Competition policy in selection markets
File(s)
Published version
Author(s)
Mahoney, Neale
Veiga, Andre
Weyl, E Glen
Type
Working Paper
Abstract
Selection markets, like insurance and finance, where the value of customers depends on their identity, create fundamental challenges for competition policy. Competition is often harmful in these markets either by creating socially excessive supply or leading to degradation of product quality. Standard indicators used to gauge policies, such as upward pricing pressure, are also often mis-calibrated in these settings. We summarize for a policy audience and draw competition policy conclusions from two recent papers on the interaction between competition policy and selection, using calibrations to sub-prime auto lending and health insurance.
Date Issued
2014-08-21
Citation
2014
ISSN
1554-6853
Publisher
SSRN
Copyright Statement
© 2014 The Author(s)
Identifier
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2484738
Publication Status
Published