Distributed coordination of flexible loads using locational marginal prices
File(s) TCNSangeligongstrbacdepaola.pdf (4.88 MB)
Accepted version
Author(s)
Gong, Xuan
De Paola, Antonio
Angeli, David
Strbac, Goran
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
This paper presents a novel distributed control strategy for large-scale deployment of flexible demand in power systems. A game theoretical setting is adopted, modeling the loads as rational players that aim to complete an assigned task at minimum cost and compete for power consumption at the cheapest hours of the day. The main novelty is the analysis of power systems with congestion: the proposed modeling framework envisages heterogeneous groups of loads that operate at different buses, connected by transmission lines of limited capacity. The locational marginal prices of electricity, different in general for each bus, are calculated through an optimal power flow problem, accounting for the impact of the flexible devices on power demand and generation. A new iterative scheme for flexible demand coordination is analytically characterized as a multivalued mapping. Its convergence to a stable market configuration (i.e., variational Wardrop equilibrium) and global optimality are analytically demonstrated, for any penetration level of flexible demand and any grid topology. Distributed implementations of the proposed control strategy are discussed, evaluating their performance with simulations on the IEEE 24-bus system.
Date Issued
2019-09-01
Date Acceptance
2019-05-18
Citation
IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, 2019, 6 (3), pp.1097-1110
ISSN
2325-5870
Publisher
IEEE
Start Page
1097
End Page
1110
Journal / Book Title
IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
Volume
6
Issue
3
Copyright Statement
© 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
Sponsor
Engineering & Physical Science Research Council (E
Identifier
http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000487200900017&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=1ba7043ffcc86c417c072aa74d649202
Grant Number
EP/I031650/1
Subjects
Science & Technology
Technology
Automation & Control Systems
Computer Science, Information Systems
Computer Science
Distributed control
flexible demand
game theory
locational marginal prices (LMPs)
transmission network
DEMAND RESPONSE
AGGREGATIVE GAMES
POWER
STRATEGY
IMPACT
OPF
Publication Status
Published
Date Publish Online
2019-06-03
