Nash and Wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling constraints
File(s)
Accepted version
Author(s)
Paccagnan, Dario
Gentile, Basilio
Parise, Francesca
Kamgarpour, Maryam
Lygeros, John
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash and Wardrop equilibria. By exploiting a characterization of the two equilibria as solutions of variational inequalities, we bound their distance with a decreasing function of the population size. As second contribution, we propose two decentralized algorithms that converge to such equilibria and are capable of coping with constraints coupling the strategies of different agents. Finally, we study the applications of charging of electric vehicles and of route choice on a road network.
Date Issued
2019-04-01
Date Acceptance
2018-04-30
Citation
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2019, 64 (4), pp.1373-1388
ISSN
0018-9286
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Start Page
1373
End Page
1388
Journal / Book Title
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Volume
64
Issue
4
Copyright Statement
© 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
Subjects
cs.SY
cs.SY
cs.GT
math.OC
0102 Applied Mathematics
0906 Electrical and Electronic Engineering
0913 Mechanical Engineering
Industrial Engineering & Automation
Publication Status
Published
Date Publish Online
2018-06-25