Feedback Nash equilibria for scalar two-player linear-quadratic discrete-time dynamic games
File(s)FNE_IFAC2023.pdf (608.62 KB)
Accepted version
Author(s)
Nortmann, Benita
Monti, Andrea
Sassano, Mario
Mylvaganam, Thulasi
Type
Conference Paper
Abstract
In this paper, we consider discrete-time, scalar,
two-player, linear-quadratic dynamic games and study the
coupled algebraic equations characterising feedback Nash
equilibria. Using geometric arguments, we first analyse the
possible number of distinct feedback Nash equilibrium
solutions a game may admit and discuss properties of
different solutions, before deriving conditions for the
existence of no, one, two or three distinct feedback Nash
equilibria. Finally, illustrative numerical simulations
corroborate the theoretical findings.
two-player, linear-quadratic dynamic games and study the
coupled algebraic equations characterising feedback Nash
equilibria. Using geometric arguments, we first analyse the
possible number of distinct feedback Nash equilibrium
solutions a game may admit and discuss properties of
different solutions, before deriving conditions for the
existence of no, one, two or three distinct feedback Nash
equilibria. Finally, illustrative numerical simulations
corroborate the theoretical findings.
Date Issued
2023-11-22
Date Acceptance
2023-03-03
Citation
IFAC-PapersOnLine, 2023, 56 (2), pp.1772-1777
ISSN
2405-8963
Publisher
Elsevier
Start Page
1772
End Page
1777
Journal / Book Title
IFAC-PapersOnLine
Volume
56
Issue
2
Copyright Statement
© 2023 The Authors. With the permission of IFAC for the purpose of open access, the author has applied a Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence to any Author Accepted Manuscript version arising.
Source
22nd IFAC World Congress
Publication Status
Published
Start Date
2023-07-09
Finish Date
2023-07-14
Coverage Spatial
Yokohama, Japan