There is a growing movement to retrofit ageing,
large scale infrastructures, such as water networks, with wireless
sensors and actuators. Next generation Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPSs) are a tight integration of sensing, control, communication,
computation and physical processes. The failure of any one of
these components can cause a failure of the entire CPS. This
represents a system design challenge to address these interde-
pendencies. Wireless communication is unreliable and prone to
cyber-attacks. An attack upon the wireless communication of CPS
would prevent the communication of up-to-date information from
the physical process to the controller. A controller without up-to-
date information is unable to meet system’s stability and perfor-
mance guarantees. We focus on design approach to make CPSs
secure and we evaluate their resilience to jamming attacks aimed
at disrupting the system’s wireless communication. We consider
classic time-triggered control scheme and various resource-
aware event-triggered control schemes. We evaluate these on
a water network test-bed against three jamming strategies:
constant, random, and protocol aware. Our test-bed results show
that all schemes are very susceptible to constant and random
jamming. We find that time-triggered control schemes are just
as susceptible to protocol aware jamming, where some event-
triggered control schemes are completely resilient to protocol
aware jamming. Finally, we further enhance the resilience of
an event-triggered control scheme through the addition of a
dynamical estimator that estimates lost or corrupted data.