We analyze the optimal behavior of a platform providing essential inputs to do-
wnstream firms selling a primary and a second complementary good. Final demand
is affected by consumer foresight, i.e., consumers may not anticipate the ex post sur-
plus from the secondary good when purchasing the primary good. We first set up a
reduced-form platform model and evaluate the effects of consumer foresight on the
platform’s optimal decisions. Then, we specialize the analysis in the context of ai-
rports, which derive revenues from both aeronautical and, increasingly, commercial
activities. An airport sets landing fees and, in addition, it chooses the retail market
structure by selecting the number of retail concessions to be awarded. We find that,
with perfectly myopic consumers, the airport chooses to attract more passengers via
low landing fees, and also sets the minimum possible number of retailers in order to
increase the concessions’ revenues. However, even a very small amount of anticipa-
tion of the consumer surplus from retail activities changes significantly the airport’s
choices: the optimal policy is dependent on the degree of differentiation in the retail
market. When consumers instead have perfect foresight, the airport establishes a very
competitive retail market. This attracts passengers and it is exploited by the airport
by charging higher landing fees, which then constitute the largest share of its profits.
Overall, the airport’s profits are maximal when consumers have perfect foresight.