Defense-in-depth vs. Critical Component Defense for Industrial Control Systems
File(s)
Accepted version
OA Location
Author(s)
Fielder, A
Li, T
Hankin, C
Type
Conference Paper
Abstract
Originally designed as self-contained and isolated networks, Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have evolved to
become increasingly interconnected with IT systems and other wider networks and services, which enables
cyber attacks to sabotage the normal operation of ICS. This paper proposes a simulation of attackers and
defenders, who have limited resources that must be applied to either advancing the technology they have
available to them or attempting to attack (defend) the system. The objective is to identify the appropriate
deployment of specific defensive strategy, such as Defense-in-depth and Critical Component Defense.
The problem is represented as a strategic competitive optimisation problem, which is solved using a coevolutionary
Particle Swarm Optimisation problem. Through the development of optimal defense strategies,
it is possible to identify when each specific defensive strategies is most appropriate; where the optimal
defensive strategy depends on the kind of attacker the system is expecting and the structure of the network.
become increasingly interconnected with IT systems and other wider networks and services, which enables
cyber attacks to sabotage the normal operation of ICS. This paper proposes a simulation of attackers and
defenders, who have limited resources that must be applied to either advancing the technology they have
available to them or attempting to attack (defend) the system. The objective is to identify the appropriate
deployment of specific defensive strategy, such as Defense-in-depth and Critical Component Defense.
The problem is represented as a strategic competitive optimisation problem, which is solved using a coevolutionary
Particle Swarm Optimisation problem. Through the development of optimal defense strategies,
it is possible to identify when each specific defensive strategies is most appropriate; where the optimal
defensive strategy depends on the kind of attacker the system is expecting and the structure of the network.
Date Issued
2016-08-23
Date Acceptance
2016-06-23
Citation
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2016
Publisher
BCS Learning & Development Ltd.
Journal / Book Title
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2016
Copyright Statement
© Fielder et al.
Sponsor
Engineering & Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC)
Grant Number
EP/L021013/1
Source
International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security
Publication Status
Published
Start Date
2016-08-23
Finish Date
2016-08-25
Coverage Spatial
Belfast, Northern Ireland