Optimal strategies for bidding agents participating in simultaneous Vickrey auctions with perfect substitutes
File(s)
Accepted version
Author(s)
Gerding, E
Dash, R
Byde, A
Jennings, N
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
We derive optimal strategies for a bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We prove that, if everyone else bids locally in a single auction, the global bidder should always place non-zero bids in all available auctions, provided there are no budget constraints. With a budget, however, the optimal strategy is to bid locally if this budget is equal or less than the valuation. Furthermore, for a wide range of valuation distributions, we prove that the problem of finding the optimal bids reduces to two dimensions if all auctions are identical. Finally, we address markets with both sequential and simultaneous auctions, non-identical auctions, and the allocative efficiency of the market.
Date Issued
2008-08
Date Acceptance
2007-01-01
Citation
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2008, 32, pp.939-982
ISSN
1076-9757
Start Page
939
End Page
982
Journal / Book Title
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Volume
32
Copyright Statement
© 2008 AI Access Foundation. All rights reserved.
Identifier
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/266075/
Subjects
Science & Technology
Technology
Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence
Computer Science
COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
CONSTRAINED BIDDERS
MECHANISM DESIGN
MULTIPLE-OBJECT
ONLINE AUCTIONS
GAME
PROBABILITY
COMPETITION
SYNERGIES
INTERNET
Artificial Intelligence & Image Processing
0102 Applied Mathematics
0801 Artificial Intelligence And Image Processing
1702 Cognitive Science
Publication Status
Published