We conduct a field experiment in which we offer credit and saving contracts to the same
pool of Pakistani microfinance clients. Additional treatments test ex ante demand for soft
commitment (in the form of reminders, either to respondents or to their families), hard commitment (in the form of a penalty for missing an instalment), and flexibility (an option to
postpone an instalment) to save or pay loan instalments on time. We find substantial demand for fixed-repayment contracts in both the credit and savings domains, in ways that
imply that respondents value the commitment required. While we find little or no average demand for additional contractual features, we nonetheless observe that different combinations
of contractual add-ons are preferred depending on the respondent’s level of financial discipline. Respondents with high financial discipline prefer flexibility in credit contracts when
combined with reminders to self while those with low discipline value penalties in savings
contracts only when paired with reminders. Our results imply that, for the average microfinance client, demand for commitment is met through the regular payment schedule built
into standard microcredit or commitment savings contracts. However, combining penalties or
flexibility with reminders may appeal to certain subsets of clients.