In Boolean games, agents uniquely control a set of propositional
variables, and aim at achieving a goal formula whose realisation
might depend on the choices the other agents make with respect to
the variables they control. We consider the case in which assigning
a value to propositional variables incurs a cost, and moreover, we
assume agents to be restricted in their choice of assignments by
an initial endowment: they can only make choices with a lower
cost than this endowment. We then consider the possibility that
endowments can be redistributed among agents. Different redistributions
may lead to Nash equilibrium outcomes with very different
properties, and so certain redistributions may be considered more
attractive than others. In this context we study centralised redistribution
schemes, where a system designer is allowed to redistribute
the initial energy endowment among the agents in order to achieve
desirable systemic properties. We also show how to extend this
basic model to a dynamic variant in which an electric Boolean game
takes place over a series of rounds.