A novel bias in managers' allocation of bonuses to teams: emphasis on team size instead of team contribution
File(s)Bai et al 2023 jbdm.pdf (455.54 KB)
Accepted version
Author(s)
Bai, Yun
Feng, Zhiyu
Savani, Krishna
Pinto, Jonathan
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
How should managers supervising multiple teams allocate bonuses—based on each team’s
size or based on each team’s contribution? According to the commonly accepted equity norm
for allocating rewards, managers should distribute bonuses based on the relative contributions
of the team. In contrast, we propose that managers are instead distracted by the number of
employees in each team and neglect team contribution highlighted in the equity norm. Pilot
Studies 1 and 2 confirmed that in both individual- and team-based bonus allocation situations,
people preferred and actually allocated rewards according to the equity norm rather than the
equality norm or the need norm when only contribution was manipulated. However, Study 1, a
laboratory experiment, revealed that individuals assigned to the role of a manager allocated
more bonuses to the larger team even though the two teams’ actual work output (in terms of the
number of units of work completed) was nearly identical. Study 2 replicated the key findings of
Study 1 using a sample of managers supervising teams in organizations. Study 3 developed an
information nudge—highlighting the team contribution—that reduced this bias. Together, these
studies indicate a novel team-size bias that creeps in when managers allocate rewards to
multiple teams and document an information nudge to reduce this bias.
size or based on each team’s contribution? According to the commonly accepted equity norm
for allocating rewards, managers should distribute bonuses based on the relative contributions
of the team. In contrast, we propose that managers are instead distracted by the number of
employees in each team and neglect team contribution highlighted in the equity norm. Pilot
Studies 1 and 2 confirmed that in both individual- and team-based bonus allocation situations,
people preferred and actually allocated rewards according to the equity norm rather than the
equality norm or the need norm when only contribution was manipulated. However, Study 1, a
laboratory experiment, revealed that individuals assigned to the role of a manager allocated
more bonuses to the larger team even though the two teams’ actual work output (in terms of the
number of units of work completed) was nearly identical. Study 2 replicated the key findings of
Study 1 using a sample of managers supervising teams in organizations. Study 3 developed an
information nudge—highlighting the team contribution—that reduced this bias. Together, these
studies indicate a novel team-size bias that creeps in when managers allocate rewards to
multiple teams and document an information nudge to reduce this bias.
Date Issued
2023-10
Date Acceptance
2023-05-14
Citation
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2023, 36 (4), pp.1-15
ISSN
0894-3257
Publisher
Wiley
Start Page
1
End Page
15
Journal / Book Title
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
Volume
36
Issue
4
Copyright Statement
Copyright © 2023 Owner. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Bai, Y., Feng, Z., Pinto, J., & Savani, K. (2023). A novel bias in managers' allocation of bonuses to teams: Emphasis on team size instead of team contribution. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, e2336., which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2336. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley’s version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited.
Identifier
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/bdm.2336
Publication Status
Published
Rights Embargo Date
2025-06-07
Article Number
e2336
Date Publish Online
2023-06-08