VCG-based incentive-compatible LQ control for truthful and efficient vehicle platooning

Manfredi, Sabato; Molino, Leonardo; Angeli, David; Innocenti, Giacomo; Martini, Davide

doi:10.1016/j.ifacol.2025.12.093

File(s)

1-s2.0-S2405896325027752-main.pdf (646.06 KB)

Published version

Author(s)

Manfredi, Sabato

Molino, Leonardo

Angeli, David

Innocenti, Giacomo

Martini, Davide

Type

Conference Paper

Abstract

Vehicle platooning enhances fuel efficiency, traffic flow, and safety by maintaining a common velocity and minimizing acceleration fluctuations. However, strategic misreporting in cooperative control can lead to inefficiencies. To address this, the present work proposes a pricing-based Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism that ensures truthful cost reporting, aligning individual incentives with collective goals. Applied to platooning, the approach optimizes velocity and spacing while minimizing energy use and discomfort. A supervisor solves a linear quadratic (LQ) control problem based on declared costs, with a pricing mechanism penalizing misreporting. This method is particularly relevant for freight convoys, ride-sharing fleets, and autonomous vehicle formations, where operators or autonomous agents may have competing priorities. By enforcing truthful participation, the framework enhances sustainability, efficiency, and stability in cooperative driving, benefiting commercial and public transportation networks.

Date Issued

2025-12-11

Date Acceptance

2025-09-01

Citation

IFAC-PapersOnLine, 2025, 59 (27), pp.144-149

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/128611

URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2025.12.093

DOI

10.1016/j.ifacol.2025.12.093

ISSN

2405-8963

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Start Page

144

End Page

149

Journal / Book Title

IFAC-PapersOnLine

Volume

59

Issue

27

Copyright Statement

License URL

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Identifier

10.1016/j.ifacol.2025.12.093

Source

7th IFAC Symposium on Telematics Applications TA 2025

Subjects

Vehicle platooning