Feedback Nash equilibria for scalar N-player linear quadratic dynamic games
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Published version
Author(s)
Nortmann, Benita
Sassano, Mario
Mylvaganam, Thulasi
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
Considering infinite-horizon, discrete-time, linear quadratic, N-player dynamic games with scalar dynamics, a graphical representation of feedback Nash equilibrium solutions is provided. This representation is utilised to derive conditions for the number and properties of different feedback Nash equilibria a game may admit. The results are illustrated via a numerical example.
Date Issued
2025-04-01
Date Acceptance
2024-10-07
Citation
Automatica, 2025, 174
ISSN
0005-1098
Publisher
Elsevier
Journal / Book Title
Automatica
Volume
174
Copyright Statement
© 2025 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
License URL
Identifier
10.1016/j.automatica.2025.112133
Publication Status
Published
Article Number
112133
Date Publish Online
2025-01-24