We study Cournot competition among firms in a multi-market framework where each of
the firms face different budget / capacity constraints. We assume independent linear inverse
demand functions for each market, and completely characterize the resulting unique equilibrium.
Specifically, we introduce the notions of augmented and cutoff budgets for firms and markets,
respectively. We show, for example, that firm i operates in market j if and only if firm i’s
augmented budget is greater than market j’s cutoff budget. We also study the properties of the
equilibrium as a function of the number of firms N while keeping the aggregate budget fixed.
In a numerical study, we show that increasing N increases the total output across all markets
although this monotonicity can fail to hold at the individual market level. Similarly, we show
that that while the firms’ cumulative payoff decreases in N, the consumer surplus and social
surplus increase in N.