Repository logo
  • Log In
    Log in via Symplectic to deposit your publication(s).
Repository logo
  • Communities & Collections
  • Research Outputs
  • Statistics
  • Log In
    Log in via Symplectic to deposit your publication(s).
  1. Home
  2. Faculty of Natural Sciences
  3. Life Sciences
  4. Life Sciences PhD theses
  5. Making friends with benefits: an investigation into the use of incentives for the conservation of forest commons
 
  • Details
Making friends with benefits: an investigation into the use of incentives for the conservation of forest commons
File(s)
Travers-H-2015-PhD-Thesis.pdf (3.64 MB)
Thesis
Author(s)
Travers, Henry
Type
Thesis or dissertation
Abstract
The use of incentives to encourage sustainable natural resource use is widespread in conservation. Yet, the relative or combined effects of conservation interventions on resource use can be difficult to predict. This is particularly so in contexts with weak institutions or poorly defined property rights, conditions that typify forest commons. In this study, I investigate the effect of different policy options, currently being implemented or under consideration in a protected area in Cambodia, on the resource appropriation of indigenous smallholder farmers in order to develop a framework for predicting the effectiveness of conservation interventions.
I begin by evaluating the progress made towards two project targets relating to the security of natural resources important for local livelihoods, showing that, whilst security issues exist, the project has so far been successful in protecting key resources. I also evaluate an existing programme of indigenous land titling, which is shown to be consistent with conservation goals but vulnerable to interference from land grabs.
Using two approaches for predicting behavioural response to planned interventions, experimental games and scenario analysis, I demonstrate that collective performance payments are more effective than individually contracted payments or increased law enforcement effort. Previous research has shown that externally imposed rule enforcement can undermine existing norms for cooperation, particularly in contexts where social cohesion is high. I build upon this research by demonstrating that exogenous rule enforcement, when coupled with reward payments that have been found to encourage high levels of cooperation, can increase resource extraction compared to when payments are offered in isolation.
The research presented highlights the difficulty of predicting the effect of policies designed to reduce resource use, particularly when interventions interact to increase the institutional complexity in which resource use decision-making takes place, but offers a novel framework for the investigation of intervention effectiveness.
Version
Open Access
Date Issued
2014-05
Date Awarded
2015-09
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/26284
DOI
https://doi.org/10.25560/26284
Advisor
Milner-Gulland, E.J.
Sponsor
Natural Environment Research Council
Economic and Social Research Council
Publisher Department
Department of Life Sciences (Silwood Park)
Publisher Institution
Imperial College London
Qualification Level
Doctoral
Qualification Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
About
Spiral Depositing with Spiral Publishing with Spiral Symplectic
Contact us
Open access team Report an issue
Other Services
Scholarly Communications Library Services
logo

Imperial College London

South Kensington Campus

London SW7 2AZ, UK

tel: +44 (0)20 7589 5111

Accessibility Modern slavery statement Cookie Policy

Built with DSpace-CRIS software - Extension maintained and optimized by 4Science

  • Cookie settings
  • Privacy policy
  • End User Agreement
  • Send Feedback