Artificial agents are typically oriented to the realization of an externally
assigned task and try to optimize over secondary aspects of plan execution such
time lapse or power consumption, technically displaying a quasi-dichotomous
preference relation. Boolean games have been developed as a paradigm for
modelling societies of agents with this type of preference. In boolean games
agents exercise control over propositional variables and strive to achieve a
goal formula whose realization might require the opponents' cooperation.
Recently, a theory of incentive engineering for such games has been devised,
where an external authority steers the outcome of the game towards certain
desirable properties consistent with players' goals, by imposing a taxation
mechanism on the players that makes the outcomes that do not comply with those
properties less appealing to them. The present contribution stems from a
complementary perspective and studies, instead, how games with
quasi-dichotomous preferences can be transformed from inside, rather than from
outside, by endowing players with the possibility of sacrificing a part of
their payoff received at a certain outcome in order to convince other players
to play a certain strategy. Concretely we explore the properties of endogenous
games with goals, obtained coupling strategic games with goals, a
generalization of boolean games, with the machinery of endogenous games coming
from game theory. We analyze equilibria in those structures, showing the
preconditions needed for desirable outcomes to be achieved without external
intervention. What our results show is that endogenous games with goals display
specific irreducible features - with respect to what already known for
endogenous games - which makes them worth studying in their own sake.