Negotiating socially optimal allocations of resources: an overview
File(s)
Published version
Author(s)
Endriss, Ulle
Maudet, Nicolas
Sadri, Fariba
Toni, Francesca
Type
Report
Abstract
A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software
agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice
theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this paper, we study
an abstract negotiation framework where agents can agree on multilateral deals to
exchange bundles of discrete resources. We then analyse how these deals affect social
welfare for different instances of the basic framework and different interpretations of
the concept of social welfare itself. In particular, we show how certain classes of deals
are both sufficient and necessary to guarantee that a socially optimal allocation of
resources will be reached eventually.
agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice
theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this paper, we study
an abstract negotiation framework where agents can agree on multilateral deals to
exchange bundles of discrete resources. We then analyse how these deals affect social
welfare for different instances of the basic framework and different interpretations of
the concept of social welfare itself. In particular, we show how certain classes of deals
are both sufficient and necessary to guarantee that a socially optimal allocation of
resources will be reached eventually.
Date Issued
2005-01-01
Citation
Departmental Technical Report: 05/2, 2005, pp.1-44
Publisher
Department of Computing, Imperial College London
Start Page
1
End Page
44
Journal / Book Title
Departmental Technical Report: 05/2
Publication Status
Published
Article Number
05/2