Resilience to Contagion in Financial Networks
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Accepted version
Published version
Author(s)
Amini, H
Cont, R
Minca, A
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
Propagation of balance-sheet or cash-flow insolvency across financial
institutions may be modeled as a cascade process on a network representing
their mutual exposures. We derive rigorous asymptotic results for the magnitude
of contagion in a large financial network and give an analytical expression for
the asymptotic fraction of defaults, in terms of network characteristics. Our
results extend previous studies on contagion in random graphs to inhomogeneous
directed graphs with a given degree sequence and arbitrary distribution of
weights. We introduce a criterion for the resilience of a large financial
network to the insolvency of a small group of financial institutions and
quantify how contagion amplifies small shocks to the network. Our results
emphasize the role played by "contagious links" and show that institutions
which contribute most to network instability in case of default have both large
connectivity and a large fraction of contagious links. The asymptotic results
show good agreement with simulations for networks with realistic sizes.
institutions may be modeled as a cascade process on a network representing
their mutual exposures. We derive rigorous asymptotic results for the magnitude
of contagion in a large financial network and give an analytical expression for
the asymptotic fraction of defaults, in terms of network characteristics. Our
results extend previous studies on contagion in random graphs to inhomogeneous
directed graphs with a given degree sequence and arbitrary distribution of
weights. We introduce a criterion for the resilience of a large financial
network to the insolvency of a small group of financial institutions and
quantify how contagion amplifies small shocks to the network. Our results
emphasize the role played by "contagious links" and show that institutions
which contribute most to network instability in case of default have both large
connectivity and a large fraction of contagious links. The asymptotic results
show good agreement with simulations for networks with realistic sizes.
Date Issued
2016-04-01
Date Acceptance
2013-03-01
Citation
Mathematical Finance, 2016, 26 (2), pp.329-365
ISSN
0960-1627
Publisher
Wiley Periodical Inc.
Start Page
329
End Page
365
Journal / Book Title
Mathematical Finance
Volume
26
Issue
2
Copyright Statement
©2016 The Authors. Mathematical Finance Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivsLicense, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use isnon-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made
Identifier
http://arxiv.org/abs/1112.5687v1
Subjects
Social Sciences
Science & Technology
Physical Sciences
Business, Finance
Economics
Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications
Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods
Business & Economics
Mathematics
Mathematical Methods In Social Sciences
systemic risk
default contagion
random graphs
interbank network
financial stability
macroprudential regulation
BOOTSTRAP PERCOLATION
SYSTEMIC RISK
BANKING SYSTEMS
DEGREE SEQUENCE
RANDOM GRAPHS
TOPOLOGY
DIFFUSION
COMPONENT
MARKET
MODEL
q-fin.RM
math.PR
0102 Applied Mathematics
1502 Banking, Finance And Investment
Finance
Notes
40 pages, 5 figures
Publication Status
Published