Competitive analysis of vehicle-sharing systems with Cournot queueing games
File(s)
Accepted version
Author(s)
Sheldon, Matthew
Paccagnan, Dario
Casale, Giuliano
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
Product-form closed queueing networks are a useful formalism for analyzing the availability of vehicles within a vehicle sharing system with stochastic user behavior. However, existing models assume that the provider has full control over the system. In reality, competition between providers within a single geographic area is quite common. In this paper, we introduce a non-cooperative game that extends a closed queueing model into a competitive environment, in which players decide the number of jobs that they wish to submit. This can be used to model vehicle sharing systems with multiple providers, in which they receive fares from trips but are responsible for the costs of their own fleet. The core technical results of this paper include conditions that guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium, and an efficient equilibrium-finding algorithm. We then present a case study, using our model, of a vehicle sharing system in Oslo with multiple providers. In this case study, we find that adding an additional competitor can increase the number of trips by up to 18.9%, and a highly competitive market can increase this by up to 30%.
Date Issued
2025-05-15
Date Acceptance
2025-04-02
Citation
IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 2025
ISSN
1524-9050
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Journal / Book Title
IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Copyright Statement
© 2025 IEEE. This is the author’s accepted manuscript made available under a CC-BY licence in accordance with Imperial’s Research Publications Open Access policy (www.imperial.ac.uk/oa-policy)
License URL
Publication Status
Published online
Date Publish Online
2025-05-15