Free to choose? Reform, choice, and consideration sets in the English
National Health Service
National Health Service
File(s)AER-2012-1532.R3.pdf (533.99 KB)
Accepted version
Author(s)
Gaynor, M
Propper, C
Seiler, S
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
Choice in public services is controversial. We exploit a reform in
the English National Health Service to assess the effect of removing
constraints on patient choice. We estimate a demand model that
explicitly captures the removal of the choice constraints imposed on
patients. We find that, post-removal, patients became more responsive
to clinical quality. This led to a modest reduction in mortality
and a substantial increase in patient welfare. The elasticity of demand
faced by hospitals increased substantially post-reform and we
find evidence that hospitals responded to the enhanced incentives by
improving quality. This suggests greater choice can raise quality.
the English National Health Service to assess the effect of removing
constraints on patient choice. We estimate a demand model that
explicitly captures the removal of the choice constraints imposed on
patients. We find that, post-removal, patients became more responsive
to clinical quality. This led to a modest reduction in mortality
and a substantial increase in patient welfare. The elasticity of demand
faced by hospitals increased substantially post-reform and we
find evidence that hospitals responded to the enhanced incentives by
improving quality. This suggests greater choice can raise quality.
Date Issued
2016-11-01
Date Acceptance
2016-05-06
Citation
American Economic Review, 2016, 106 (11), pp.3521-3557
ISSN
0002-8282
Publisher
American Economic Association
Start Page
3521
End Page
3557
Journal / Book Title
American Economic Review
Volume
106
Issue
11
Copyright Statement
© 2016 by the American Economic Association.
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Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of American Economic Association publications for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not distributed for profit or direct commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation, including the name of the author. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than AEA must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted.
Sponsor
Department of Health
Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC)
Grant Number
PO Number: CMPO057
ES/J023108/1
Subjects
Demand Estimation
Non-price Competition
Health Economics
Patient Choice
Health Care Reform
Publication Status
Published