From luck to choice: the Wimbledon ballot and matching markets
File(s)
Author(s)
Haugh, Martin
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
Every year, hundreds of thousands of fans strike lucky in Wimbledon’s public ballot—only to discover that their “prize” is tickets for a court or day they do not especially want. What if there were a simple way to let winners swap tickets so that everyone ended up at least as happy as before, and many much happier? That is exactly the promise of the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) algorithm, a cornerstone of matching markets theory that shows how mathematics can turn lotteries from luck alone into genuine choice.
Date Issued
2026-01-01
Date Acceptance
2026-02-02
Citation
CHANCE, 2026, 39 (1), pp.23-34
ISSN
1867-2280
Publisher
Taylor and Francis Group
Start Page
23
End Page
34
Journal / Book Title
CHANCE
Volume
39
Issue
1
Copyright Statement
© 2026 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
Identifier
10.1080/09332480.2026.2648468
Publication Status
Published
Date Publish Online
2026-05-28