A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Market Selection Strategies for Competing Double Auction Marketplaces
OA Location
Author(s)
Shi, Bing
Gerding, Enrico H
Vytelingum, Perukrishnen
Jennings, Nicholas R
Type
Conference Paper
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a novel general framework for analysing competing double auction markets that vie for traders, who then need to choose which market to go to. Based on this framework, we analyse the competition between two markets in detail. Specifically, we game-theoretically analyse the equilibrium behaviour of traders’ market selection strategies and adopt evolutionary game theory to investigate how traders dynamically change their strategies, and thus, which equilibrium, if any, can be reached. In so doing, we show that it is unlikely for these competing markets to coexist. Eventually, all traders will always converge to locating themselves at one of the markets. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that sometimes all traders converge to the market that charges higher fees. Thus we further analyse this phenomenon, and specifically determine the factors that affect such migration.
Date Issued
2010
Citation
2010, pp.857-864
Start Page
857
End Page
864
Copyright Statement
© 2010, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
Identifier
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/268467/
Source
9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS2010)
Source Place
Toronto, Canada
Notes
Event Dates: 14th-18th May
Publication Status
Unpublished
Start Date
2010-05-10
Finish Date
2010-05-14