Nash-MFG equilibrium in a SIR model with time dependent newborn vaccination
File(s) vaccination_turinici_v2 (1).pdf (708.5 KB)
Accepted version
Author(s)
Hubert, Emma
Turinici, Gabriel
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
We study the newborn, non compulsory, vaccination in a SIR model with vital dynamics. The evolution of each individual is modeled as a Markov chain. His/Her vaccination decision optimizes a criterion depending on the time-dependent aggregate (societal) vaccination rate and the future epidemic dynamics. We prove the existence of a Nash-Mean Field Games equilibrium among all individuals in the population. Then we propose a novel numerical approach to find the equilibrium and test it numerically.
Date Issued
2018-06
Date Acceptance
2017-07-14
Citation
Ricerche di Matematica, 2018, 67 (1), pp.227-246
ISSN
0035-5038
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Start Page
227
End Page
246
Journal / Book Title
Ricerche di Matematica
Volume
67
Issue
1
Copyright Statement
© 2018 Springer-Verlag. The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/s11587-018-0365-0
Identifier
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11587-018-0365-0
Subjects
0101 Pure Mathematics
Publication Status
Published
Date Publish Online
2018-02-02
