the solution methods that will be employed throughout the paper and derive some preliminary results on optimal capital structure, agency costs and incentives to adjust leverage levels.\(^2\)

Section 2 of the paper incorporates our model of a single firm in an industry equilibrium. We show that free entry and exit impose reflecting barriers on the price of the industry’s output, affecting the valuation of corporate debt and equity and the optimal capital structure decision.

Our pricing expressions for corporate debt have the interesting feature that, when equity-holders are cash-constrained, the bonds become riskless as the elasticity of output demand approaches zero. The reason is that, for low price elasticities, very few firms have to leave the industry in order to prevent the output price dropping below the exit trigger level, \(p_b\). Hence, for a given firm, bankruptcy is a low probability event and the bonds resemble the safe asset.
When equity-holders are not cash-constrained and debt is risky, individual firms entering the industry have an incentive to ‘under-cut’ other firms by adopting marginally lower leverage. In equilibrium, this incentive forces down the level of borrowing until all debt is fully collateralized, i.e., at closure equal in value to the residual value of firms’ assets.

Section 3 relaxes the assumption that the leverage level is fixed after the firm is set up. We characterize a firm’s optimal dynamic re-leverage policy, assuming that increasing leverage is costless but that un-levering can only be accomplished through liquidation. We justify the latter assumption by supposing that free-rider behavior by individual bond-holders prevents any capital restructuring agreement that involves reductions in leverage.

We show that the value of the firm, in these circumstances, equals that of its discounted cash flows assuming a fixed capital structure plus the value of a continuum of options to increase leverage. These options are exercised successively as the output price hits new peaks.

1 A SIMPLE BENCHMARK MODEL

1.1 Basic Assumptions

We begin by describing a simple model that demonstrates our solution techniques and establishes a benchmark. This model will abstract from industry equilibrium effects in that firm bankruptcies will not affect the basic state variable, the price of the firm’s output.

Suppose that a firm may issue debt or equity to finance the purchase of capital costing $K$. We shall initially assume that no adjustment in the level of leverage is possible after the firm is set up. At the end of this section, and then at more length in later sections we shall return to this point.
The firm’s technology is such that output is unity per period of time and it faces a flow of costs, \( w \), (assumed to be constant through time) as long as production continues. If \( p_t \) is the price of the firm’s output, net earnings equal:

\[
(1 - \tau)(p_t - w)
\]

where \( \tau \) is the corporate income tax rate. Implicitly, we assume here that the firm’s dividend policy is fixed. One should regard our analysis below of optimal investment and bankruptcy decisions as conditional on this. Also, suppose that \( p_t \) is a geometric Brownian motion:

\[
dp_t = \mu p_t dt + \sigma p_t dB_t
\]

for constants \( \mu \) and \( \sigma \) and a standard Brownian motion \( B_t \).

If the output price falls far enough, earnings will eventually turn negative, obliging equity-holders to cover operating losses through capital injections.\(^3\) Bankruptcy will be triggered by the equity-holders’ decision to cease injecting funds.\(^4\)

A crucial question for valuing debt is then: what is the residual value of the firm after bankruptcy? To emphasize the wide applicability of our results, we develop our models with a general residual value function, \( X(p) \). The only restriction we place on the function \( X(p) \) is that it be non-decreasing in its argument.

**Assumption 1** The residual value of the firm after bankruptcy is a function \( X(p_t) \) of the output price where \( X'(p) \geq 0 \) for all \( p \geq 0 \).

Our approach is sufficiently general to encompass various assumptions made in past studies. For example, classic studies of debt valuation such as Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976) have supposed that after bankruptcy, bond-holders receive the value of the firm’s assets which are assumed to follow a simple geometric Brownian motion. On the other hand, Mello and Parsons (1992) assume that when bankruptcy occurs, bond-holders receive the pure equity value of the firm, i.e. a basic asset value following a geometric Brownian motion as in Merton (1974) plus the option value associated with liquidation possibilities.\(^5\)
In fact, neither the Merton-Black-Cox nor the Mello-Parsons approach is ideal. Bond-holders taking control after bankruptcy may re-lever a firm in a variety of ways. The options associated with re-leverage possibilities are likely to form an important part of the firm’s value and hence affect the premia on corporate debt well before bankruptcy occurs. Our approach is sufficiently general to allow for such options.

As well as specifying the residual value function, \( X(p_t) \), to price debt in industry equilibrium, one needs to make assumptions about what bankruptcy implies for the output level of the firm. Specifically, if a firm ceases to produce when it goes bankrupt, this may affect industry output and feed back into the profitability of other corporations.

The models we develop below will vary according to whether industry output falls when firms go bankrupt. In the benchmark model of this section, industry output is assumed not to fall and hence the price process, \( p_t \), can be treated as fully exogenous.

Finally, note that we do not allow the equity-holders in our model to suspend production temporarily. Such ‘moth-balling’ of productive activities and the real option values that it can induce have been studied by Brennan and Schwartz (1984) and Mello and Parsons (1992).

### 1.2 Debt and Equity Valuation

Let us suppose that the firm is financed with equity and infinite maturity debt, paying a fixed coupon, \( b \). If agents are risk neutral, and \( r \) is the constant risk-free interest rate, the firm’s total equity and debt values, \( V_t \) and \( L_t \) must satisfy:

\[
\begin{align*}
    r V_t &= (1 - \tau)(p_t - w - b) + \frac{d}{d\Delta} E_t V_{t+\Delta} \bigg|_{\Delta=0}, \\
    r L_t &= b + \frac{d}{d\Delta} E_t L_{t+\Delta} \bigg|_{\Delta=0},
\end{align*}
\]

where \( b \) is the flow of coupon payments on the firm’s debt. In words, the expected return from investing amounts \( V_t \) or \( L_t \) in the safe asset must equal the expected
return from investing in the firm’s equity or debt. For simplicity, we assume that, at a personal level, all income is taxed at the same rate and, hence, personal tax rates drop out of the above equilibrium conditions. Note that we also assume in the above equations that interest payments are tax deductible. This assumption introduces a tax advantage to leverage.

If \( V_t \) and \( L_t \) are twice-continuously differentiable functions of the state variable, \( p_t \), we may apply Ito’s lemma to obtain:

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{V}(p_t) &= (1 - \tau)(p_t - w - b) + V'(p_t)p_t\mu + V''(p_t)p_t^2\frac{\sigma^2}{2}, \\
\dot{L}(p_t) &= b + L'(p_t)p_t\mu + L''(p_t)p_t^2\frac{\sigma^2}{2}.
\end{align*}
\]

The appropriate boundary conditions are as follows. If the CRM is closed at some price \( p_b \), then, in the absence of arbitrage, \( V(p_b) = 0 \) and \( L(p_b) = X(p_b) \). As \( p_t \to \infty \), the possibility of closure plays a smaller and smaller role in valuation, so \( V \) and \( L \) must approach the unlimited liability values of the income streams, i.e.,

\[
\begin{align*}
\lim_{p \to \infty} V(p) &= E_t \left[ \int_t^\infty \exp[-r(s - t)](1 - \tau)(p_s - w - b)\, ds \right], \\
\lim_{p \to \infty} L(p) &= E_t \left[ \int_t^\infty \exp[-r(s - t)]b\, ds \right].
\end{align*}
\]

The right hand side terms may readily be calculated as: \( \lim_{p \to \infty} V(p) = (1 - \tau)(p_t/(r - \mu) - (w + b)/r) \) and \( \lim_{p \to \infty} L(p) = b/r \).

Finally, since equity-holders may always cover operating losses by injecting capital,8 the closure price, \( p_b \), is effectively their choice. Hence, \( p_b \) will be determined so as to maximize the value of equity-holders’ claims, \( V(p_t) \). As Dixit (1992a) and Dumas (1992) show, the relevant condition determining \( p_b \) is a smooth-pasting equation for total equity at the trigger price, i.e., \( V'(p_b) = 0 \). Applying the above boundary conditions and supposing that \( V(p_t) \) and \( L(p_t) \) satisfy equations (5) and (6), one may obtain explicit solutions for equity and bond values.

**Proposition 1** Let the firm’s output price be exogenously given and equal to the process given in equation (2). If the flow of coupon payments is fixed at \( b \) and debt is
risky in that the residual firm value at closure is less than the face value of the debt, the value of the firm’s equity and bonds, $L_t$ and $V_t$ satisfy:

$$V(p_t) = (1 - \tau) \left[ \frac{p_t}{r - \mu} - \frac{w + b}{r} \right] - (1 - \tau) \left[ \frac{p_b}{r - \mu} - \frac{w + b}{r} \right] \left( \frac{p_t}{p_b} \right)^{\lambda_1},$$

(9)

$$L(p_t) = \frac{b}{r} + \left( X(p_b) - \frac{b}{r} \right) \left( \frac{p_t}{p_b} \right)^{\lambda_1},$$

(10)

where $\lambda_1$ is the negative root of the quadratic equation: $\lambda(\lambda - 1)\sigma^2/2 + \lambda \mu = r$, and where the close-down price, $p_b$, equals

$$p_b = -\frac{\lambda_1}{1 - \lambda_1} \frac{r - \mu}{r} (w + b).$$

(11)

The proofs of this and subsequent propositions are sketched in the Appendix.10

Figure 1 depicts the solution given in Proposition 1 for the simple case in which $X(p) = 0$ for all $p$. Note that the equity and bond values approach the unlimited liability values as $p \to \infty$, that $V(p)$ smooth-pastes at $p_b$ and that $L(p)$ hits $X(p)$ (in this case the horizontal axis) obliquely.

1.3 Optimal Leverage

How then is the level of leverage determined? First, suppose that equity-holders have access to unlimited external resources, for example because outside equity is available in any quantity. In this case, leverage will be set to maximise the unconstrained ex ante value of the firm. Let $W(p_t, b)$ denote the total value of the firm for some leverage level, $b$. Then:

$$W(p_t, b) = \left\{ (1 - \tau) \left[ \frac{p_t}{r - \mu} - \frac{w}{r} \right] + \frac{b \tau}{r} \right\} + \left[ X(p_b) - \left\{ (1 - \tau) \left[ \frac{p_b}{r - \mu} - \frac{w}{r} \right] + \frac{b \tau}{r} \right\} \right] \left( \frac{p_t}{p_b} \right)^{\lambda_1}. \quad (12)

Suppose that the firm is set up when the output price is at some initial level, $p_i$. The capital structure will then be chosen so as to maximize $W(p_i, b)$. In particular, the optimal $b$ will be the root of the first order condition $\partial W(p_i, b^*)/\partial b = 0$. 

9
Proposition 2  Suppose that equity-holders have access to unlimited external resources. Let the firm’s output price be exogenously given and equal to the process given in equation (2). If the flow of coupon payments is fixed at $b$ and debt is risky in that the face value of debt exceeds the residual assets available at closure, the optimal capital structure conditional on some initial price, $p_i$, is the root of the equation:

$$\frac{\tau}{r} \left( 1 - \left( \frac{p_i}{p_b} \right)^{\lambda_1} \right) = -\frac{\lambda_1 b}{w + b} \left( \frac{p_i}{p_b} \right)^{\lambda_1} + \frac{1}{w + b} [X'(p_b)p_b - \lambda_1 X(p_b)],$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

where $p_b$ is defined as in Proposition 1. When $X(p) = 0$ for all $p$, one may show that (13) has a unique solution and that this is an optimum.

The optimal degree of leverage indicated by equation (13) sets the probability-weighted marginal tax benefit, $(1-(p_b/p_b)^{\lambda_1})\tau/r$, equal to the net discounted marginal bankruptcy cost stemming from an inefficient choice of closure point by equity-holders who select $p_b$ to maximize $V(p_t)$ rather than $W(p_t)$. Of the two terms on the right hand side of equation (13), the first measures the effect of additional leverage in accelerating bankruptcy and hence the loss of the tax shield. The second reflects the fact that as debt increases, equity-holders may precipitate bankruptcy and hence switch to the residual value function, $X(p_t)$, at an inefficient time.

Figure 2 illustrates the optimal capital structure decision. In the top panel, $W_b \equiv \partial W(p_i, b) / \partial b$ is drawn as an increasing function of $p_i$ for two different coupon flows, $b^L$ and $b^H$. The points at which the schedules cross the horizontal give the the prices, $p^L_t$ and $p^H_t$, for which such leverage would be optimal, while their intersections with the BB schedule indicate the prices at which these levels of debt would trigger bankruptcy. The lower panel of Figure 2 shows how optimal leverage increases with the entry price. Later in the paper where we allow for increases in leverage, we find that the option of waiting shifts the LL schedule to the right.

How is the leverage decision affected if the total amount of equity capital is constrained? Several recent papers have studied capital structure under this assumption (see, for example, Aghion and Bolton (1992), Hart and Moore (1994) and Anderson and Sundaresan (1996)). Such situations can arise if firm profits are unverifiable by
holders of external equity. Equity claims then can only be held by firm insiders who combine ownership with control of the firm’s operations. Within our framework, one may suppose that equity-holders have a maximum sum $J$ to invest in the firm and that $L(p_i, b^*) + J < K$ where $K$ is the initial capital cost of establishing the firm and $b^*$ is the level of leverage that maximises ex ante firm value. If there exists a $\hat{b}$ such that $L(p_i, \hat{b}) + J \geq K$, then the firm will be set up but with a sub-optimally high level of debt. In particular, $b$ will be the root of $L(p_i, b) + J = K$.

1.4 Agency Costs

Note that the closure price which maximizes the ex ante value of the firm, call it $\overline{p}_b$ is not equal to the liquidation price chosen by equity-holders, $p_b$. This leads to an agency cost. If equity-holders could commit before the firm is set up to close the firm at $\overline{p}_b$, the ex ante value of the firm would be higher. The debt remains fairly priced since bond-holders correctly anticipate that equity-holders will close the firm at $p_b$, but this outcome is still inefficient. The agency cost, which resembles the agency costs investigated by, for example, Myers (1977), may be calculated as follows.

**Proposition 3** Let the firm’s output price be exogenously given and equal to the process given in equation (2). If the flow of coupon payments is fixed at $b$ and debt is risky in that the face value exceeds the residual assets available at closure, the agency cost equals:

$$ W(p_i, b) - W(p_i, \overline{b}) ,$$

where $W$ is the same as in equation (12) except that $p_b$ is replaced by $\overline{p}_b$ where:

$$ \overline{p}_b = \frac{-\lambda_1}{1-\lambda_1} \frac{r-\mu}{r} \left\{ w - \frac{\tau b}{1-\tau} - \frac{r}{1-\tau} \frac{1}{\lambda_1} (\lambda_1 X(\overline{p}_b) - \overline{p}_b X'(\overline{p}_b)) \right\} .$$

Since $X'(p)$ is non-negative, by assumption, for all $p > 0$, it follows that $\overline{p}_b \leq p_b$.

The last sentence of the Proposition highlights the fact that the closure price that maximizes firm value, $\overline{p}_b$, is lower than that which would be chosen by equity-holders.
maximizing their own equity value, \( p_b \). The reasons are equity-holders ignore (i) the tax shield that may be lost when the firm closes, and (ii) do not internalize the residual value of the firm in their choice of closure time.

### 1.5 Incentives to Adjust Leverage

The last point we wish to make in this preliminary section relates to incentives for adjustments in capital structure after the firm is set up. Below we shall develop a dynamic theory of capital structure but, for the moment, we assume that the leverage level is fixed by the initial agreement between equity-holders and bond-holders. The following proposition shows the degree to which this assumption is restrictive.

**Proposition 4** In the model of this section, excluding side payments, equity-holders will never wish to buy back marginal amounts of the firm’s debt. Equally, in the absence of side payments, if \( X(p_b) \) and \( X'(p_b) \) are small, bond-holders will never prefer that the firm issue more debt of the same seniority.

Equity-holders’ reluctance to unlever at the margin reflects the fact that reducing leverage cuts the option value associated with limited liability implicit in the value of equity. If equity-holders could agree on side-payments from the bond-holders who remain after the debt buy-back (the latter benefit because the firm moves further from the liquidation point and so might be willing to pay), they might wish to purchase marginal amounts of debt. Otherwise, only discrete reductions in leverage could be in the interests of equity-holders.

However, if some debt-holders try to free ride, demanding special treatment in the buy-back, the effect may be to make even discrete reductions in leverage too expensive as far as equity-holders are concerned. The standard solution to this problem is a take-it-or-leave-it offer conditional on everyone accepting. Such a strategy is not really implementable in practice since debt is often dispersed among many creditors and take-it-or-leave-it offers are not credible. This provides a justification for the
assumption made here that firms cannot unlever.

The second part of Proposition 4 states that, so long as the residual post-bankruptcy value of the firm is small and insensitive to the output price, $p_t$, bond-holders will tend to resist increases in leverage. Although bond covenants do commonly limit firms’ ability to increase borrowing, we regard the assumption made in this section and the next that firms cannot raise their leverage as simply a benchmark case. The assumption is open to criticism as precluding leverage adjustments may seriously impair the ex ante value of the firm by impeding optimal exploitation of tax advantages after the firm is set up. In Section 3, we show how this assumption may be relaxed by developing a theory of optimal dynamic re-leverage.

The above model has provided a benchmark case. We now wish to show how one can (i) endogenize the output price by embedding the above model in an industry equilibrium, and (ii) incorporate optimal dynamic adjustments in leverage.

2 INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM

2.1 The Output Price in Industry Equilibrium

Consider an industry with a large number of identical firms all possessing the technology and cost structure described in the last section. Again, we limit attention to the case in which, once the firm is set up, changes in the level of leverage are impossible. First, let us examine the equilibrium that arises if equity-holders are cash-constrained as described in 1.3. In Section 2.4 below, we discuss how the industry equilibrium changes when this assumption is altered to permit equity-holders an unconstrained choice of capital structure.

Assume that the inverse demand function for industry output is:

$$p_t = x_t D(q_t)$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)

13
where \( q_t \) is the number of firms active at time \( t \), which will turn out to be endogenous variable in this model. (For simplicity, we take \( q_t \) to be a stochastic process with continuous rather than integer support.) Since each firm produces a unit of output, \( q_t \) is also the total output of the industry. Assume for simplicity that the good is not storable so that industry output equals supply. Suppose that \( D(.) \) is a continuously differentiable, monotonically declining function and \( x_t \) is an exogenous stochastic process reflecting taste shocks. Specifically, we assume that \( x_t \) is a geometric Brownian motion with constant parameters, \( \mu \) and \( \sigma \). Application of Ito's lemma and the assumption (to be justified below) that \( q_t \) is a finite variation process yields:

\[
d p_t = p_t D'(q_t) D(q_t) dq_t + \mu p_t dt + \sigma p_t dB_t
\]

where \( B_t \) is a standard Brownian motion. We suppose that there is an infinite pool of potential firms and that, apart from a lump sum cost of entry, they may enter the industry costlessly. Output increases if prices rise to such a point that it is profitable for some of these firms to enter. Since all firms are identical and entry is free apart from fixed capital costs, the price process can never pass the level at which entry is profitable for an individual firm. Hence, the term, \( p_t D'(q_t) D(q_t) \) acts like a “stochastic regulator”, keeping \( p_t \) below the entry price, \( p_e \). A similar argument applies for the price \( p_b \) at which firms wish to leave the industry. Thus, the price process may be thought of as a doubly reflected geometric Brownian motion with barriers, \( p_b \) and \( p_e \), i.e.,

\[
\begin{align*}
d p_t &= \mu p_t dt + \sigma p_t dB_t + dM^b_t + dM^e_t,
\end{align*}
\]

where \( M^b_t \) and \( M^e_t \) are monotonically increasing and decreasing stochastic regulator processes. Formally, \( M^b_t \) and \( M^e_t \) may be written as:

\[
\begin{align*}
M^e_t &= \sup_{0 \leq \tau \leq t} [\min\{p_e - (p_r - p_b) - M^b_t , 0\}] , \\
M^b_t &= \sup_{0 \leq \tau \leq t} [\min\{p_r - p_b - M^e_t , 0\}] .
\end{align*}
\]

(See Harrison (1985), page 22.) \( V_t \) and \( L_t \) continue to satisfy the differential equations (5) and (6) but the relevant boundary conditions are now somewhat different.
2.2 Industry Equilibrium Boundary Conditions

First, consider the value of equity. To rule out arbitrage, it must be the case, as before, that $V(p_b) = 0$. Instead of the asymptotic condition on $V$ for high prices, however, the second boundary condition for $V$ is now $V'(p_e) = 0$. To understand this condition, note that as $p_t$ hits $p_e$, the behavior of the process changes, with upward movements in the infinite variation term, $p_e \sigma dB_t$ being cancelled by offsetting movements in the stochastic regulator. The solution can satisfy the equilibrium condition (3) both at $p_e$ and at points close to $p_e$ only if the infinite variation part of the equity value, $V'(p_t) \sigma p_t dB_t$ vanishes, i.e., if $V'(p_e) = 0$.

Turning now to the bond value, $L_t$, at $p_e$ we again have a reflecting barrier condition, in this case $V'(p_e) = 0$. At the lower price barrier, $p_b$, however, the condition is much less standard. We shall suppose that when $p_t$ hits $p_b$, each firm has an equal chance of leaving the industry. (Other assumptions are possible and we comment further below.) Now, for each firm, when $p_t$ hits $p_b$, the probability of liquidation equals the proportion of firms that exit, $dq_t/q_t$. The expected capital loss to bond-holders due to liquidation is, therefore, $L(p_b) dq_t/q_t$. Balancing this must be some probability of capital gains in bond values in the event that the output price rises.

To express this balancing of expected gains and losses more formally, recall that $p_t = x_t D(q_t)$ and that when regulation occurs, $p_t$ is fixed. Hence, we can write output quantity changes in the neighborhood of $p_b$ in terms of changes in the $p_b$ stochastic regulator as follows:

$$dM^b_t = \frac{p_t D'(q_t)}{D(q_t)} dq_t . \tag{21}$$

The marginal cost of applying the $p_b$ stochastic regulator (because of expected capital losses) may, therefore, be written as:

$$-\frac{dq_t}{q_t} (L_t - X_t) = \frac{D(q_t)}{D'(q_t) q_t} \frac{(L_t - X_t)}{p_t} dM^b_t . \tag{22}$$

But, Harrison (1985) shows (see his Corollary 4, page 83) that the appropriate boundary condition in such models sets the costs of regulation equal to the first derivative...
of the relevant discounted integral (in our case, $L_t$), i.e.,

$$L'(p_b) = - \frac{D(q_t) (L(p_b) - X(p_b))}{D'(q_t) q_t}.$$

This condition is in itself quite interesting. $D(q_t)/|D'(q_t) q_t|$ is the price elasticity of demand for the industry’s output. If we take $D(q_t)$ to be isoelastic, then we have,

$$\frac{L'(p_b)p_b}{L(p_b) - X(p_b)} = \frac{\partial q(p_b) p_b}{\partial p q_t} = \eta,$$

for some constant, $\eta$. In the remainder of the paper, we shall suppose that $D(q)$ is isoelastic.

Figure 3, which is drawn for the special case in which $X(p) = 0$ for all $p$, illustrates what is going on. By appropriate choice of units, bond value, $L$, and aggregate demand, $q_t$ are shown as (locally-linearized) functions of price intersecting at $C$ where prices equal $p_b$. For a given firm, the expected capital loss due to liquidation if the forcing process, $x_t$, falls by $\Delta x$ equals $\beta_2 \equiv L(p_b) CD/CE$. On the other hand, if $x_t$ rises by $\Delta x$, bond-holders gain $\beta_1$. Our elasticity condition is equivalent to $\beta_1 = \beta_2$, ensuring that the expected capital gains and losses cancel.

Finally, we require two conditions to determine the trigger prices, $p_b$ and $p_e$. $p_b$ is chosen by equity-holders who, at that price, are indifferent between leaving the industry or staying in production. The relevant condition is then $V'(p_b) = 0$. The upper trigger price is given by our assumption of free entry and consists of $V(p_e) + L(p_e) = K$, where $K$ is the cost of setting up the firm.

### 2.3 Valuing Debt and Equity

The following values of debt and equity may then be obtained:

**Proposition 5** In industry equilibrium when the flow of coupon payments is fixed at $b$, the values of bonds and equity are given by:

$$V(p_t) = (1 - \tau) \left[ \frac{p_t}{r - \mu} - \frac{w + b}{r} \right] - (1 - \tau) \left[ \frac{p_b}{r - \mu} - \frac{w + b}{r} \right] \gamma_1 \left[ \lambda_2 \left( \frac{p_t}{p_b} \right) ^{\lambda_1} - \lambda_1 \left( \frac{p_b}{p_t} \right) ^{\lambda_1} \right] \left( \frac{p_t}{p_e} \right) ^{\lambda_2},$$
\[-(1 - \tau) \frac{p_e}{r - \mu} \gamma_1 \left[ \left( \frac{p_e}{p_c} \right)^{\lambda_2} - \left( \frac{p_c}{p_b} \right)^{\lambda_2} \right] \right],

\[ L(p_t) = \frac{b}{r} + \left( X(p_b) - \frac{b}{r} \right) \eta \gamma_2 \left[ \lambda_2 \left( \frac{p_t}{p_b} \right)^{\lambda_1} - \lambda_1 \left( \frac{p_c}{p_b} \right)^{\lambda_2} \right] \right],

where \( \gamma_1 \) and \( \gamma_2 \) equal:

\[ \gamma_1 = (\lambda_2 - \lambda_1) (p_c/p_b)^{\lambda_1 - \lambda_2} - 1 \]

\[ \gamma_2 = (\lambda_2 (\eta - \lambda_1) - \lambda_1 (\eta - \lambda_2) (p_c/p_b)^{\lambda_1 - \lambda_2} - 1 \right].

\( p_e \) and \( p_b \) are the roots to the free entry condition, \( V(p_e) + L(p_e) = K \), and the equity-holders’ optimality condition for the timing of bankruptcy, \( V'(p_b) = 0 \). \( \lambda_1 \) and \( \lambda_2 \) are the negative and positive roots respectively of the quadratic equation: \( \lambda \left( \lambda - 1 \right) \sigma^2 / 2 + \lambda \mu = r \). \( \eta \) is the constant price elasticity of demand for industry output.

Proposition 5 derives equity and debt values for a given coupon flow \( b \). If equity-holders are cash-constrained, having a maximum of \( J \) available to invest, then \( b \) will be determined by the equation \( L(p_e, b) = K - J \).

We portray the equilibrium industry dynamics in Figure 4. At the entry price, \( p_e \), the combined value of bonds and equity, \( W(p_e) \), equals the capital cost, \( K \). At the lower trigger point \( p_b \), equity value is zero and optimality requires that \( V'(p_b) = 0 \). Again, we assume for simplicity that \( X(p) = 0 \) for all \( p \), so that the boundary condition for bonds is \( L'(p_b)p_b/L(p_b) = \eta \). This is equivalent to the tangency shown between the \( W \) function and the ray starting at \( p_b - \eta/p_b \), since at the bankruptcy price, \( p_b \), \( V = V' = 0 \),

\[ \frac{L'(p_b)p_b}{L(p_b)} = \frac{W'(p_b)p_b}{W(p_b)} = \frac{W(p_b)}{a} \frac{p_b}{W(p_b)} = \eta \right].

In the lower panel of Figure 4, we illustrate the equilibrium that prevails when the elasticity of demand is low, specifically when \( \eta \leq 1 \). Ceteris paribus, a low elasticity means that only a few firms need to close to regulate the output price at \( p_b \), i.e., individual firms face a small chance of bankruptcy. For this reason, bond values, represented by the distance \( W - V \) in the figure, do not decrease greatly even when prices approach the bankruptcy trigger.
How do the trigger prices compare with those of an unlevered firm? The latter are shown as the prices at points $C$ and $E$ in the lower panel where the schedule $U$ gives the value of a pure equity firm. Evidently, leverage has narrowed the distance between the trigger points. The tax deductibility of interest payments encourages entry at a lower price, while the impact of coupon payments on equity-holders’ income flow induces a higher price trigger for exit.

Above, we supposed that, when $p_t$ hits $p_b$, each firm has an equal chance of being liquidated. Other approaches to “ordering” liquidation across firms are possible, e.g. some deterministic ordering of firms based on differences in their wage costs. This would affect both bond and equity claims which would both become functions of the number of firms left in the industry, $q_t$, as well as of the output price, $p_t$.

It should be stressed that our assumption of an isoelastic industry demand function is crucial in allowing us to obtain simple closed form results. Any other specification would mean that the boundary condition to the bond prices would depend on $q_t$. The solutions would then be functions of two state variables ($p_t$ and $q_t$) rather than one ($p_t$). Of course, numerical solutions would still be available in the two state variable case.

Finally, note that $M_t^b$ and $M_t^e$, as monotonically increasing and decreasing processes respectively, must be of finite variation. Equation (21) and a similar equation linking output quantity changes and $M_t^e$ at the upper barrier, $p_e$, imply that $q_t$ must also be of finite variation, as claimed prior to equation (17).

2.4 Equilibrium Without Cash Constraints

How is equilibrium affected if equity-holders are not cash-constrained and hence can freely choose the capital structure at entry? The crucial point to note is that in the equilibrium described in Proposition 5, when $p_t$ hits the closure trigger, $p_b$, debt value (and hence total firm value) of any firm that closes experiences a negative jump.
Suppose that all firms adopt a particular coupon flow, \( b \). A firm which at entry adopts a marginally lower level of coupon payments enjoys the same tax advantages of leverage but avoids future negative jumps. The reason is that exit by other firms ensures that the output price never falls to a level at which the equity-holders of the low-leverage firm are unwilling to cover operating losses.

Thus, so long as bond values jump at closure, a marginal reduction in leverage (below the level adopted by other firms) discretely increases firm value at entry by eliminating the possibility of bankruptcy. Firms will therefore ‘under-cut’ each other at entry, adopting lower and lower levels of leverage. The incentive to undercut disappears only when bond values are continuous at closure. In this case, the firms are in a Nash equilibrium, choosing their level of leverage at entry in a way that is optimal given the behaviour of other firms.

Continuity of bond values at \( p_b \) implies the condition: \( L(p_b) = X(p_b) \). Since most firms do not close at \( p_b \), in the absence of arbitrage possibilities, it must also be true that \( L'(p_b) = 0 \). Together with the entry condition, \( L'(p_e) = 0 \), these equations uniquely determine the debt value and the parameter \( b \). The equity value and the entry and closure prices are determined by the conditions: \( V'(p_e) = V(p_b) = V'(p_b) = 0 \) and \( V(p_e) + L(p_e) = K \).

Solving for debt and equity values subject to these boundary conditions, we obtain the following proposition.

**Proposition 6** When equity-holders are not cash constrained and can therefore select \( b \) freely at entry, the value of debt is \( b/r \) while total equity value equals that given in Proposition 5. The closure price \( p_b \) satisfies the equation \( X(p_b) = b/r \).

This is a strong result. Competitive pressure induces equity-holders entering the industry to reduce leverage until the point at which the face value of the debt, \( b/r \), equals the residual value of the firm’s assets available to bond-holders at closure, \( X(p_b) \). In the special case illustrated in Figure 4 in which the residual value, \( X(p) \), is zero for all \( p > 0 \), in the Nash equilibrium, leverage is zero.
3 OPTIMAL DYNAMIC RELEVERAGE

3.1 Basic Assumptions

In this section, we re impose the assumption made in Sections 1 and 2 that the output price is exogenous and behaves as in equation (2). On the other hand, we relax the assumption made up to this point, that the firm's leverage level is fixed up until the moment of bankruptcy. In so doing, we shall derive a dynamic theory of capital structure. As mentioned in the Introduction, our approach to re leverage resembles that of Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989a,1989b) in that we will derive optimal leverage adjustment policies subject to adjustment costs. Our results differ from theirs because the form of the costs we assume is different.

Consider again the single firm model of Section 1. The following assumptions will combine to yield reasonably tractable pricing expressions.

Assumption 2 Feasible changes in leverage occur so as to maximize the total value of the firm's securities, \( W(p) \equiv V(p) + L(p) \).

Assumption 2 states that any leverage changes that are possible (and some may be ruled out by stake-holders' ex post conflicts of interest and restrictions on side-payments) should be carried out so as to maximize the total value of the firm. This is a natural assumption to make since the policy of maximizing \( W \) is obviously ex ante efficient and will be followed if it can be enforced ex post.

Assumption 3 Firms can increase but not reduce their level of leverage.

Recall that in Proposition 4 we showed that, in the absence of side-payments, marginal decreases in debt will be opposed by equity-holders while debt-holders will resist increases in debt of similar maturity if \( X(p_b) \) and \( X'(p_b) \) are sufficiently small. One may think of Assumption 3 as partially relaxing the hypothesis of Proposition 4.
by allowing side-payments from equity-to-debt-holders but not in the other direction. In these circumstances, if both groups can veto changes in the firm’s capital structure, the firm will be able to raise but not lower its leverage level.

If debt-holders are assumed to be relatively small and widely-dispersed, whereas equity-holders are represented in negotiations by a single, unified management, then it is quite plausible that side-payments from equity-to-debt-holders are possible but not vice versa. In effect, hold-out problems by small debt-holders preclude equity-holders being compensated for changes in capital structure that would maximize firm value.

The last assumption we require concerns the allocation of the benefits of re-leverage between the two different investor groups. A priori reasoning provides little guidance here and we shall simply adopt the reasonable assumption that:

**Assumption 4** Equity-holders receive a fraction, $\zeta$, of the benefits of leverage changes, where $\zeta \in [0, 1]$

Finally, note that there is no contradiction between our assumption that feasible changes are carried out so as to maximize firm value whereas liquidation decisions are made in an inefficient way by equity-holders maximizing the ex post value of their claims. Liquidation involves equity-holders invoking limited liability and washing their hands of the firm at a higher trigger level than that which maximizes total firm value. As with leverage reductions, the problem could be mitigated if debt-holders might be persuaded to make ex post concessions such as side-payments to equity-holders. Supposing that hold-out problems by debt-holders preclude this is consistent with our assumptions above.

### 3.2 Pricing The Firm with Leverage Adjustments

Let us see how the above assumptions combine to yield pricing expressions. For some coupon flow level, $b$, one may think of the total value of the firm as comprising
the discounted cash-flow with the current level of leverage (i.e., \( W(p_t, b) \)) as defined in equations (11) and (12)) plus a continuum of options to raise the leverage level by incremental amounts as prices increase. The reason these options will only be exercised gradually as the output price rises is that if the price subsequently falls, the higher the leverage, the greater the agency costs due to an inappropriately chosen close-down price, \( p_b \).

Let \( \bar{W}(p_t, b) \) be the total value of the firm including the option value associated with releverage possibilities, and let \( H(p_t, b) = \bar{W}(p_t, b) - W(p_t, b) \). If \( H(p_t, b) \) is a sufficiently smooth function of \( b \), one will always be able to write it as an integral:

\[
H(p_t, b) = \int_b^\infty G(p_t, \xi) d\xi
\]

for some function \( G(., .) \). This is a useful trick as one may then interpret \( G(p_t, b) \) as the value, at \( p_t \), of an option to increase the leverage parameter, \( b \), incrementally, i.e., from \( b \) to \( b + db \).

Assumption 4 implies that the firm is closed down when prices fall to \( p_b = p_b(b) \) where \( V'(p_b) + \zeta \partial H(p_b, b)/\partial p = 0 \). Raising \( b \) allows the firm to reap greater tax savings but at the cost of a less efficient closure decision in the event that prices decline. Since, by assumption, \( b \) cannot decline, it will only change when \( p_t \) exceeds its past peak, i.e. when

\[
p_t = \hat{p}_t = \sup_{0 \leq \tau \leq t} \{ p_{\tau} \}.
\] (30)

The main result of this section may be stated as:

**Proposition 7** Under Assumptions 1 to 4, the total value of the firm, \( \bar{W}(p_t, b(\hat{p}_t)) \), is:

\[
\bar{W}(p_t, b(\hat{p}_t)) = W(p_t, b(\hat{p}_t)) + \int_{b(\hat{p}_t)}^\infty G(p_t, \xi) d\xi,
\] (31)

where \( \hat{p}_t \equiv \sup_{0 \leq \tau \leq t} \{ p_{\tau} \} \). Here, \( G(p_t, b) \) represents the value of an option to increase leverage incrementally, when the current level of coupon payments is \( b \). \( G(p_t, b) \) is given by:

\[
G(p_t, b) = \gamma_3 \left[ \left( \frac{p_t}{p_x(b)} \right)^{\lambda_2} - \left( \frac{p_b(b)}{p_x(b)} \right)^{\lambda_2} \left( \frac{p_t}{p_b(b)} \right)^{\lambda_1} \right] \times
\] (32)
\[
\frac{\tau}{r} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{p_x(b)}{p_b(b)} \right)^{\lambda_1} \right] + \frac{\lambda_1}{w + b} \left( \frac{p_x(b)}{p_b(b)} \right)^{\lambda_1} + \frac{1}{w + b} \left[ X'(p_b) p_b - \lambda_1 X(p_b) \right] \left( \frac{p_x(b)}{p_b(b)} \right)^{\lambda_1},
\]

where \( \gamma_3 \equiv (1 - (p_x(b)/p_b(b))^{\lambda_1-\lambda_2})^{-1} \), and \( p_x(b) \), and \( p_b(b) \) may be found by solving for the root respectively of: \( \partial G(p_x, b) / \partial p = \partial^2 W(p_x, b) / \partial p \partial b \) and \( V'(p_b) + \zeta \partial H(p_b, b) / \partial p = 0 \) for different values of \( b \), where \( H(p_t, b) = \int_0^\infty G(p_t, \xi) d\xi \).

Thus, the value of the firm, \( \tilde{W}(p_t, b(\hat{p})) \), equals, at any given moment, the value of the firm’s cash flows assuming \( b = b(\hat{p}) \) where \( \hat{p} \) is the highest price reached up to the present, plus the value of a continuum of options to increase leverage incrementally from \( b = b(\hat{p}) \) to \( \infty \).

Obtaining solutions for \( G(p_t, b) \) is relatively straightforward. For a grid of \( b \) values, one may solve the boundary conditions to obtain \( p_x = p_x(b) \) and \( p_b = p_b(b) \). Equation (32) then yields \( G(p_t, b) \) for different \( b \).

Figure 5 shows \( \tilde{W}_b \equiv \partial \tilde{W} / \partial b \) and \( \tilde{\tilde{W}}_b \equiv \partial \tilde{\tilde{W}} / \partial b \) as functions of \( p \). Incremental leverage occurs when \( \tilde{W}_b \) smooth pastes to the horizontal axis as at \( p_x \) in the figure. The shaded vertical distance between \( W_b \) and \( \tilde{W}_b \) is the value of the option exercised at \( p_x \).

Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 2, one may see how the option to increase leverage in the future shifts the optimal leverage schedule to the right as claimed in Section 1. Leverage level \( b_x \) is now only chosen when the price goes to \( p_x \), and not at the lower price \( p_t \) which applies when there is no option to wait. For any initial price, say \( p_i \), the schedule \( \tilde{L} \tilde{L} \) gives the amount of leverage chosen when the firm is set up, \( b_i \), and shows how bonds will be increased incrementally as and when \( p \) exceeds \( p_i \).

Note that the assumption made in this section that the output price process is exogenously given (i.e., that there is no reflecting barrier on prices due to free entry by competitor firms) is not innocuous in this context. A reflecting barrier would reduce the option values associated with leverage increments that would have been implemented at prices above the barrier if the latter were absent.
The model of this section is closely linked to the analysis of irreversible investment by Pindyck (1988). In Pindyck’s case, incremental amounts of real capital are installed by the firm as the output price rises but irreversibility means that, if prices fall, the capital stock does not change. At any given moment, the current capital stock depends upon the maximum output price so far attained.

In our model, as in Pindyck’s, the total value of the firm equals the value of the future cash flows assuming no change in the control variable (capital stock or coupon flow, \( b \), respectively) plus a continuum of option values associated with marginal changes in the control.

### 4 CONCLUSION

This paper has priced corporate debt in an industry equilibrium with entry and exit of firms. For general assumptions about the residual, post-bankruptcy value of the firm, we derive the values of debt and equity. We show how, when equity-holders are cash-constrained at entry, the demand elasticity for industry output crucially affects the default premium on the bonds. If equity-holders are not constrained and can freely choose the initial level of leverage, competitive pressure leads firms to reduce leverage until the face value equals the residual value of the firm’s assets at closure, i.e., the bonds are riskless.

Much of our analysis is conducted under the assumption that the firm’s leverage level is fixed once and for all when the firm is initially set up. Adopting this assumption, we obtain simple, intuitive expressions for the value of debt that depend explicitly on the price elasticity of demand for total industry output.

However, we think it is important to explore the implications of relaxing the ‘fixed leverage’ assumption by allowing firms to increase their borrowing as their profitability improves. The degree to which a firm takes on debt when it is initially set up may depend significantly on the option it has to issue more bonds in future.
The observation that firms appear relatively under-levered given apparent bankruptcy costs could reflect the fact that the option to increase debt levels induces them to take on relatively little debt to start with.

The last section, therefore, develops a dynamic theory of optimal leverage. As we show, the value of the firm may be written as the value of its cash flow assuming a fixed level of leverage plus that of a continuum of options to increase borrowing. These options are exercised progressively each time the price of the firm’s output exceeds its previous peak.

As a final point, we have supposed throughout our analysis that the firm’s debt is of infinite maturity. Various assumptions would allow one to price finite maturity bonds within our framework. For example, one may suppose that the firm is funded overwhelmingly with perpetuals and equity but that it issues a small amount of finite maturity debt. In this case, the trigger levels for entry, exit etc., would be stationary and the short debt may easily be priced using Fourier or other methods. Leland and Toft (1996) has considered other assumptions that yield stationary over-all capital structure and trigger prices and hence facilitate pricing of finite maturity bonds in models similar to ours.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1: First, consider the equity value. The general solution to equations (5) and (6) are:

\[
V(p) = A_0 + A_1 p + A_2 p^{\lambda_1} + A_3 p^{\lambda_2},
\]

\[
L(p) = C_0 + C_1 p + C_2 p^{\lambda_1} + C_3 p^{\lambda_2}.
\]

Take derivatives and substitute in (5) and (6). Equating coefficients on like terms yields:

\[
A_0 = -(1 - \tau)(w + b)/r, \quad A_1 = (1 - \tau)/(r - \mu), \quad C_0 = b/r, \quad \text{and} \quad C_1 = 0, \quad \text{while} \quad \lambda_1 \quad \text{and} \quad \lambda_2 \quad \text{are the negative and positive roots to} \quad \lambda(\lambda - 1)\sigma^2/2 + \lambda\mu = r. \quad \text{Since} \quad \lambda_2 > 0, \quad A_3 \quad \text{and} \quad C_3 \quad \text{must be zero if} \quad V(p) \quad \text{and} \quad L(p) \quad \text{are to approach the unlimited liability values as} \quad p \to \infty. \quad A_2 \quad \text{and} \quad C_2 \quad \text{are then easily obtained using} \quad V(p_b) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad L(p_b) = X(p_b). \quad \square
\]

Proof of Proposition 2: Set \( \partial W(p_e, b)/\partial b = 0 \) and then substitute for \( p_b \) using the expression in equation (11) and rearrange. \( \square \)

Proof of Proposition 3: We obtain \( \hat{b}_b \) by solving \( \partial W^*(\hat{b}_b)/\partial p = 0 \). Taking derivatives and rearranging yields the desired expression. \( \square \)

Proof of Proposition 4: Buying back one dollar of debt reduces the coupon flow, \( b \), by:

\[
\frac{b}{L(p_t)} = \frac{b}{\left( \frac{b}{r} [1 - (p_t/p_b)^{\lambda_1}] + (p_t/p_b)^{\lambda_1} X(p_b) \right)}.
\]

Now since:

\[
\frac{\partial V(p_t)}{\partial b} = \frac{(1 - \tau)}{r} \left( 1 - \left( \frac{p_t}{p_b} \right)^{\lambda_1} \right) - \left[ \frac{(1 - \tau)p_b}{(r - \mu)(w + b)} - \frac{(1 - \tau)\lambda_1}{w + b} \left( \frac{p_b}{r - \mu} - \frac{w + b}{r} \right) \right] \left( \frac{p_t}{p_b} \right)^{\lambda_1},
\]

\[
= \frac{(1 - \tau)}{r} \left( 1 - \left( \frac{p_t}{p_b} \right)^{\lambda_1} \right).
\]

One may easily show that change in equity value \( \partial V(p_t)/\partial b b/L(p_t) < (1 - \tau) \). Since this is less than one dollar, equity-holders will never wish to carry out such a transaction.
The impact on the value of existing bonds if the firm issues more debt is:

\[
\frac{b}{r} \frac{\partial}{\partial b} \left( 1 - \left( \frac{p_t}{p_b} \right)^{\lambda_1} \right) = \frac{\lambda_1}{w + b} \left( \frac{p_t}{p_b} \right)^{\lambda_1} \left\{ \frac{b}{r} + \frac{1}{\lambda_1} [X'(p_b) p_b - \lambda_1 X(p_b)] \right\} .
\]  

(39)

The right hand side is negative if \( X(p_b) \) and \( X'(p_b) \) are small, and, in this case, bond-holders will never favour increases in leverage.

**Proof of Proposition 5:** The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 1. Take derivatives of the general solutions given in (34) and (35), substitute in (5) and (6) and equate coefficients on like terms. The boundary conditions for the equity value form two linear systems in the coefficients, \( A_2 \) and \( A_3 \), and \( C_2 \) and \( C_3 \), respectively. Solving these two systems by inverting a pair of simple, two-by-two matrices yields the required results. □

**Proof of Proposition 6:** Solving for debt and equity values in an industry equilibrium for a given \( \frac{b}{r} \) when \( b \) is large enough to imply that debt is risky debt, one obtains the expressions in Proposition 5. If debt is risky, debt values drop discretely if the firm in question goes bankrupt. If all firms adopt a particular leverage, \( b \), for an individual firm total firm value at entry is increased if it adopts a leverage level slightly below \( b \) as in this case it will never experience bankruptcy. Firms will therefore have an incentive to undercut each other’s leverage level until there is no jump in bond values at bankruptcy. This occurs when \( \frac{b}{r} = X(p_b) \), i.e., the debt principal equals the residual value at closure. Since, in industry equilibrium, only a fraction of firms actually close at \( p_b \), (and bond-holders of firms that do close are indifferent between closure and continuation) the latter price acts as a reflecting barrier. Hence, the boundary condition \( L'(p_b) = 0 \) must hold. Solving for the debt and equity values with the other boundary conditions, \( V(p_e) + \frac{b}{r} = K \), \( L(p_b) = \frac{b}{r} \), \( V'(p_e) = 0 \), \( V'(p_b) = 0 \), yields the results in the proposition. □

**Proof of Proposition 7:** As the difference between two asset prices, \( H \) may be thought of as the value of a security. Since holders of this security only receive capital gains income, \( H \) must satisfy the equation:

\[
r H(p_t, b) = \mu_t \frac{\partial H(p_t, b)}{\partial p} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \hat{p}_t \frac{\partial^2 H(p_t, b)}{\partial p^2} .
\]

(40)
Taking derivatives with respect to $b$, we obtain:

$$rG(p_t, b) = \mu p_t \frac{\partial G(p_t, b)}{\partial p} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} p_t^2 \frac{\partial^2 G(p_t, b)}{\partial p^2} .$$ (41)

The general solution to this equation is:

$$G(p, b) = C_1(b) \left( \frac{p}{p_t} \right)^{\lambda_1} + C_2(b) \left( \frac{p}{p_x} \right)^{\lambda_2} .$$ (42)

$p_x$ is the price at which it is optimal for the firm to increase its leverage incrementally and is a function of the current leverage level, $b$. At $p_x$, it must be the case that $\partial W(p_x(b), b)/\partial b = 0$. But, as one may easily show, this implies that:

$$G(p_x(b), b) = \frac{\partial W(p_x(b), b)}{\partial b} .$$ (43)

Also, when $p_t = p_b(b)$ and the current level of leverage is $b$, the firm will be liquidated, so options to relever must cease to have value. Therefore:

$$H(p_b(b), b) = 0 \quad \forall \ b .$$ (44)

If we apply the boundary condition:

$$G(p_b(b), b) = 0 \quad \forall \ b ,$$ (45)

and let $G(p, b) = 0$ for all pairs $(p, b)$ where $p < p_b(b)$, then

$$\int_b^{\infty} G(p_b, \xi) d\xi = H(p_b(b), b) = 0 \quad \forall \ b ,$$ (46)

as required. Lastly, the optimal exercise price, $p_x(b)$, may be obtained from a smooth-pasting condition:

$$\frac{\partial G(p_x, b)}{\partial p} = \left. \frac{\partial}{\partial p} \left[ \frac{\partial W(p, b)}{\partial b} \right] \right|_{p=p_x} .$$ (47)

Solving this yields $p_x$ as a function of $b$.

To complete the derivation of $G$, take derivatives of the general solution of the differential equation, substitute in the boundary conditions and determine the free parameters in the usual way. □
Footnotes

1. Also see Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) for an extremely interesting analysis of exit consent renegotiations of public bond issues.

2. The framework of Section 1 resembles models employed in a number of recent papers on corporate bond pricing, namely Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Leland (1994a) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1993). An important feature of these models is that, unlike earlier work by, for example, Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976), they suppose that bankruptcy is triggered by cash flow rather than net worth considerations. Leland (1994a) argues persuasively that bond covenants concerning net worth are hard to enforce and that it is more reasonable to think of equity-holders as effectively choosing the bankruptcy point through their decision of when to cease meeting coupon payments.

3. We abstract here from the fact that the marginal tax rate for negative earnings may be zero. In practice there are many ways in which companies can use tax losses to offset other income including the sale of subsidiaries embodying tax losses and leasing transactions. It is, therefore, probably more realistic to assume that \( \tau \) remains unchanged when earnings turn negative than to assume that it drops to zero.


5. To anticipate our results somewhat, note that in our framework Merton’s approach would correspond to assuming that, upon bankruptcy, bond-holders receive the unlimited liability value of the firm’s income stream, i.e., \( X(p_t) = (1 - \tau)[p_t/(r - \mu) - (w/r)] \). On the other hand, the equivalent of Mello and Parsons in our framework would be \( X(p_t) = (1 - \tau)[p_t/(r - \mu) - (w/r)] - (1 - \tau)[p_t/(r - \mu) - (w/r)](p_l/p_t)^{\lambda_1} \) where \( p_l = -\lambda_1/(1 - \lambda_1)w(r - \mu)/r \) and \( \lambda \) is as defined in Proposition 1.

6. This does not represent much of a loss of generality since, an economy with risk averse agents may be transformed into one with risk neutrality by the change
of measure arguments suggested by Harrison and Kreps (1979). The significant restriction one has to make is to suppose that the financial structure of the firm does not affect the Radon Nikodym derivative for this change of measure, i.e., the state prices are invariant to the firm’s financing decisions. Adopting this assumption, one should interpret the term $\mu k_t$ in (2) as the risk-adjusted drift and not the actual instantaneous mean of the process.

7. We assume that $r > \mu$. One may show that otherwise, claims to the firm’s earning stream would be of infinite value which is obviously inconsistent with equilibrium.

8. Share offerings are equivalent, in this context, to capital injections since existing equity-holders could always buy the new issue.

9. In optimal stopping problems of this sort, a necessary condition for optimality is that the derivatives with respect to the state variable of the optimizing agent’s value function and of the payoff received after stopping are equal at the trigger level.

10. If the assumption that $X(p) \geq 0$ for all $p \geq 0$ is relaxed, then debt and equity values equal the solutions in Proposition 1 except that the closure price is the maximum of $p_b$ (as defined in the proposition) and of $\sup\{p : X(p) < 0\}$. Subsequent propositions may be similarly generalized.

11. BB itself crosses the horizontal axis at $-\lambda_1/(1 - \lambda_1)(r - \mu)/rw$ which is the closure price for the pure equity firm when $X(p) = 0$ for all $p$.

12. Leland (1994a) found a similar result in a related model.
References


Figure 1: A SIMPLE BENCHMARK MODEL
Figure 2: OPTIMAL INITIAL LEVERAGE CHOICE
Figure 3: THE INDUSTRY EXIT CONDITION FOR BOND VALUATION
Figure 4: EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTIONS WITH LIQUIDATION
Figure 5: OPTIMAL LEVERAGE CHOICE WITH LEVERAGE OPTIONS
LEGENDS FOR FIGURES

Figure 1

Debt and equity values ($L(p)$ and $V(p)$) appear as functions of the firm’s output price. The post-bankruptcy, residual value, $X(p)$ is assumed to be zero so $V$ and $L$ equal zero at the bankruptcy trigger price, $p_b$. Optimal choice of $p_b$ by equity-holders implies that $V'(p_b) = 0$.

Figure 2

The optimal coupon, $b^*$, is shown for different entry prices, $p_e$, as the zeros of the derivative of total firm value with respect to the coupon, $W_b$. Entry prices and optimal coupon levels are positively correlated.

Figure 3

Appropriate choice of units allow one to show the bond value, $L(p)$, and industry demand, $q(p)$ intersecting at the bankruptcy trigger price, $p_b$. The boundary condition for the bonds at $p_b$ balances capital gains and expected losses and corresponds to the equality, $\beta_1 = \beta_2$.

Figure 4

In the industry equilibrium, both the total firm value, $W$, and the equity value, $V$, smooth-paste at $p_e$ as entry by new firms prevents $p_t$ from rising any further. At $p_b$ the slope of $W$ is such that the capital gain from an output price rise equals the expected capital loss from a price fall. If the price elasticity, $\eta$, is low, few firms must exit to keep $p_t$ above $p_b$.

Figure 5
Optimal marginal increases in the coupon flow occur when the change in firm value, $\bar{W}_h$, equals zero. At this point, the value of the exercised leverage option, $G$, exactly offsets the increase in the ‘constant-coupon firm value’, $W_h$. For a given entry price, optimal leverage is lower when there are options to increase the coupon in future.