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Contesting the Anticipated Infrastructural City: A Grounded Analysis of Silk Road Urbanization in the Multipurpose Port Terminal in Chancay, Peru

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A new private port and logistics complex is under construction in the city of Chancay, located north of Lima, Peru, as part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) promising to change life in the city while expanding a Sino-centric globalized economy and Peru's reach within it. Through a series of interviews conducted between 2020 and 2022 and document analysis, we seek to offer a grounded theorization of how the BRI, as an exemplar of infrastructure-led urbanization, interweaves with broader sociospatial and socationatural transformations, affecting the present and future of the places where it materializes. By using the concept of the infrastructural city we show how the combination of port and logistics infrastructures with spatial interventions in periurban space is guiding contemporary urbanization, resulting in the formation of a new, amorphous city that has as its defining characteristic the domination of infrastructure over urban life, eradicating prior functions and marginalizing local grievances to facilitate the creation of a privatized enclave for international trade. Our analysis provides insights into the intricate and multifaceted geographies of emerging Chinese-sponsored infrastructural strategies, the hopes and struggles that contextually shape them, and the potentially distinctive and contested urban features of the anticipated infrastructural cities yet to come. **Key Words:** *Belt and Road Initiative, environmental justice, infrastructural violence, infrastructure-led development, logistics.*

In 2020, the construction of a massive port commenced in the coastal city of Chancay, Peru, situated 78 kilometers north of Lima. Despite its extensive history tracing back to pre-Hispanic times,¹ Chancay was, until then, a small agricultural and fishing city of around 60,000 inhabitants.² Since the port construction started, the once natural southern beach has been interrupted lengthwise by odd mounds concealing geotubes placed to prevent erosion caused by the altered wave patterns resulting from the new port. As one stands on the boardwalk, cranes construct new infrastructure in close proximity to the solitary pier, surrounded by artisanal fishing boats. Along the boardwalk, amidst the array of tourist restaurants, graffiti contests dominant narratives about the forthcoming “city of services” and its touted economic prosperity (Figure 1). Just beyond the last line of houses atop Cascajo Hill, a green barrier segregates the city of Chancay from the land

owned by the port consortium. Given the substantial transformations unfolding in the region, it is not surprising that the development of the multipurpose port complex faces considerable resistance from residents. What began as opposition gradually escalated into a severe conflict, addressing the social, economic, and environmental ramifications of contentious, large-scale infrastructure projects (Apostolopoulou and Pantis 2010; Flyvbjerg 2017; Schindler, Fadaee, and Brockington 2019).

Such conflicts have been commonplace in Peru, a country with a history of prioritizing infrastructure and extractive industries over the well-being of local populations and natures (Pieck 2015; Rodríguez and Bazán Seminario 2023).³ The heightened involvement of Chinese capital, however, injected a new dynamic, accelerating the construction process and broadening its scope. The Chancay port complex, with an initial investment of US\$1.3 billion, now

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Figure 1. A wall on the boardwalk displays the message “No to the megaport.” In the background, you can see the beach, the artisanal fishing pier, and the sea dotted with artisanal fishing boats. To the far left, cranes are visible, working on the construction of the megaport.

stands as one of the most promising projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Peru and South America at large. Positioned as a critical component of the Maritime Silk Road, its primary objective is to reshape the region into a pivotal trade and logistics hub,⁴ potentially altering shipping routes along the Southern Pacific. The BRI, unveiled by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, underscores the central role of infrastructure in China’s foreign policy (Furlong 2022) and also manifests the ascendancy of a global paradigm centered on infrastructure-driven development that aims to integrate subnational urban systems into transnational territories through an extensive network of large-scale infrastructure projects (Schindler and Kanai 2021; Rodríguez and Gurol 2023).

In this article, we use the conflict surrounding the construction of the Chancay port complex as a starting point to offer a grounded theorization of how the BRI, as an exemplar of infrastructure-led development, intricately interweaves with broader spatial transformations, affecting the present and future of the places where it materializes. To this end, we synthesize key insights from two bodies of academic literature. First, we draw on the literature on

infrastructure-led development and the urban geographies of the New Silk Road (e.g., Wiig and Silver 2019; Williams, Robinson, and Bouzarovski 2020; Apostolopoulou 2021a; Schindler, DiCarlo, and Paudel 2022; Smith 2022; Apostolopoulou et al. 2023), to comprehend how China’s BRI drives urban transformation in periurban space. This way we aim to offer a historical-geographical analysis of BRI’s unfolding in Peru, describing the emerging geographies of state-sponsored infrastructural strategies and the potentially distinctive urban features of the resulting landscapes (Graham and Marvin 2022). Second, we draw on broader geographical literature examining the role of infrastructure in shaping the urban experience (e.g., Graham and Marvin 2001, 2022; Larkin 2008; Anand, Gupta, and Appel 2018), including work on infrastructural violence (Rodgers and O’Neill 2012; Datta and Ahmed 2020), logistical infrastructures (Cowen 2014; Chua et al. 2018; Danyluk 2018), and the infrastructural city (Read 2009; Varnelis 2009; Roseau 2022). Infrastructures offer a material basis on which we can explore and substantiate how the dynamics of infrastructure-led urbanization (re)configure periurban space, lives, social relations, and socionatures,

reshaping patterns of inequality, vulnerability, and precarity. Considering that logistical infrastructures constitute a unique form of political, economic, social, and natural infrastructures essential for the circulation of commodities (De Lara 2018), our engagement with the literature on logistics helps capture these specificities. By bringing these literatures together we aim to show that spatial transformation in the places where BRI projects materialize reflects not only the place-making capabilities of logistical and port infrastructures but is also affected by China's distinct urban development model, producing potentially novel urban development pathways (Apostolopoulou 2021a, 2021b; Apostolopoulou and Pant 2022). We also pay attention to the ways the construction of the Chancay megaport disproportionately affects local communities, enabling and embodying diverse forms of exclusion, marginalization, social-environmental injustice, and violence.

Our goal is to make a threefold contribution. First, we aim to expand the concept of the infrastructural city by showing how the combination of large-scale port and logistics infrastructures with broader spatial interventions in the periurban space is guiding contemporary urbanization, establishing a new, amorphous city whose defining characteristic is the domination of infrastructure over urban space in a totalitarian manner that almost eradicates prior functions. Second, and in tandem, we endeavor to broaden the analysis of contestation surrounding BRI infrastructures, which has been limited thus far, reflecting a broader gap in integrating social struggle as an intrinsic element in the formation of any infrastructural, urbanization, and spatial fix (Ekers and Prudham 2017). In this regard, we strive to illustrate that infrastructural violence simultaneously affects sociocultures, places, and livelihoods, bringing together struggles for social, environmental, and spatial justice. This underscores the vital role of conflict in the unfolding of infrastructure-led development, emphasizing the variations, disruptions, uncertainties, and anticipations that shape its outcomes. Third, we aim to move beyond a binary understanding of China's BRI that currently prevails in Silk Road scholarship, which tends to either exaggerate the grandiose nature of the BRI (Hillman 2020) and Chinese exceptionalism (Zhang 2013) or undermine the BRI as a cohesive, geopolitically driven grand strategy (Jones and Zeng 2019) and present it as a

fragmented initiative driven solely by project-specific characteristics (Cheng and Apostolopoulou 2023). By analyzing the BRI as a materially grounded field of practice (Oakes 2021), our analysis adopts an extroverted perspective of place (Massey 1994), and aspires to the planetary (Brenner and Schmid 2015) through the intensive study of the concrete and the particular to understand a large-scale process, such as infrastructure-led urbanization, through its fragments and sedimented effects (Katz 2021), confronting the challenge of theorizing the urban across difference by envisioning cities in a world of cities (Robinson 2011). That way we aim to highlight that a focus on the BRI need not imply either a one-dimensional interpretation of China or stand in opposition to global China scholarship and research that perceives China as a method (Shin, Zhao, and Koh 2022). Instead, it can reflect a theorization of the BRI as an exemplar of a broader process of infrastructure-led urbanization (see also Veglio et al. 2024). We consider this important given that infrastructure-led development is rapidly becoming hegemonic worldwide, as evidenced by initiatives like the European Union's €300 billion Global Gateway, the \$600 billion Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), and the newly born India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC; Veglio et al. 2024).

Empirically, we draw on two years of qualitative research spanning from January 2020 until December 2022. Due to COVID-19 limitations, this involved on-site, phone, and online interviews in Spanish with opposition leaders, environmental and human rights organizations, and local citizens, along with an extensive document and social media analysis. We identified interviewees from local groups, media, and snowball sampling. We also reached out to the local government and developers but did not receive any responses. Therefore, we gathered their perspectives from official public media and communications. Our engagement with opposition leaders remains ongoing as they persist in their struggle.

Theorizing Silk Road Infrastructures

The rise of the infrastructure-led development paradigm on a global scale (Schindler and Kanai 2021) gradually triggered a global rush in infrastructure (Tooze 2018), characterized by the proliferation of large-scale projects worldwide (Hildyard and Sol 2017). The BRI stands as a notable manifestation of

this broader trend. Serving as a spatial fix for capital's global overaccumulation crisis (D. Harvey 2016; Summers 2016), it seeks to promote a Sino-centric reterritorialization of trade routes, with urban nodes, special economic zones (SEZs), and logistics hubs playing pivotal roles in its corridors (Mayer and Zhang 2021; Schindler, DiCarlo, and Paudel 2022). Megaprojects like the Chancay port complex, characterized by their large scale, complexity, involvement of both public and private sectors, and the potential to transform the lives of millions of people (Flyvbjerg 2017), have become defining features of the initiative, constituting 18 percent of the total number of BRI projects and representing 56 percent of total investment (Zhu, Mwangi, and Hu 2022).

The BRI's primary economic driver, namely the ambition to accelerate capital circulation and minimize turnover time (Marx 1978), has historically been a driving force behind capitalist competition. It is also a foundational motive propelling advancements in logistics (Cowen 2014; Danyluk 2018) to enhance the speed, cost-efficiency, volume, reliability, and flexibility of commodity flows (Danyluk 2018). These improvements and the broader reorganization of capitalist circulatory systems aim to eliminate temporal and spatial barriers, effectively annihilating space with time (Harvey 1989; Marx [1857] 1973). Advances in logistics hold a central role in the BRI and run parallel to substantial investments in transportation infrastructures, such as ports, highways, and railways. Here we are particularly interested in the place-making effects of the amalgamation of large-scale logistical and port infrastructures. As Cowen (2014) explained, the logic of frictionless flow intrinsic to corporate distribution centers and automated container terminals becomes ingrained in the physical and social fabric of entire urban areas. Similarly, as Chua et al. (2018) argued, logistics is a spatial and material practice, rooted in the expansion and reconfiguration of physical networks of production and distribution that manifests through the production of extensive infrastructural assemblages inscribing calculative modes of spatial reasoning into the built environment (see also Lefebvre 1991). Ziadah (2018) also noted that the construction of megacontainer ships is an illustrative example of the way logistics' technoscientific innovations have conferred the industry a pivotal role in shaping space. The capacity of these ships has doubled within a decade, propelling the establishment

of megacontainer ports and leading states to allocate extensive lands and embark on reclamation projects (Ziadah 2018).

Integrating cities into logistics hubs, production systems, and export processing zones connecting resource-rich regions with manufacturing and production centers, along with investments in transport infrastructure, is a central aspect of the BRI (Liu, Schindler, and Liu 2020; Schindler and Kanai 2021). This emphasis on city-making aligns with the conventional perspective on urbanization in China, exemplified by the New Urbanization Plan (NUP) that portrays the city as a symbol of prosperity (Oakes 2021), with a particular focus on port cities and coastal areas. This is also evident in the global attempts, both within and beyond the BRI, to replicate the "port-park-city" (PPC) model at numerous ports worldwide. The PPC model, originally developed in Shenzhen in the 1980s, is characterized by a comprehensive integration of logistics, production, and urban services, featuring a front-facing port, an industrial zone, and a city at the rear (Liu, Schindler, and Liu 2020). In this model, ports serve as gateways for import and export, linked to hinterland areas through transport infrastructure. Industrial parks act as platforms for production, innovation, and economic growth, and cities provide support for infrastructure, labor, and markets. Overall, the PPC model strives to improve intra- and interregional connectivity by bringing industrial infrastructure and production close to ports and connecting them with cities to enhance the efficiency of goods transportation, increase profitability, and achieve sustained urban growth and economic development. The key logic of the PPC model is reflected in the BRI, particularly in the prevalence of innovative combinations involving large-scale infrastructure alongside industrial projects and significant investments in urban built environments (Apostolopoulou et al. 2023). Moreover, and relatedly, a distinct characteristic of Silk Road urbanization (Apostolopoulou 2021a) is the rapid transformation of space, resulting in displacements and the reconfiguration of urban areas at a scale and speed that are unprecedented for many countries, echoing Chien and Woodworth's (2018) notion of the "Chinese urban speed machine."

How, though, can we ground these concepts to the experiences of those who live and work in the places where these projects are planned and

materialized? Infrastructure is a “fundamentally relational concept,” and can be seen “as part of human organization” (Star 1999, 380). Infrastructures can be theorized as complex sociotechnical and socioecological processes (Murton and Lord 2020; Rogelja 2020) that mediate urban lives and socionatures, and reconfigure the production of nature and space as well as the geographies of everyday life (Lefebvre 1970; Graham and McFarlane 2015). Socioecological and sociocultural vulnerabilities play a crucial role in shaping how infrastructures transform the sociomaterial fabric of societies (Joniak-Lüthi 2020). Infrastructures constitute, therefore, sites where the actions of the state intersect with the global economy and development processes (Ferguson 2010) and are an integral part of daily life influencing the systemic conditions of possibility under which people can act (P. Harvey 2018). They thus offer grounds for exploring how structural factors and social orderings are manifested and experienced in everyday life (Rodgers and O'Neill 2012). As Bosworth (2022) pointed out, infrastructures can also be an enabling mechanism involving a constellation of material relationships and flows that facilitate specific social and material activities (Larkin 2013; Ballesterio 2018). Examining logistical and port infrastructures through the lens of the contradictory forces and unequal power dynamics that influence their creation and daily experience (Graham and Marvin 2001) enables us to determine under which circumstances they can have detrimental or beneficial effects and for whom (Salamanca and Silver 2022). Rodgers and O'Neill (2012), by drawing on Mann's concept of infrastructural power and Graham's notion of infrastructural warfare, used the term *infrastructural violence* to describe how “processes of marginalization, discrimination and exclusion” are often operated and sustained by infrastructure, drawing attention to how “the workings of infrastructure can be substantially deleterious” (401–03). The concept of infrastructural violence uncovers the political economy behind the sociospatial production of suffering by providing a concrete way to discuss who is responsible for harm and spark action toward achieving infrastructural justice (Enns and Sneyd 2020). As Datta and Ahmed (2020) argued, infrastructural violence is often located in geopolitical and ecological conflicts, disaster, and crisis contexts (Rodgers and O'Neill 2012), and entwined with the

structural violence of neoliberal urbanization (Graham and Marvin 2001). It is, therefore, directly relevant to the analysis of how spatial politics shaped by the imperatives of capital accumulation inscribe unjust class relations into the concrete materiality of particular places (Smith 2010). Relatedly, research on infrastructural violence highlights how state actors deploy the state's infrastructural power to advance infrastructure projects and suppress contestation (Post 2022). Rodríguez and Bazán Seminario (2023) used the term *para-coloniality* to specifically denote how Chinese state capital mobilizes Eurocentric coloniality to further its global accumulation project, employing state policing to quell opposition.

In what follows we draw on the preceding literatures to understand how Chancay's port and logistics infrastructures profoundly transform space, nature, and people's lives, even from their construction stage. We use the term *infrastructural city* to describe the pivotal role of infrastructure construction in the emergence of new cities, like the “city of services” in Chancay. The term was used by Varnelis (2009) in an edited volume exploring how infrastructure shapes modern urban life and potential future developments on a global scale. Read (2009) also used the term to describe “a new amorphous city of fragments” that has invaded everywhere, producing a “new regional urbanism without community, public space, or centrality” (5). Our deliberate focus on the infrastructural rather than the logistics city (Cowen 2014) serves two main purposes. First, it aims to draw research attention to the intricate ways in which extensive port infrastructure can influence urban space and lives from its construction phase, even before its logistics function becomes fully operative. Second, it aims to underscore that BRI infrastructures often entail a variety of infrastructural investments that are not confined exclusively to the circulation of commodities, extending beyond logistics to include industrial, commercial, and housing projects that span across the city. Bringing these literatures together allows us to unveil the multiple forms of infrastructural violence embodied within urban BRI logistics infrastructures in the making, simultaneously affecting space, labor, human relationships, and socionatures in their efforts to produce infrastructure-led development.

A Historical-Geographical Understanding of the Emergence of the New Silk Road in Latin America and Peru

Over the last two decades, a plethora of Chinese infrastructure and investment projects have been proposed and executed in Latin America (Oliveira and Myers 2021), with a total value surpassing US\$400 billion.⁵ Although initial discussions concerning the BRI excluded the region, that began to change in 2015 due to lobbying efforts by Latin American politicians who sought to be included in the surge of Chinese investments (Myers 2018), and the growing interest of the Chinese government in the Latin American and Caribbean region⁶ (Serrano Moreno, Telias, and Urdinez 2020). The invitation for Latin American states to participate in the BRI was formalized in January 2018 at the Forum of China and the Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (China-CELAC Forum), a platform for intergovernmental cooperation launched in 2015 and led by the Chinese Foreign Ministries and CELAC countries (Osterloh 2019). During the Forum, China's Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that Latin America was a natural extension of the twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road, reflecting the Pacific trade route connecting Asia and Latin America between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries and marking an attempt to frame the BRI as a geopolitical and geoeconomic strategy with a global impact.⁷ In April 2019, at the second BRI Forum for International Cooperation, Latin America's participation was formally acknowledged through an official communique emphasizing the construction of infrastructure in the region in the context of the BRI⁸ (Hui 2018).

Peru communicated its interest in joining the BRI in 2016 through various articles by Peruvian officials (Capuñay 2016; Myers 2018). On 28 April 2019, the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Commerce signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Chinese government confirming its participation in the initiative (Serrano Moreno, Telias, and Urdinez 2020). Peru was considered an essential partner in establishing new trade routes and strengthening connectivity between China and Latin America due to its strategic location and abundance of natural resources, raw materials, and agricultural products.⁹ Since signing the MoU, various projects and

investments have been proposed, spanning sectors such as mining, telecommunications, construction, energy, and infrastructure (Neyra 2020).

The MoU is the result of a long-standing commercial relationship between China and Peru that, *inter alia*, includes a Free Trade Agreement.¹⁰ Peru also participates in the China-CELAC Forum, which includes a China-Latin America and Caribbean Region Infrastructure Cooperation Forum, hosted by the Ministry of Commerce of China, and organized by China International Contractors Association; as well as a Special Loan Program for China-Latin America Infrastructure totaling US\$20 billion, implemented by the China Development Bank. In Peru, Chinese investment and acquisition of key infrastructure increased enormously the last decade. This included selling China Three Gorges a 97 percent share of Luz del Sur, Peru's largest electricity company, as well as the Chaglla hydroplant. Additionally, the Power Construction Corporation of China has been awarded contracts for the construction of the Chinchero International Airport and the Chupaca Hospital, and Chinese investment in the Peruvian mining sector alone has totaled approximately US\$15 billion between 2009 and 2020.¹¹

Interestingly, the idea of the Chancay port was born long before the BRI was launched. It dates to 2008 when an ex-admiral started acquiring land and securing government permits. Later, he partnered with Volcan Compañía Minera, a Peruvian mining company that also holds interests in logistics and hydropower,¹² and created the Terminales Portuarios Chancay company in 2011.¹³ Volcan's controlling shareholder is Glencore Plc, a Swiss mining company listed on the London Stock Exchange. When the ex-admiral passed away in 2016, Volcan retained sole ownership and started searching for an international investor. That year, preliminary work began for the initial—and much smaller—infrastructure proposal. Not much is known about the negotiations, but in January 2019, Cosco Shipping Ports Limited (COSCO) announced their partnership with Volcan at the World Economic Forum in Davos, to acquire a stake for the construction of a US\$3000 million port.¹⁴ COSCO acquired the majority (60 percent) of Volcan's stake on the Chancay port in May 2019, worth US\$225 million according to Chinese state media,¹⁵ and Volcan kept the remaining 40 percent.¹⁶ This was just a month

after Peru and China signed the BRI MoU (Canchari, Osterloh Mejía, and Deng 2020). There is incomplete information about the project's financing, but the most recent US\$975 million loan in March 2023 was from Chinese institutions, led by the Bank of China.¹⁷ It is important to mention here that COSCO, a state-owned multinational conglomerate headquartered in Shanghai, is part of the Ocean Alliance group (Narrea 2022). Alongside other members such as the Taiwanese container and shipping company Evergreen Line, the French CMA CGM, and OOCL headquartered in Hong Kong, COSCO plays a significant role in shaping global shipping dynamics. The establishment of COSCO shipping ports in Chancay suggests potential benefits for both COSCO and the Ocean Alliance, although the extent of these advantages remains uncertain. Additionally, it is plausible that other major players in the shipping industry, such as Maersk, might also consider using the facilities at Chancay.

Despite high levels of inequality and political turmoil, Peru has long been considered a robust economy, maintaining a steady growth. The 1990s saw a strong shift toward neoliberalization under the dictatorship of Alberto Fujimori, whose free-market policies led to the erosion of public services and infrastructures of social reproduction, the opening of natural resources to foreign investment, and a large-scale privatization program (Pieck 2015; Rodríguez and Bazán Seminario 2023). One of us, as a Peruvian, has personally experienced how Peruvian politics have been marked by the deepening of neoliberalism (Avilés and Celis 2017), corruption scandals, citizen distrust of government authorities, severe socioenvironmental conflicts (Neyra 2019), and political instability, leading to the country having six different presidents from 2018 to 2022. Starting in the 2000s and intensifying in the 2010s, the Peruvian government adopted a strategy for achieving macroeconomic growth by relying on foreign investments. This coincided with the Chinese government's decision to encourage investment in Latin America (González-Vicente 2012; Kotschwar 2014), leading to a significant increase in Chinese influence in Peru. Pointedly, Peru has viewed infrastructures as crucial for nation-building, perceived as vital components of economic progress, modernization, and urban growth despite their contentious nature (P. Harvey and Knox 2012; Romero Sommer 2022). This is evident in Chancay: The ongoing

developmentalist wave is fueled by large-scale private infrastructure investments designed to establish new trade corridors, enhancing the city's economic significance within Peru and promoting the country's integration into the global economy. Moreover, the decision to construct a fully private port exemplifies how the persistence of neoliberal austerity is intertwined with the withdrawal of state funding even for vital infrastructures (Anand, Gupta, and Appel 2018) and a growing dependence on foreign investment. Similar trends have been identified in Piraeus port in Greece, where the acquisition of a 60 percent stake by COSCO led to a major increase in the port's operations amidst rising neoliberal urbanism and prolonged austerity (Apostolopoulou 2021b).

Chancay as China's "Gateway" to Latin America: How a Port and Logistics Complex is Transforming a City

Infrastructures of Hope and Prosperous Urban Futures

Situated in the Huaral province, Chancay port (Figure 2) is set to play a key role in driving the symbolic, material, and strategic vision of both the Chinese and the Peruvian governments to boost international connectivity, free trade, and efficient commodity circulation. The city is surrounded by agricultural fields and has access to an expanded road infrastructure that directly links Chancay port to key distribution points, including Lima and




Figure 2. The city of Chancay is depicted in the center of the image, with the sea to the west and agricultural fields surrounding it to the north, east, and south. To the south of the city, you can see the area where the port is being constructed, with some visible progress. East of the construction site, the Santa Rosa wetland is also visible.

central mining and agricultural regions, increasing the complex's potential to become a profitable logistics center.¹⁸ Currently, Lima is the hub of most of Peru's economic activity, and that is where its main port, Callao, is located. The Chancay port seeks to alleviate the high levels of congestion and increasing logistics costs of the Lima-Callao hub by operating the load from the east and central highlands.¹⁹ It is also expected to benefit from other transport infrastructures under construction (Narrea 2022), many of them funded by Chinese investments.²⁰ These include the Central Bi-Oceanic Railway, called "the Panama Canal of the twenty first century," a planned 3,000-km route that will run from Puerto Santos in Brazil to Puerto de Ilo in Peru.

These reasons explain well why this small city attracted major investment interest. Chancay is now considered a promising logistical space, an emerging industrial and technological hub, and a gateway for maritime transport from Asia to Latin America.²¹ Government and corporate actors have stressed that once the complex is operational, Huaral province will become the country's key gateway to Asia and a global commercial hub redistributing cargo with significant local, national, and regional geopolitical and geoeconomic implications. As the project's leader stated during the port fair Trans-Port 2021, the port "aims to have constant direct routes between Peru and Asia" to "generate connectivity between Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, southern Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador, concentrate that synergy and link it with the Asian continent."²² Similarly, representatives of the Peruvian Ministry of Transport and Communications stated that the new multipurpose port terminal will transform the region into a "hub in the South Pacific,"²³ facilitating the development of new profitable markets²⁴ by reducing product delivery time from Asia to South America from between thirty-five and forty days to twenty-three days.²⁵ The investment is described by the Chinese and Peruvian governments not only as a "bridge for trade and economic exchanges" but also as a "symbol of cooperation and friendship" between the two countries,²⁶ echoing the China-CELAC Forum's aspirations. Moreover, COSCO personnel,²⁷ government communications, and media articles²⁸ tend to emphasize that the Chancay port is part of the BRI.

In line with these aspirations, the Chancay Port Terminal is designed to be a multipurpose port with the capacity to handle containerized, general, and

rolling cargo, and accommodate the world's largest container ships, handling up to 1 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) annually.²⁹ Designated as a port-industrial node covering 992 hectares,³⁰ it promises to generate between 9,000³¹ and 15,000 jobs.³² The complex consists of three primary components: a port operational zone, an industrial logistics complex³³ (also known as the entrance complex), and an underground viaduct tunnel. The port zone encompasses docks, breakwaters, maritime entry channels, storage areas for bulk and rolling cargo containers, and maintenance areas and workshops. Positioned in the northwestern part of the project area, it includes the Punta Chancay massif, the surrounding maritime area, the bay extending to the east, and the maritime zone south of Punta Chancay. The entrance complex located east of the operational zone comprises the vehicular foreport, entrance gates to the terminal, customs inspection area, administrative offices, and logistics and support services areas. The tunnel connects the entrance complex with the port operational zone, spanning a length of 1.8 km. It serves as a segregated and exclusive road for traffic related to port operations, featuring three vehicular lanes, two conveyor belts for solid bulks, and multiproduct pipes for liquid bulks. Complementing the entrance is a logistics complex, named Chancay Park, intended to host various national and international exporting companies. The Park is divided into six zones mirroring the PPC model: logistics, industrial, commercial, residential, amenities, and green areas. In 2021, CHECSAC-CCCC4TH, a consortium of China Communications Construction Company and China Harbor Engineering Company, was awarded the construction contract for the project, with a commitment to complete it in 2024. By December 2023, the project reported around 50 percent progress.

The Chancay megaport is presented in media reports as an investment that goes beyond traditional notions of logistics complexes, industrial parks, and free zones. Instead, it aspires to evolve into a comprehensive "logistics-industrial and service city," with a strong emphasis on "social and environmental preservation" that will become "a legacy for future generations."³⁴ Chancay's characterization as a prospective "service city" reflects the developers' aspirations and has been strategically employed by Peruvian and Chinese officials to assert that the project holds the potential to stimulate urban growth, enhancing "the quality of life of Peruvians"³⁵

through modernization, economic development, and employment opportunities. Residents of Chancay are not indifferent to these discourses: Some are already preparing for the city yet to come, with more affluent people opening new service businesses or constructing hotels to cater to the expected increase in transit and trade. Others are hopeful about benefiting from the arrival of new industries. As one local fisher told us:

If we don't find work in the [port], we will find it in incoming businesses because the developers promised that Chinese companies will come. They said that Huawei is already setting up a plant here. There are several companies like that. The new city will become a small Chinese colony. ... Chancayan entrepreneurs who have hotels or businesses, as well as transport entrepreneurs are in favor of the new port and they are preparing for this. ... The most impoverished workers in the area, or the most artisanal, are the ones that will lose.

Recently, there have been indications that port construction is already affecting the local economy, leading to a surge in land values near the construction site. As mentioned by the mayor of Chancay in the media, "Fifteen years ago, the land was priced at US\$ 1 per square meter, and now it can command up to US\$1,000 for land located within the city."³⁶ The local government has observed an overall increase in prices, with the highest prices being quoted for land close to the Chancay port. They also highlight that parcels of land previously used for agriculture are now up for sale, as the increased profitability associated with the port construction surpasses earnings from agriculture. This shows well how the construction of the new port and service city is reshaping the political economy of the area, even at its initial stages.

Infrastructures of Violence, Precarity and Social-Environmental Injustice: A Divided City in the Making

Despite expectations for future prosperity, the construction of the multipurpose port terminal is triggering a massive transformation disproportionately affecting the residents of Chancay, particularly those in the southern part of the city. At the start of the project, opposition groups proposed its relocation approximately 10 km north to an area that was not only without residents but also better suited for the

port. At that point, Volcan had already commenced land acquisition and was reluctant to jeopardize their investment. The acquisition process was disputed by opposition leaders, alleging corruption, and lobbying within the Ministries of Defense and Transport and Communications. Local opposition groups collaborated with national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to gather funds, organize communication campaigns, and enlist technical support to challenge the land acquisition and the project's EIA.³⁷ Members from these groups told us that they have faced harassment and abuse from the developers.³⁸ Indeed, the developers reported local opposition leaders to the police, accusing them of defamation for claiming that the Chancay port would transport minerals.³⁹ Although COSCO and Volcan later dropped some charges, three Chancay citizens still face prosecution. Despite the narratives portraying modernization and growth, the construction of the port is thus characterized by infrastructural violence facilitated through authoritarian measures to ensure its investment security (Rodríguez and Bazán Seminario 2023). This pattern of repression, often backed by government support, is not unique to Chinese investments in Peru (Neyra 2020), but extends to various other investment ventures (Saldaña Cuba and Portocarrero Salcedo 2017; Dunlap 2019).

A significant aspect of local opposition stems from the environmental impacts of the port and logistics complex. The degradation of the Santa Rosa wetland serves as a stark example, highlighting the contrast between the current state of Chancay and its projected urban future.⁴⁰ Positioned less than 200 m from the construction site,⁴¹ the wetland is a vital ecosystem for migratory birds and climate change mitigation, and a source of pride for both the local community and environmental groups. Partnering opposition organizations, including Cooperación and the Comité de Vigilancia Ambiental, have protested the developers' failure to address the project's adverse impacts on the wetland and the broader area, arguing that the required environmental impact assessments (EIAs) were based on partial information and inadequate methodologies. Local groups have consistently submitted their concerns to government authorities and the developers, hoping they would reconsider their strategies.

COSCO and Volcan not only initially disregarded residents' concerns but also opted to expand the construction area to enhance the port's capacity.

In 2020, local groups, in collaboration with the environmental NGO⁴² Mundo Azul, scrutinized the modified EIA (mEIA) submitted to Peruvian authorities for permission to extend the project. The assessment was deemed unsatisfactory, prompting opposition groups and governmental bodies, including the National Forestry and Wildlife Service, to submit 114 observations. These referred to impacts on the environment and public health, including the effects on the Santa Rosa wetland, the local fauna and flora, the broader coastline, and Chancay's beaches.⁴³ The grave consequences of increased noise and toxic pollution were also underscored, including the emission of cancerous particles (PM10 and PM2.5). Opposition groups stressed that the project's impacts would not only severely affect ecosystems and public health but also livelihoods. This is due to the companies' plans to dump excavated soil on fish breeding sites, disrupting marine currents and the availability of marine resources (Rodríguez and Gurol 2023), threatening the local economy that relies heavily on commercial and artisanal fisheries.⁴⁴ As a resident told us:

The coastline has already changed because they covered a bay with rubble, now the beaches are sanded. There are no fishing sites, and the sea has receded many meters, which also caused the fishing pier to lose depth. Many vessels got stranded. We are witnessing tremendous destruction, and the project has just started.

Not surprisingly, local artisanal fishers were among the first to oppose the port complex, expressing their grievances to both the local government authorities and the developers. As they explained to us:

We are going to be the first to lose our jobs because the dynamics of the waves are changing, which means that the dynamics of fishing are changing, too. We protested from the very start. We even went to Lima. Little by little, the authorities abandoned us, both regional and local governments.

In an attempt to quell opposition, developers approached leaders of local fishing associations, offering a flat rate and support for their children's education as compensation, assuring them that the port and the new city would bring a better future. As a member of a fishing association told us:

Our position as fishermen is, and I hope [the developers] keep their promise, to ensure education for our children so that they become professionals and

have better job opportunities, better lives in the new city than the lives we had.

Despite growing community concerns and increasing opposition, the National Environmental Certification Service for Sustainable Investments (Senace), the public body responsible for EIAs in Peru, approved the mEIA in December 2021. This approval was granted through the IntegrAmbiente process, introduced in 2017 amidst a shift toward neoliberalization in Peru's EIA procedures. The policy aimed to expedite administrative processes, making them more efficient to attract large-scale investments like the Chancay port complex, essentially facilitating the approval of projects with adverse impacts due to their economic significance. The decision to disregard local concerns and proceed with the port expansion marked a critical juncture, revealing to the community that the establishment of a globally competitive port was an irreversible spatial and material endeavor. Integrated with the logistics complex and the proposed new service city, the megaport necessitates extensive infrastructural configurations, signaling the gradual emergence of a new, indeterminate cityscape that entails the destruction of significant aspects of life in Chancay.

This fact was particularly evident in the case of El Cascajo Hill, located just a few meters from the construction site. The 1.8-km tunnel that aims to connect the entrance of the logistics complex and the operational port zone is being built beneath the hill. Despite more than fifty families living there, developers have employed explosives to reduce the hill without presenting comprehensive plans for relocation or compensation.⁴⁵ The construction work, literally beneath the homes of people living in the three *asentamientos humanos* (informal settlements) on the hill, has led to protests due to continuous disturbance caused by noise, dust, and damage from explosions. Complaints from families reached local media in 2017, citing disproportionate impacts of the preliminary construction work such as the rupture of water pipes and serious damage to walls and floors (Rodríguez and Gurol 2023). Some of these concerns were mentioned in reports published by the Senace leading Volcan to offer money for home repairs.⁴⁶ Affected residents explained to us, however, that the money offered was insufficient to cover the costs. Construction work persists, causing further damage to people's homes. The president of the Association in Defense of Housing and

Environment in the Port of Chancay stated in 2022 that residents anticipate being eventually forced to leave because living in the area would become untenable. As a resident of the Hill told us:

Our houses have cracked because we are too close to the explosions. ... They are going to destroy everything to settle themselves but according to them, the tunnel will benefit us because the trucks will not drive through the highway. This doesn't make any sense; we live in a construction zone, we see a tunnel being built underneath our houses, and we feel that the hills that protect us are breaking down.

All of these factors indicates a gradual takeover of the city of Chancay by the port and logistics infrastructures, exerting a totalitarian dominance over space that nearly erases the area's previous functions. The construction site now mirrors a privatized and securitized enclave, detached from its surroundings, with minimal interaction with the city or its residents. It is indicative that in 2020, opposition groups managed to gain support from members of Congress who tried to visit the construction area but were blocked by security officials claiming that the land is private property and, thus, no longer accessible. This marked a pivotal moment in the conflict, highlighting the significance of Chancay being not only the inaugural port in Latin America under COSCO's operation but also the first fully private port in Peru.⁴⁷ Beyond COSCO's key role, this situation indicates that investment-attracting states like Peru are increasingly constructing ports as spaces primarily dedicated to offering secure zones for the uninterrupted flow of goods, ignoring prior land uses and activities. State structures of policing, EIA, and consultation are therefore used to suppress dissent, legitimizing infrastructural violence (Saldaña-Cuba and Portocarrero Salcedo 2017; Post 2022; Rodríguez and Bazán Seminario 2023). As a resident told us:

Around here you no longer see agricultural plots; it's only roads, buildings, and all kinds of infrastructures. There will come a time when there won't be enough space for living or growing food for people. I hope that in the future, the government will regulate land sales to ensure agriculture can persist. Otherwise, there will be money but no food to eat. I foresee that the megaport will eventually acquire all the land around it. They will displace the people living around there, attempt to buy their land, or relocate them elsewhere.

According to a member of a local NGO: There is going to be a gradual but profound change in the city

dynamics when the megaport is built that will completely transform all the social and territorial dynamics for the decades to come.

The port industrial and logistics complex in Chancay necessitates new forms of containment to assert its presence within the existing space, yielding paradoxical effects on the urban fabric (see also Cowen 2014; Jenss 2020). This is particularly visible in the construction of access gates that shield terminals from their surroundings and completely restrict public access. Fencing off port areas excludes specific urban segments from accessing them, while creating a division between the existing town and the envisioned infrastructural city. The modern, privately operated Chancay port under construction is physically separated from the adjacent damaged houses. This physical barrier not only limits social and economic interaction but also signifies, even during the construction phase, which segment of the urban population will be adversely affected by the new port infrastructure. The exclusion of particular social groups has been also evident in the way community's objections to the EIA were handled. In June 2020, a public consultation process regarding the mEIA approval took place remotely due to COVID-19 lockdown restrictions. The event was broadcast on local television and radio channels and comments were received by phone.⁴⁸ Local citizens strongly opposed the hasty way the audience was organized, arguing that it impeded them from participating properly. As they explained:⁴⁹

The audience was transmitted through two cable channels in the area. Not everyone has access to those channels in Chancay. But even people who asked questions never received an answer. This was a very clear sign that they would approve the project whatever it takes and that they do not care about the community. Restricting participation in that way goes against our right to have an opinion and all the necessary information about what is happening in our town.

A final point is important here. COSCO has recently lobbied with the Peruvian Congress to establish an SEZ to receive further tax and customs benefits.⁵⁰ In December 2022, a member of Congress raised the SEZ request into a proposed new law, which will be discussed in the near future.⁵¹ If approved, it will become one of only a handful of such SEZs in Peru, and the first to be mostly managed by a foreign actor. This echoes developments under the BRI elsewhere, such as the Sihanoukville SEZ established in Cambodia (Wash 2019), and

Colombo Port City SEZ in Sri Lanka (Apostolopoulou 2021b).⁵² As SEZs are known as zones of exception and exploitation of both nonhuman nature and workers, these developments exacerbate existing concerns about the employment conditions in the port.

Contesting the Infrastructural City Yet to Come⁵³

By embracing the challenge of theorizing from anywhere (Robinson 2011), we tried to show that BRI-induced urban transformation in Chancay exhibits unique characteristics stemming from the particularities of Latin America, Chancay itself, and China's urban development model, particularly its emphasis on infrastructure as the catalyst for urban development and growth. Despite the multitude of interests involved and the port's extensive history, COSCO's acquisition heralded a new era for Chancay. This does not imply, however, that the ongoing sociospatial restructuring is solely influenced by Chinese agency. Nor does it underestimate the importance of fostering mutual apprehension, cocreation, and aligning BRI's goals with those of national governments and investors (Mayer and Zhang 2021). Rather, it underscores China's increasing hegemony and orchestrated efforts to reshape capital accumulation patterns through the promotion of Sino-centric connectivity. Chancay's integration into the Maritime Silk Road and COSCO's port acquisition amplified existing site-specific trends (Safina, Ramondetti, and Governa 2023), injecting new vigor and vision into port development. With Chinese capital taking a prominent role geopolitically in its interactions with the Peruvian government, administratively through a 60 percent ownership of port stakes, and materially by constructing infrastructure, the project has expanded significantly and included new plans for a logistical complex and a new service city that were not part of the initial project. Contrary to emerging discourses suggesting that broader Chinese investment blurs the lines between what is and is not included in the BRI, potentially diluting BRI's significance, we argue that this diversity of Chinese capital investment strengthens the promises of the BRI and the envisioned infrastructural city in the sense that it fosters a broader consensus among key national stakeholders, enhancing the project's potential impact and reach.

We argue that the infrastructural spaces taking shape in Chancay can be viewed as nascent landscapes of urbanization. These landscapes signify potentially distinctive paths of urban development, coproduced by the spatial-geographical reorganization of capital accumulation patterns, as primarily shaped by the central role of trade corridors, logistical and port infrastructures, and capital circulation under neoliberalism (Ziadah 2018), Chinese and multinational corporate interests, as well as prevailing national and local conditions. Crucially, megaprojects like the Chancay port complex act as paradigms of how infrastructure and logistical networks act as agents of urbanization even during their construction phases. They generate new geographies that promise to position previously less connected areas as pivotal nodes within emerging global trade networks. These evolving locales are anticipated to diverge significantly from traditional urban landscapes, highlighting the need to conceptualize urbanization as a relational process capable of engendering unprecedented outcomes that transcend conventional urban boundaries (Lefebvre 1970). In the case of Chancay, a novel form of urban space is emerging, using infrastructure as a means to create the city itself, echoing Star's (2010) depiction of infrastructure as the Cinderella of urban studies—a transformative force shaping connected spaces through its materiality and action (see also Roseau 2022). Although parallels can be drawn with China's new towns or Global North cities developed around transportation hubs and industrial zones, the unique feature here lies in the promise of connectivity and the distinct role of infrastructure. As Allen (1999) explained in his work on infrastructural urbanism:

infrastructure works not so much to propose specific buildings on given sites, but to *construct the site itself*. Infrastructure prepares the ground for future building and creates the conditions for future events. Its primary modes of operation are the division, allocation, and construction of surfaces; the provision of services to support future programs; and the establishment of networks for movement, communication, and exchange. ... *Infrastructure's medium is geography*. (54, emphasis added)

Oakes (2020) further argued, particularly in the context of China, that “what fuels these growth machines is construction, especially the construction of infrastructure. ... These landscapes want to tell

us, ‘a city is coming here, the empty roads and towers will soon be filled with cars and people. Try to ignore the piles of rubble’” (199).

From maps depicting the area devoid of previous life to the use of explosives in an inhabited hill, the anticipated infrastructure city appears both shapeless and exclusionary. Even during its construction stage, it disproportionately affects the most vulnerable, alienating them from previously familiar spaces. Although the advent of the new megaport promises to forge novel globalized connections, it also disrupts and undermines existing relationships. Chancay’s gradual metamorphosis mirrors Appel’s (2012) analysis of private enclaves, which act as securitized symbols of growing inequality and governmental neglect of public infrastructures. The process of disentangling oneself from responsibility for life beyond the walls of these enclaves, coupled with creating spatial and experiential distances, perpetuates infrastructural violence in quite direct ways. As Graham and Marvin (2022) argued, the selective connectivity of these spaces generates infrastructural landscapes that shape conflicting urbanization patterns, geopolitical formations, geo-economic labor divisions, social and political structures, and, we would add, new forms of social-environmental injustice and uneven development, resulting in “exclusions, deprivations, disruptions, vulnerabilities, and disposessions” (Brenner 2019, 379). The logistics revolution’s role in exacerbating inequality is pivotal here. States and companies across the Global South and North are increasingly prioritizing the optimal operation of global supply networks over social reproduction infrastructures. This almost inevitably subjugates democratic principles, and the well-being of human and nonhuman lives to the imperative of seamless capital circulation (Chua et al. 2018; Ziadah 2018), exemplified by the heightened exploitation of workers, socionatures, and communities along trade routes and shipping corridors (Mezzadra and Neilson 2019; Danyluk 2021; Apostolopoulou 2021b).

The imposition of the emerging infrastructural city over existing space and the takeover of previous uses and functions, linked organically to the logistics-industrial complex, reflect an attempt to replicate the PPC model akin to what Guma, Akallah, and Odeo (2023) recently termed “plug-in urbanism.” Nonetheless, transplanting a “Chinese” urban model is not a straightforward, top-down process. It is a complex city-making endeavor shaped by local

political and economic interests (Loughlin and Grimsditch 2021; Shin, Zhao, and Koh 2022), governmental agendas, investors, exporters, private firms, and residents (Goodfellow and Huang 2021). Indeed, the evolving material fabric of the Chancay megaport is rescripting place, space, and socionatures, making the port infrastructures a “barometer of the lived experience of global political economy” (see P. Harvey 2018 for an analysis of road construction in Peru). Drawing on Peck’s (2017) call for an urban theorization skeptical of both “universalism and particularism,” and recognizing the need “for close and reflexive interpretations of the mutual constitution of situated circumstances and structuring conditions, moving in and out from immediate (or proximate) contexts to the (constitutive) contexts of those contexts” (14), we insist that understanding the developments in Chancay requires acknowledging the dialectics between shifting global geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions and Peru’s social, historical, and political economy context. From the perspective of state territorial and spatial planning, the megaport illustrates China’s increasing involvement in Peruvian affairs, the enduring role of extractive industries in shaping Peru’s development policies, and the state’s inability to provide public infrastructures that meet the needs of the social majority. From the standpoint of local communities and the most vulnerable, it registers as the entrenchment of state abandonment, marginalization, and exclusion. Importantly, unlike public infrastructures that evoke a sense of abandonment due to malfunctioning, the port infrastructure in Chancay evokes despair, fear, and loss due to its functioning and the potential ways it will shape new, currently unknown, urban futures that diverge from community needs. Funded by a controversial consortium and part of an infrastructure initiative promising new trade links while promoting Sino-centric connectivity, Chancay does not stand as an undisputed symbol of national prosperity, but rather assumes the role of a tangible and symbolic embodiment of Peru as a site of extraction, neoliberal revanchism, and neocolonialism. Drawing on theorizations of the BRI as a manifestation of a new form of infrastructure-led, neoliberal urbanism (Apostolopoulou 2021b), we argue that it is precisely the explicitly profit-driven nature of these infrastructures that heightens the contradictions between social groups placing their hopes in new infrastructures and those fearing the uneven

ways in which their lives will be affected. Thus, the construction of the Chancay megaport, tied to hegemonic understandings of an urban future as a time-space of potentiality for change and improvement (P. Harvey 2018), exacerbates infrastructural violence with detrimental consequences for both local livelihoods and ecosystems (see also Post 2022). As Li (2018) argued by referring to plantation zones, this infrastructural violence is evident in the vast spatial extent and material fixity of port and logistics centers: The radical landscape transformation makes repurposing the space challenging, fostering a perception that the port will endure for generations and disciplining opposing voices due to its material fixity. The significance of this extends even further amidst ongoing discussions regarding the potential deceleration of BRI initiatives or the setbacks in realizing expansive large-scale foreign investments. Even if these projects encounter obstacles, experience delays, or operate less spectacularly than envisioned, it does not diminish their profound impact on urban spaces and the potential for alternative urban futures.

A final observation is important here. Despite their grand aspirations, investments in expansive infrastructure endeavors such as the BRI are deeply intertwined with contextual realities and, as such, remain susceptible to speculation, geopolitical volatility, geoeconomic fragility, and societal resistance. Grasping the nuanced intricacies of BRI infrastructures necessitates an examination of historically and geographically specific conditions, local social dynamics, and the interplay between national and foreign capital as well as different forms of state capitalism (Alami and Dixon 2020; Jensen 2022). The unfolding narrative of the New Silk Road presents unique conceptual, analytical, methodological, and political challenges for those seeking to decipher and influence its variegated spatiotemporal dynamics. Urban formations catalyzed by the BRI are distinctive in that they evolve from shifting geopolitical and geoeconomic relations, global dynamics of accumulation, and China's growing sway in shaping urban development trajectories. These formations also stem from the ongoing logistics revolution and the increasing privatization of traditionally state-managed infrastructure. Consequently, we witness the rise of privately operated terminal operators and immense concentrations of corporate power within the global transport sector (Ziadah 2018). This changing landscape not only creates new vulnerabilities but also offers potential

avenues for liberation from imperialist and neocolonial dispossession and capitalist hegemony (Chua et al. 2018). Contesting the violence and injustice entwined with the expansion of logistical and port infrastructures should therefore be a cornerstone of critical geographical research and praxis that wishes to comprehend and challenge the multifaceted city-making processes underway, as well as the diverse and novel urban configurations, socionatures, and spatialities emerging from them, while also scrutinizing the questionable promises attached to the anticipated infrastructural city.

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Notes

1. The colonial Chancay was founded in 1562.
2. See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ToOUDgJu8s>.
3. The “Baguazo” is an emblematic example of the latter: a proposed law facilitating foreign extraction in the Amazon coupled with evidence of corruption for the concession of drilling rights led to a deadly conflict between Indigenous groups and the Peruvian government in 2009.
4. See <https://andina.pe/ingles/noticia-peru-chancay-port-will-turn-peru-into-south-americas-hub-916932.aspx>.
5. See <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-59823320>; <https://athenalab.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/D15-Puerto-Chancay.pdf>.
6. Joint communique of leaders roundtable of Belt and Road forum (16 May 2017). Belt and Road Portal, available at <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/13694.htm>.
7. See <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8595274/#Fn3>.
8. The Belt and Road Initiative: Progress, Contributions and Prospects, Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the Belt and Road Initiative, available at: <https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wcm.files/upload/CM5ydylgw/201904/201904220254037.pdf>.
9. See <https://blogs.eui.eu/latin-american-working-group/the-belt-and-road-initiative-in-latin-america-how-china-makes-friends-and-what-this-means-for-the-region/>.

10. Peru was one of the first South American countries that signed a free trade agreement with China and its exports have boomed as a result.
11. See <https://www.gob.pe/institucion/minem/noticias/300881-inversiones-chinas-en-mineria-suman-casi-us-15-mil-millones-en-los-ultimos-11-anos>.
12. Volcan is a mining subsidiary of Swiss mining company Glencore.
13. See <https://www.americaeconomia.com/negocios-industrias/desde-shanghai-hasta-chancay-peru-acoge-el-primer-puerto-operado-por-una-empresa>.
14. See <https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/cosco-shipping-ports-peru-chancay-project-official-transfer-ceremony-and-cosco-shipping-ports-chancay-peru-s-a-promotional-event-were-officially-held-in-peru/>.
15. See http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-01/25/c_137773672.htm; <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/25/WS5c4a6594a3106c65c34e6744.html>.
16. See <https://gestion.pe/economia/empresas/volcan-cosco-shipping-ports-firman-acuerdo-construccion-puerto-chancay-266764-noticia/?ref=gesr>.
17. See <https://latinfinance.com/awards/project-infrastructure-finance-awards/2023-project-infrastructure-finance-awards/2023/10/05/port-financing-of-the-year-chancay-port-financing/>.
18. See <https://www.volcan.com.pe/operaciones/puerto/>.
19. See <https://athenalab.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/D15-Puerto-Chancay.pdf>.
20. See <https://www.gob.pe/institucion/presidencia/noticias/28357-presidente-vizcarra-inversion-en-megapuerto-de-chancay-refleja-confianza-y-estabilidad-en-el-peru>.
21. See <https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/el-primer-puerto-de-china-en-latinoamerica-se-construye-en-peru>.
22. See <https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/ports-logistics/cosco-aims-shipping-hub-perus-chancay-port>.
23. See <https://www.investinperu.pe/en/climate/detail-news/the-port-of-chancay-will-have-a-great-regional-im>.
24. See <https://gestion.pe/economia/puerto-de-chancay-avanzan-obras-que-comprometen-una-inversion-de-us-1100-millones-nndc-noticia/?ref=gesr>.
25. See <https://andina.pe/agencia/noticia-from-chancay-to-shanghai-a-new-silk-road-linking-asia-and-south-america-952363.aspx>.
26. See <https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/cosco-shipping-ports-peru-chancay-project-official-transfer-ceremony-and-cosco-shipping-ports-chancay-peru-s-a-promotional-event-were-officially-held-in-peru/>.
27. See <https://apnews.com/article/peru-chancay-china-port-construction-d13e8e8fe19289a6ab97628f708bc671>.
28. See <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-peru-chancay-port-rcna124564>.
29. See <https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/05/18/cosco-to-invest-us3-billion-in-perus-chancay-port/>.
30. See <https://www.volcan.com.pe/operaciones/puerto/>.
31. See <https://www.gob.pe/institucion/presidencia/noticias/28357-presidente-vizcarra-inversion-en-megapuerto-de-chancay-refleja-confianza-y-estabilidad-en-el-peru>.
32. See <https://gestion.pe/economia/puerto-de-chancay-avanzan-obras-que-comprometen-una-inversion-de-us-1100-millones-nndc-noticia/?ref=gesr>.
33. See <https://www.volcan.com.pe/operaciones/puerto/>.
34. See <https://www.trans-port.cl/en/volcan-presents-chancay-park-a-world-class-industrial-logistics-complex-at-trans-port-2021/>.
35. See <https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/cosco-shipping-ports-peru-chancay-project-official-transfer-ceremony-and-cosco-shipping-ports-chancay-peru-s-a-promotional-event-were-officially-held-in-peru/>.
36. See <https://www.elperuano.pe/noticia/223681-se-eleva-valor-de-terrenos-en-el-puerto-de-chancay>.
37. See http://derechoshumanos.pe/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/OBSERVACIONES_MEIA_Chancay.pdf.
38. See <https://lamula.pe/2020/10/02/puerto-multiproposito-chancay-denuncia-empresas-querella-difamacion-retiro-cnddhh/jorgepaucar/>. It is worth mentioning here that Volcan's involvement in the project has created major concerns that the port would be used for exporting mineral products. Peru has a long history of conflicts between communities and extractive industries due to pollution, abuse of power, uneven distribution of costs and benefits, and disregard of Indigenous and peasant rights (Arellano-Yanguas 2011; Irwin and Gallagher 2013).
39. See <https://lamula.pe/2020/10/02/puerto-multiproposito-chancay-denuncia-empresas-querella-difamacion-retiro-cnddhh/jorgepaucar/>.
40. See <https://redaccion.lamula.pe/2020/08/17/chancay-organizaciones-sociales-piden-no-aprobar-modificacion-del-eia-del-puerto-multiproposito/jorgepaucar/>.
41. See <https://convoca.pe/agenda-propia/alertan-sobre-graves-omisiones-en-el-estudio-de-impacto-ambiental-del-proyecto-de>.
42. See <http://derechoshumanos.pe/2020/10/volcan-y-cosco-shipping-ports-destruiran-cerro-el-cascajo-para-construccion-del-megapuerto-de-chancay/>.
43. See <http://www.inforegion.pe/276013/existen-mas-de-50-graves-observaciones-al-terminal-portuario-de-chancay/>.
44. See <https://wayka.pe/megapuerto-de-chancay-senace-aprueba-proyecto-pese-a-riesgos-ambientales/>.
45. See <https://wayka.pe/megapuerto-de-chancay-proyecto-planea-desaparecer-76-metros-de-un-cerro-con-viviendas/>.
46. See <https://redaccion.lamula.pe/2017/03/27/chancay-viviendas-se-caen-a-pedazos-por-explosiones-en-construccion-de-megapuerto-videos/jorgepaucar/>.
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