CamForensics: understanding visual privacy leaks in the wild
File(s)camforensics.pdf (7.75 MB)
Accepted version
Author(s)
Srivastava, Animesh
Jain, Puneet
Demetriou, Soteris
Cox, Landon
Kim, Kyu-Han
Type
Conference Paper
Abstract
Many mobile apps, including augmented-reality games, bar-code readers, and document scanners, digitize information from the physical world by applying computer-vision algorithms to live camera data. However, because camera permissions for existing mobile operating systems are coarse (i.e., an app may access a camera's entire view or none of it), users are vulnerable to visual privacy leaks. An app violates visual privacy if it extracts information from camera data in unexpected ways. For example, a user might be surprised to find that an augmented-reality makeup app extracts text from the camera's view in addition to detecting faces. This paper presents results from the first large-scale study of visual privacy leaks in the wild. We build CamForensics to identify the kind of information that apps extract from camera data. Our extensive user surveys determine what kind of information users expected an app to extract. Finally, our results show that camera apps frequently defy users' expectations based on their descriptions.
Date Issued
2017-11-06
Date Acceptance
2017-07-17
Citation
ACM Conference on Embedded Network Sensor Systems, 2017
ISBN
9781450354592
Publisher
ACM
Journal / Book Title
ACM Conference on Embedded Network Sensor Systems
Copyright Statement
© 2017 ACM. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in SenSys 2017 - Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems (06 Nov 2017), https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3131672.3131683
Source
ACM Conference on Embedded Network Sensor Systems
Publication Status
Published
Start Date
2017-11-05
Finish Date
2017-11-08
Coverage Spatial
Delft, Netherlands