Guaranteed benefit collusion strategies for Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism
File(s)
Published version
Author(s)
Kurniawan, Joshua L
Angeli, David
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
Achieving socially optimal decisions requires access to agents’ true preferences, which is challenging as this information is privately held. The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism addresses this problem by incentivizing truthful reporting when agents act individually. However, the mechanism is vulnerable to collusion, where agents form coalitions to manipulate the system for their own benefit. Although this weakness has been recognized in previous research, formal methods for guaranteed beneficial manipulation have remained elusive. This paper introduces four collusion strategies that guarantee benefits to coalitions. By characterizing these manipulation approaches, we develop modified VCG mechanisms that are robust against harmful collusion. Our contributions provide both a framework for understanding potential collusion strategies and practical mechanisms that maintain efficiency while resisting manipulation, making VCG more applicable in real-world settings where coalitions may form.
Date Issued
2026-08-01
Date Acceptance
2026-03-30
Citation
Nonlinear Analysis: Hybrid Systems, 2026, 61
ISSN
1751-570X
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Journal / Book Title
Nonlinear Analysis: Hybrid Systems
Volume
61
Copyright Statement
© 2026 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
License URL
Publication Status
Published
Article Number
101716
Date Publish Online
2026-03-31