Contract design for traffic offloading and resource allocation in heterogeneous ultra-dense networks

Abstract

In heterogeneous ultra-dense networks (HetUDNs), the software-defined wireless network (SDWN) separates resource management from geo-distributed resources belonging to different service providers. A centralized SDWN controller can manage the entire network globally. In this work, we focus on mobile traffic offloading and resource allocation in SDWN-based HetUDNs, constituted of different macro base stations (MBSs) and small-cell base stations (SBSs). We explore a scenario where SBSs’ capacities are available, but their offloading performance is unknown to the SDWN controller: this is the information asymmetric case. To address this asymmetry, incentivized traffic offloading contracts are designed to encourage each SBS to select the contract that achieves its own maximum utility. The characteristics of large numbers of SBSs in HetUDNs are aggregated in an analytical model, allowing us to select the SBS types that provide the off-loading, based on different contracts which offer rationality and incentive compatibility to different SBS types. This leads to a closed-form expression for selecting the SBS types involved, and we prove the monotonicity and incentive compatibility of the resulting contracts. The effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed contract-based traffic offloading mechanism, and its overall system performance, are validated using simulations.