Redistribution of VCG payments in public project problems
OA Location
Author(s)
Naroditskiy, Victor
Guo, Mingyu
Dufton, Lachlan
Polukarov, Maria
Jennings, Nicholas R
Type
Conference Paper
Abstract
Redistribution of VCG payments has been mostly studied in the context of resource allocation. This paper focuses on another fundamental model–the public project problem. In this scenario, the VCG mechanism collects in payments up to n?1n of the total value of the agents. This collected revenue represents a loss of social welfare. Given this, we study how to redistribute most of the VCG revenue back to the agents. Our first result is a bound on the best possible efficiency ratio, which we conjecture to be tight based on numerical simulations. Furthermore, the upper bound is confirmed on the case with 3 agents, for which we derive an optimal redistribution function. For more than 3 agents, we turn to heuristic solutions and propose a new approach to designing redistribution mechanisms.
Editor(s)
Goldberg, Paul W
Date Issued
2012
Citation
The 8th Workshop on Internet & Network Economics, 2012, pp.323-336
Publisher
Springer
Start Page
323
End Page
336
Journal / Book Title
The 8th Workshop on Internet & Network Economics
Identifier
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/343343/
Source
Internet and Network Economics: Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop, WINE 2012
Subjects
Artificial Intelligence & Image Processing
08 Information And Computing Sciences
Publication Status
Unpublished