Entrusted loans: a close look at China's shadow banking system
File(s)Entrusted Loans 20180322.pdf (525.96 KB)
Accepted version
Author(s)
Allen, HF
Qian, Yiming
Tu, Guoqian
Yu, Frank
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
We perform transaction-level analyses of entrusted loans, one of the largest components of shadow banking in China. Entrusted loans involve firms with privileged access to cheap capital channeling funds to less privileged firms, and the increase when credit is tight. Nonaffiliated loans have much higher interest rates than both affiliated loans and official bank loans, and they largely flow into real estate. The pricing of entrusted loans, especially of nonaffiliated loans, incorporates fundamental and informational risks. Stock market reactions suggest that both affiliated and nonaffiliated loans are fairly compensated investments.
Date Issued
2019-07-01
Date Acceptance
2018-03-28
Citation
Journal of Financial Economics, 2019, 133 (1), pp.18-41
ISSN
0304-405X
Publisher
Elsevier
Start Page
18
End Page
41
Journal / Book Title
Journal of Financial Economics
Volume
133
Issue
1
Copyright Statement
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This manuscript is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Subjects
Social Sciences
Business, Finance
Economics
Business & Economics
Shadow banking
Entrusted loans
Credit shortage
Fundamental risk
Informational risk
LENDING RELATIONSHIPS
DISTANCE
CREDIT
1402 Applied Economics
1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
1606 Political Science
Finance
Publication Status
Published
Date Publish Online
2019-01-10