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Free to choose? Reform, choice, and consideration sets in the English National Health Service
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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AER-2012-1532.R3.pdf | Accepted version | 533.99 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Title: | Free to choose? Reform, choice, and consideration sets in the English National Health Service |
Authors: | Gaynor, M Propper, C Seiler, S |
Item Type: | Journal Article |
Abstract: | Choice in public services is controversial. We exploit a reform in the English National Health Service to assess the effect of removing constraints on patient choice. We estimate a demand model that explicitly captures the removal of the choice constraints imposed on patients. We find that, post-removal, patients became more responsive to clinical quality. This led to a modest reduction in mortality and a substantial increase in patient welfare. The elasticity of demand faced by hospitals increased substantially post-reform and we find evidence that hospitals responded to the enhanced incentives by improving quality. This suggests greater choice can raise quality. |
Issue Date: | 1-Nov-2016 |
Date of Acceptance: | 6-May-2016 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/32626 |
DOI: | https://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20121532 |
ISSN: | 0002-8282 |
Publisher: | American Economic Association |
Start Page: | 3521 |
End Page: | 3557 |
Journal / Book Title: | American Economic Review |
Volume: | 106 |
Issue: | 11 |
Copyright Statement: | © 2016 by the American Economic Association. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of American Economic Association publications for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not distributed for profit or direct commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation, including the name of the author. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than AEA must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. |
Sponsor/Funder: | Department of Health Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC) |
Funder's Grant Number: | PO Number: CMPO057 ES/J023108/1 |
Keywords: | Demand Estimation Non-price Competition Health Economics Patient Choice Health Care Reform 14 Economics 15 Commerce, Management, Tourism And Services Economics |
Publication Status: | Published |
Appears in Collections: | Imperial College Business School |