Market Design for Long-Distance Trade in Renewable Electricity
File(s)Market design.pdf (670.75 KB)
Accepted version
Author(s)
Green, RJ
Pudjianto, D
Staffell, I
Strbac, G
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
While the 2009 EU Renewables Directive allows countries to purchase some of their obligation from
another member state, no country has yet done so, preferring to invest locally even where load factors are
very low. If countries specialised in renewables most suited to their own endowments and expanded
international trade, we estimate that system costs in 2030 could be reduced by 5%, or €15 billion a year,
after allowing for the costs of extra transmission capacity, peaking generation and balancing operations
needed to maintain electrical feasibility.
Significant barriers must be overcome to unlock these savings. Countries that produce more renewable
power should be compensated for the extra cost through tradable certificates, while those that buy from
abroad will want to know that the power can be imported when needed. Financial Transmission Rights
could offer companies investing abroad confidence that the power can be delivered to their consumers.
They would hedge short-term fluctuations in prices and operate much more flexibly than the existing
system of physical point-to-point rights on interconnectors. Using FTRs to generate revenue for
transmission expansion could produce perverse incentives to under-invest and raise their prices, so
revenues from FTRs should instead be offset against payments under the existing ENTSO-E
compensation scheme for transit flows. FTRs could also facilitate cross-border participation in capacity
markets, which are likely to be needed to reduce risks for the extra peaking plants required.
another member state, no country has yet done so, preferring to invest locally even where load factors are
very low. If countries specialised in renewables most suited to their own endowments and expanded
international trade, we estimate that system costs in 2030 could be reduced by 5%, or €15 billion a year,
after allowing for the costs of extra transmission capacity, peaking generation and balancing operations
needed to maintain electrical feasibility.
Significant barriers must be overcome to unlock these savings. Countries that produce more renewable
power should be compensated for the extra cost through tradable certificates, while those that buy from
abroad will want to know that the power can be imported when needed. Financial Transmission Rights
could offer companies investing abroad confidence that the power can be delivered to their consumers.
They would hedge short-term fluctuations in prices and operate much more flexibly than the existing
system of physical point-to-point rights on interconnectors. Using FTRs to generate revenue for
transmission expansion could produce perverse incentives to under-invest and raise their prices, so
revenues from FTRs should instead be offset against payments under the existing ENTSO-E
compensation scheme for transit flows. FTRs could also facilitate cross-border participation in capacity
markets, which are likely to be needed to reduce risks for the extra peaking plants required.
Date Issued
2016-12-31
Date Acceptance
2016-01-26
Citation
Energy Journal, 2016, 37, pp.5-22
ISSN
0195-6574
Publisher
International Association for Energy Economics
Start Page
5
End Page
22
Journal / Book Title
Energy Journal
Volume
37
Copyright Statement
CC BY. The following article is a preprint of a scientific paper that has completed the peer-review process and been accepted for publication within The Energy Journal.
License URL
Sponsor
Engineering & Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC)
Engineering & Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC)
Grant Number
EP/I031707/1
EP/L024756/1
Subjects
1402 Applied Economics
Publication Status
Published
Article Number
S12