On the robustness of monetary stakes and lying
File(s)
Published version
Author(s)
Drouvelis, Michalis
Qiu, Zeyu
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
Using a broader online sample from the United Kingdom, we experimentally test for the impact of monetary incentives on lying behavior. Our framework consists of the die-roll paradigm. In line with previous studies using student samples, we find that lying behavior is robust to changes in monetary stakes. Our results suggest that, in our context, the reliability of student-based findings can extend to more diverse populations.
Date Issued
2026-07-01
Date Acceptance
2026-05-15
Citation
European Economic Review, 2026, 187
ISSN
0014-2921
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Journal / Book Title
European Economic Review
Volume
187
Copyright Statement
© 2026 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
License URL
Publication Status
Published
Article Number
105379
Date Publish Online
2026-05-17