Incentives in the public sector: evidence from a government
agency
agency
File(s)JCP_January2016.pdf (323.96 KB)
Accepted version
Author(s)
Burgess, S
Propper, C
Tominey, E
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
We study the impact of team-based performance pay in a major UK government agency, the
public employment service. The scheme covered quantity and quality targets, measured with
varying degrees of precision. We use unique data from the agency’s performance
management system and personnel records, linked to local labour market data. We show that
on average the scheme had no significant effect but had a substantial positive effect in small
teams, fitting an explanation combining free riding and peer monitoring. We also show that
the impact was greater on better-measured quantity outcomes than quality outcomes. The
scheme was very cost effective in small offices.
public employment service. The scheme covered quantity and quality targets, measured with
varying degrees of precision. We use unique data from the agency’s performance
management system and personnel records, linked to local labour market data. We show that
on average the scheme had no significant effect but had a substantial positive effect in small
teams, fitting an explanation combining free riding and peer monitoring. We also show that
the impact was greater on better-measured quantity outcomes than quality outcomes. The
scheme was very cost effective in small offices.
Date Issued
2017-10-24
Date Acceptance
2016-01-20
Citation
Economic Journal, 2017, 127 (605), pp.F117-F141
ISSN
1468-0297
Publisher
Wiley
Start Page
F117
End Page
F141
Journal / Book Title
Economic Journal
Volume
127
Issue
605
Copyright Statement
© 2017 Royal Economic Society. This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article, which has been published in final form at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecoj.12422
Subjects
14 Economics
Economics
Publication Status
Published