The international effort over the past two decades in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions has encouraged significant penetration of renewable energy resources in power systems. This together with the integration of heat and transport sectors into power systems will require unprecedented amount of transmission investment. How to allocate those transmission investment costs remains challenging because network users’ responses to network tariff will affect future investment and contracts. Meanwhile, the rapid transition of power system from reliance on fossil fuel towards carbon neutrality has significantly expanded the scale of network users. Therefore, this work has proposed a novel equilibrium model to investigate the long-term electricity market equilibrium between transmission expansion planning and the long-term responses of network users (producers, consumers and prosumers) resulted from various network tariffs. Because one of network tariffs requires proper power flow tracing, this work has done essential improvement to a classic power flow tracing method. Case studies have been conducted on GB networks to provide insights when choosing network tariff. The results show storage could shift the market equilibrium under network tariff when demand side pays all network costs even there is no demand response. The flexibility of storage and price-responsive demands could increase extra cost of market equilibrium under network tariffs compared to the result without tariff. Different tariffs could weigh the role of storage differently or even oppositely and can be reciprocal to the role of storage’s location. The geographically differentiated network tariff reduces network investment compared to the non-geographically counterpart in a system with distinct locational price differentials. The network tariff designed for eliciting more users’ responses may not produce better cost efficiency. The result suggests regulator to evaluate different G|D split of network costs and make a trade-off over the selection of network tariffs when fairness mismatches cost efficiency of market equilibrium.