The impact of hospital price and quality transparency tools on healthcare spending: a systematic review
File(s)
Published version
Author(s)
Chen, Jinyang
Miraldo, Marisa
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
Background
Global spending on health was continuing to rise over the past 20 years. To reduce the growth rates, alleviate information asymmetry, and improve the efficiency of healthcare markets, global health systems have initiated price and quality transparency tools in the hospital industry in the last two decades.
Objective
The objective of this review is to synthesize whether, to what extent, and how hospital price and quality transparency tools affected 1) the price of healthcare procedures and services, 2) the payments of consumers, and 3) the premium of health insurance plans bonding with hospital networks.
Methods
A literature search of EMBASE, Web of Science, Econlit, Scopus, Pubmed, CINAHL, and PsychINFO was conducted, from inception to Oct 31, 2021. Reference lists and tracked citations of retrieved articles were hand-searched. Study characteristics were extracted, and included studies were scored through a risk of bias assessment framework. This systematic review was reported according to the PRISMA guidelines and registered in PROSPERO with registration No. CRD42022319070.
Results
Of 2157 records identified, 18 studies met the inclusion criteria. Near 40 percent of studies focused on hospital quality transparency tools, and more than 90 percent of studies were from the US. Hospital price transparency reduced the price of laboratory and imaging tests except for office-visit services. Hospital quality transparency declined the level or growth rates of healthcare spending, while it adversely and significantly raised the price of healthcare services and consumers’ payment in higher-ranked or rated facilities, which was referred to as the reputation premium in the healthcare industry. Hospital quality transparency not only leveraged private insurers bonding with a higher-rated hospital network to increase premiums, but also induced their anticipated pricing behaviors.
Conclusion
Hospital price and quality transparency was not effective as expected. Future research should explore the understudied consequences of hospital quality transparency programs, such as the reputation/rating premium and its policy intervention.
Global spending on health was continuing to rise over the past 20 years. To reduce the growth rates, alleviate information asymmetry, and improve the efficiency of healthcare markets, global health systems have initiated price and quality transparency tools in the hospital industry in the last two decades.
Objective
The objective of this review is to synthesize whether, to what extent, and how hospital price and quality transparency tools affected 1) the price of healthcare procedures and services, 2) the payments of consumers, and 3) the premium of health insurance plans bonding with hospital networks.
Methods
A literature search of EMBASE, Web of Science, Econlit, Scopus, Pubmed, CINAHL, and PsychINFO was conducted, from inception to Oct 31, 2021. Reference lists and tracked citations of retrieved articles were hand-searched. Study characteristics were extracted, and included studies were scored through a risk of bias assessment framework. This systematic review was reported according to the PRISMA guidelines and registered in PROSPERO with registration No. CRD42022319070.
Results
Of 2157 records identified, 18 studies met the inclusion criteria. Near 40 percent of studies focused on hospital quality transparency tools, and more than 90 percent of studies were from the US. Hospital price transparency reduced the price of laboratory and imaging tests except for office-visit services. Hospital quality transparency declined the level or growth rates of healthcare spending, while it adversely and significantly raised the price of healthcare services and consumers’ payment in higher-ranked or rated facilities, which was referred to as the reputation premium in the healthcare industry. Hospital quality transparency not only leveraged private insurers bonding with a higher-rated hospital network to increase premiums, but also induced their anticipated pricing behaviors.
Conclusion
Hospital price and quality transparency was not effective as expected. Future research should explore the understudied consequences of hospital quality transparency programs, such as the reputation/rating premium and its policy intervention.
Date Issued
2022-12-14
Date Acceptance
2022-11-28
Citation
Health Economics Review, 2022, 12 (1), pp.1-12
ISSN
2191-1991
Publisher
Springer
Start Page
1
End Page
12
Journal / Book Title
Health Economics Review
Volume
12
Issue
1
Copyright Statement
© The Author(s) 2022. Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which
permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the
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mmons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.
permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or
other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory
regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this
licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativeco
mmons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.
License URL
Identifier
https://www.webofscience.com/api/gateway?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000899239700001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=a2bf6146997ec60c407a63945d4e92bb
Subjects
Social Sciences
Science & Technology
Life Sciences & Biomedicine
Economics
Health Policy & Services
Business & Economics
Health Care Sciences & Services
Price transparency
Quality transparency
Information disclosure
Healthcare spending
The reputation premium
Systematic review
PERFORMANCE DATA
MARKET SHARE
PATIENT
PROVIDERS
CONSUMERS
DISCLOSURE
COMPARE
RATINGS
Publication Status
Published
Article Number
ARTN 62
Date Publish Online
2022-12-14