Transmission system operators apply selective load-shedding plans to prevent system wide interruptions and black-outs due to generation and transmission adequacy issues. If the load-shedding plan is activated, the electricity supply is intentionally switched off in indicated areas for a fixed period of time. The burden of load-shedding plans thus falls on a subset of consumers, while the benefits accrue to all consumers. This results in public opposition as illustrated with the publication of the load-shedding plan in Belgium in the winter of 2014 - 2015. To improve the social acceptability of load-shedding plans, we analyzed the unfairness of load-shedding plans based on Gini-based inequality indices and studied a top-down socialized compensation scheme and bottom-up priority service contracts to indirectly reduce the unfairness. The analysis is executed for a simplified version of the Belgian load-shedding plan for the winter of 2014 - 2015.