Platform-based business models and financial inclusion: policy trade-offs and approaches
File(s)
Author(s)
Karen, Croxson
Jon, Frost
Leonardo, Gambarcorta
Valletti, Tommaso
Type
Journal Article
Abstract
Three types of digital platforms are expanding in financial services: (i) fintech entrants;
(ii) big tech firms; and (iii) increasingly, incumbent financial institutions with platformbased business models. These platforms can dramatically lower costs and thereby aid
financial inclusion – but these same features can give rise to digital monopolies and
oligopolies. Digital platforms operate in multi-sided markets, and rely crucially on big
data. This leads to specific network effects, returns to scale and scope, and policy tradeoffs. To reap the benefits of platforms while mitigating risks, policy makers can: (i) apply
existing financial, antitrust and privacy regulations, (ii) adapt old and adopt new
regulations, combining an activity and entity-based approach, and/or (iii) provide new
public infrastructures, such as digital identity and retail fast payment systems. These
public infrastructures, as well as ex ante competition rules and data portability, are
particularly promising. Yet to achieve their policy goals, central banks and financial
regulators need to coordinate with competition and data protection authorities.
(ii) big tech firms; and (iii) increasingly, incumbent financial institutions with platformbased business models. These platforms can dramatically lower costs and thereby aid
financial inclusion – but these same features can give rise to digital monopolies and
oligopolies. Digital platforms operate in multi-sided markets, and rely crucially on big
data. This leads to specific network effects, returns to scale and scope, and policy tradeoffs. To reap the benefits of platforms while mitigating risks, policy makers can: (i) apply
existing financial, antitrust and privacy regulations, (ii) adapt old and adopt new
regulations, combining an activity and entity-based approach, and/or (iii) provide new
public infrastructures, such as digital identity and retail fast payment systems. These
public infrastructures, as well as ex ante competition rules and data portability, are
particularly promising. Yet to achieve their policy goals, central banks and financial
regulators need to coordinate with competition and data protection authorities.
Date Issued
2023-03-01
Date Acceptance
2022-06-29
Citation
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2023, 19 (1), pp.75-102
ISSN
1744-6414
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Start Page
75
End Page
102
Journal / Book Title
Journal of Competition Law and Economics
Volume
19
Issue
1
Copyright Statement
© The Author(s) 2022. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in [insert journal title] following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version [insert complete citation information here] is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhac010
Publication Status
Published
Date Publish Online
2022-08-13