Privacy, adoption, and truthful reporting: A simple theory of contact tracing applications
File(s)
Accepted version
Author(s)
de Montjoye, Yves-Alexandre
Ramadorai, Tarun
Valletti, Tommaso
Walther, Ansgar
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
This paper analyzes the trade-offs associated with the deployment of contact tracing applications to support policy responses in a pandemic. In many jurisdictions, the government cannot force individuals to adopt such applications. We therefore analyze a simple model that highlights the importance of individuals’ incentives to voluntarily adopt a reporting application and reveal their infection status to the government who can then undertake contact monitoring. We discuss the consequences of various policy options, such as security, communication and anonymization policies, in terms of the size and representativeness of the sample of infection data that contract tracing applications generate.
Date Issued
2021-01
Date Acceptance
2020-11-23
Citation
Economics Letters, 2021, 198, pp.1-4
ISSN
0165-1765
Publisher
Elsevier
Start Page
1
End Page
4
Journal / Book Title
Economics Letters
Volume
198
Copyright Statement
© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This manuscript is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Sponsor
Engineering & Physical Science Research Council (E
Identifier
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176520304365?via%3Dihub
Grant Number
2033180
Subjects
Social Sciences
Economics
Business & Economics
Privacy
Contact tracing apps
Coronavirus
Incentives
14 Economics
Economics
Publication Status
Published
Article Number
109676
Date Publish Online
2020-11-25