Comparing contract-based support mechanisms for long-duration energy storage
File(s)
Accepted version
Author(s)
Suski, Adam
Spyrou, Elina
Mays, Jacob
Green, Richard
Type
Conference Paper
Abstract
Long-duration energy storage (LDES) faces significant revenue volatility that impedes investment. This paper evaluates four contract-based support mechanisms using an equilibrium model with risk-averse investors and incomplete risk markets. Applied to a stylized 2035 Great Britain case, we find that all mechanisms can achieve the targeted LDES capacity but differ substantially in cost-effectiveness and risk-aversion sensitivity. Contracts that eliminate revenue volatility achieve the lowest costs but may weaken operational incentives, while contracts that preserve market exposure maintain incentives at higher costs.
Date Issued
2026-07-10
Date Acceptance
2026-04-27
Citation
2026 22nd International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM), 2026
ISBN
979-8-3195-3554-2
Publisher
IEEE
Journal / Book Title
2026 22nd International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM)
Copyright Statement
Copyright © 2025, IEEE. This is the author’s accepted manuscript made available under a CC-BY licence in accordance with Imperial’s Research Publications Open Access policy (www.imperial.ac.uk/oa-policy)
License URL
Source
22nd International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM)
Subjects
long-duration energy storage
contracts
risk aversion
incomplete markets
equilibrium modeling
Publication Status
Published
Start Date
2026-06-22
Finish Date
2026-06-24
Coverage Spatial
Trondheim, Norway