Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources
File(s)
Published version
Author(s)
Deligkas, Argyrios
Filos-Ratsikas, Aris
Voudouris, Alexandros A
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
We initiate the study of the heterogeneous facility location problem with limited resources. We mainly focus on the fundamental case where a set of agents are positioned in the line segment [0,1] and have approval preferences over two available facilities. A mechanism takes as input the positions and the preferences of the agents, and chooses to locate a single facility based on this information. We study mechanisms that aim to maximize the social welfare (the total utility the agents derive from facilities they approve), under the constraint of incentivizing the agents to truthfully report their positions and preferences. We consider three different settings depending on the level of agent-related information that is public or private. For each setting, we design deterministic and randomized strategyproof mechanisms that achieve a good approximation of the optimal social welfare, and complement these with nearly-tight impossibility results.
Date Issued
2023-05-01
Date Acceptance
2023-03-08
Citation
Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, 139, pp.200-215
ISSN
0899-8256
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Start Page
200
End Page
215
Journal / Book Title
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
139
Copyright Statement
© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses /by-nc-nd /4.0/).
Publication Status
Published
Date Publish Online
2023-03-14