Abstract:
We prove that a known approach to improve Shamir's celebrated secret sharing scheme; i.e., adding an information-theoretic authentication tag to the secret, can make it robust for n parties against any collusion of size δn, for any constant δ ∈ (0; 1/2). This result holds in the so-called “nonrushing” model in which the n shares are submitted simultaneously for reconstruction. We thus finally obtain a simple, fully explicit, and robust secret sharing scheme in this model that is essentially optimal in all parameters including the share size which is k(1+o(1))+O(κ), where k is the secret length and κ is the security parameter. Like Shamir's scheme, in this modified scheme any set of more than δn honest parties can efficiently recover the secret. Using algebraic geometry codes instead of Reed-Solomon codes, the share length can be decreased to a constant (only depending on δ) while the number of shares n can grow independently. In this case, when n is large enough, the scheme satisfies the “threshold” requirement in an approximate sense; i.e., any set of δn(1 + ρ) honest parties, for arbitrarily small ρ > 0, can efficiently reconstruct the secret.