Combinatorial Markets for Efficient Electricity Management
OA Location
Author(s)
Penya, YK
Jennings, NR
Type
Conference Paper
Abstract
The deregulation of the electricity industry in many countries has created a number of marketplaces in which producers and consumers can operate in order to more effectively manage and meet their energy needs. To this end, this paper develops a new model for electricity retail where end-use customers choose their supplier from competing electricity retailers. The model is based on similtaneous reverse combinatorial auctions, designed as a second-price sealed-bid multi-item auction with supply function bidding. This model prevents strategic bidding and allows the auctioneer to maximise its payoff. Furthermore, we develop optimal single-item and multi-item algorithms for winner determination in such auctions that are significantly less complex than those currently available in the literature.
Date Issued
2005
Citation
Proc. IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, Compiegne, France, 2005, pp.626-632
Start Page
626
End Page
632
Journal / Book Title
Proc. IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, Compiegne, France
Identifier
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/261138/
Source
International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Publication Status
Unpublished