Confidence analysis for nuclear arms control: SMT abstractions of Game Theoretic Models
File(s)
Accepted version
Author(s)
Huth, MRA
Beaumont, P
Evans, N
Plant, T
Type
Conference Paper
Abstract
We consider the use of game theory in an arms control inspection planning scenario. Speci cally
we develop a case study that games the number of inspections available against an ideal treaty length.
Normal game theoretic techniques struggle to justify pay-o values to use for certain events, limiting the
usefulness of such techniques. In order to improve the value of using game theory for decision making, we
introduce a methodology for under-specifying the game theoretic models through a mixture of regression
techniques and Satis ability Modulo Theory (SMT) constraint solving programs. Our approach allows a
user to under-specify pay-o s in games, and to check, in a manner akin to robust optimisation, for how
such under-speci cations a ect the `solution' of a game. We analyse the Nash equilibria and the mixed
strategy sets that would lead to such equilibria - and explore how to maximise expected pay-o s and use
of individual pure strategies for all possible values of an under-speci cation. Through this approach, we
gain an insight into how - irrespective of uncertainty - we can still compute with game theoretic models,
and present the types and kinds of analysis we can run that bene t from this uncertainty.
we develop a case study that games the number of inspections available against an ideal treaty length.
Normal game theoretic techniques struggle to justify pay-o values to use for certain events, limiting the
usefulness of such techniques. In order to improve the value of using game theory for decision making, we
introduce a methodology for under-specifying the game theoretic models through a mixture of regression
techniques and Satis ability Modulo Theory (SMT) constraint solving programs. Our approach allows a
user to under-specify pay-o s in games, and to check, in a manner akin to robust optimisation, for how
such under-speci cations a ect the `solution' of a game. We analyse the Nash equilibria and the mixed
strategy sets that would lead to such equilibria - and explore how to maximise expected pay-o s and use
of individual pure strategies for all possible values of an under-speci cation. Through this approach, we
gain an insight into how - irrespective of uncertainty - we can still compute with game theoretic models,
and present the types and kinds of analysis we can run that bene t from this uncertainty.
Date Issued
2016-07-24
Date Acceptance
2016-07-09
Citation
Proceedings of the 57th INMM Annual Meeting, 2016
Publisher
Institute of Nuclear Materials Management
Journal / Book Title
Proceedings of the 57th INMM Annual Meeting
Copyright Statement
Originally published in the Proceedings of the INMM Annual Meeting. © 2016 INMM. All Rights Reserved.
Sponsor
AWE Plc
Engineering & Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC)
Grant Number
PO 30285060/2
EP/N020030/1
Source
INMM Annual Conference 2016
Publication Status
Published
Start Date
2016-07-24
Finish Date
2016-07-28
Coverage Spatial
Atlanta, Georgia