Nash equilibria for linear quadratic discrete-time dynamic games via iterative and data-driven algorithms
Author(s)
Nortmann, B
Monti, A
Sassano, M
Mylvaganam, T
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
Determining feedback Nash equilibrium solutions of nonzero-sum dynamic games is generally challenging. In this paper, we propose four different iterative algorithms to find Nash equilibrium strategies for discrete-time linear quadratic games. The strategy update laws are based on the solution of either Lyapunov or Riccati equations for each player. Local convergence criteria are discussed. Motivated by the fact that in many practical scenarios each player in the game may have access to different (incomplete) information, we also introduce purely data-driven implementations of the algorithms. This allows the players to reach a Nash equilibrium solution of the game via scheduled experiments and without knowledge of each other's performance criteria or of the system dynamics. The efficacy of the presented algorithms is illustrated via numerical examples and a practical example involving human-robot interaction.
Date Issued
2024-10-01
Date Acceptance
2024-02-24
Citation
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2024, 69 (10), pp.6561-6575
ISSN
0018-9286
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Start Page
6561
End Page
6575
Journal / Book Title
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Volume
69
Issue
10
Copyright Statement
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
License URL
Identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tac.2024.3375249
Publication Status
Published
Date Publish Online
2024-03-08