When reinforcing processes generate an outcome-quality dip
File(s)DenrellLiu_2021OrgSci.pdf (1.69 MB)
Published version
Author(s)
Denrell, Jerker
Liu, Chengwei
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
When does market success indicate superior merit? We show that when consumer choices between products with equal prices depend on quality but also on past popularity, more popular products are not necessarily of higher quality. Rather, a medium level of popularity may be associated with lower quality than lower levels of popularity. Using a formal model, we show that this kind of nonmonotonic association occurs when reinforcing processes are strong. More generally, a dip can occur when outcomes depend on both quality and resources and the latter are allocated bimodally, with some being given a lot of resources and most receiving little. Empirically, we illustrate that such a dip occurs in the association between movie theater sales and ratings. The presence of a dip in the outcome-quality association complicates learning from market outcomes and evaluation of individuals and new ventures, challenges the legitimacy of stratification systems, and creates opportunities for sophisticated evaluators who understand the dip.
Date Issued
2021-07
Date Acceptance
2020-06-18
Citation
Organization Science, 2021, 32 (4), pp.1079-1099
ISSN
1047-7039
Publisher
Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences
Start Page
1079
End Page
1099
Journal / Book Title
Organization Science
Volume
32
Issue
4
Copyright Statement
Copyright © 2021, The Author(s) This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercialNoDerivatives 4.0 International License. You are free to download this work and share with others, but
cannot change in any way or use commercially without permission, and you must attribute this work as
“Organization Science. Copyright © 2021 The Author(s). https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2020.1414, used
under a Creative Commons Attribution License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.”
cannot change in any way or use commercially without permission, and you must attribute this work as
“Organization Science. Copyright © 2021 The Author(s). https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2020.1414, used
under a Creative Commons Attribution License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.”
Identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2020.1414
Publication Status
Published
Date Publish Online
2021-02-01