A (bounded) preference for rule breakers
File(s)
Accepted version
Author(s)
Wakeman, S Wiley
Yang, Philip
Moore, Celia
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
This paper explores whether, under what conditions, and why supervisors treat rule breakers favorably. Using field data from six seasons in the National Hockey League (NHL), we find that coaches select rule breakers for play more often than rule-abiding players. However, this preference is bounded in several ways. It reverses when a player’s rule breaking becomes extreme, holds for minor (but not major) rule breaking, is absent for both players and teams in the lowest quintile of rule breaking, is observed in regular season (but not playoff) games, and is amplified when teams are on losing streaks but disappears after repeated wins. An experiment replicates this bounded preference for rule breakers and identifies that those in a position to reward rule breakers do so in part because they perceive them as more committed to team success. However, at extreme levels of rule breaking, concerns about the liability rule breakers represent eclipse these positive perceptions, reversing the preferential treatment they enjoyed when their rule breaking was more moderate. Together these findings illuminate one unexpected reason why rule breaking is so rampant and unethical behavior remains so pernicious in organizations.
Date Issued
2025-06-01
Date Acceptance
2024-09-04
Citation
Academy of Management Discoveries, 2025, 11 (2), pp.1-55
ISSN
2168-1007
Publisher
Academy of Management
Start Page
1
End Page
55
Journal / Book Title
Academy of Management Discoveries
Volume
11
Issue
2
Copyright Statement
Copyright © 2024 Academy of Management. This is the author’s accepted manuscript made available under a CC-BY licence in accordance with Imperial’s Research Publications Open Access policy (www.imperial.ac.uk/oa-policy)
License URL
Identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amd.2022.0280
Publication Status
Published
Date Publish Online
2025-06-03