Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets
OA Location
Author(s)
Gerding, Enrico H
Rogers, Alex
Dash, Rajdeep
Jennings, NR
Type
Conference Paper
Abstract
We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such as the reserve price) in such a way as to attract buyers. We show that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the case of two sellers with asymmetric production costs. In addition, we show that, rather than setting a reserve price, a seller can further improve its utility by shill bidding (i.e., pretending to be a buyer in order to bid in its own auction). But, using an evolutionary simulation, we show that this shill bidding introduces inefficiences within the market. However, we then go on to show that these inefficiences can be reduced when the mediating auction institution uses appropriate auction fees that deter sellers from submitting shill bids.
Editor(s)
Gimpel, Henner
Jennings, NR
Kersten, Gregory E
Ockenfels, Axel
Weinhardt, Christof
Date Issued
2008-01
Citation
2008, pp.164-170
Publisher
Springer-Verlag
Start Page
164
End Page
170
Identifier
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/265134/
Subjects
Social Sciences
Science & Technology
Technology
Business
Computer Science, Information Systems
Computer Science, Theory & Methods
Economics
Information Science & Library Science
Business & Economics
Computer Science