



Corporate Corruption: A Review and Research Agenda

Journal:	<i>Academy of Management Annals</i>
Manuscript ID	ANNALS-2018-0156.R4
Document Type:	Article
Keywords:	CORRUPTION, DEVIANCE, AGENCY THEORY, culture < ORGANIZATION, ETHICS

SCHOLARONE™
Manuscripts

1
2
3 **CORPORATE CORRUPTION: A REVIEW AND AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE**
4 **RESEARCH**
5

6 Armando Castro
7 University College London
8 1-19 Torrington Place,
9 London, UK
10 Tel: +44 (0)20 3108 9197
11 E-mail: a.castro@ucl.ac.uk
12
13

14 Nelson Phillips
15 Imperial College London
16 South Kensington Campus
17 London, UK
18 T: +44 (0)20 7594 1699
19 E-mail: n.phillips@imperial.ac.uk
20
21

22 Shaz Ansari
23 University of Cambridge
24 Trumpington Street
25 Cambridge UK
26 Tel: +44 (0)1223 768128
27 E-mail: s.ansari@jbs.cam.ac.uk
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

53 *Acknowledgement*

54 The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments and suggestion from Selja Vassnes,
55 Fernanda Odilla, Rasmus Pichler, Andreas Scherer, Davide Ravasi, ETHOS Centre
56 and the DPU State & Market research cluster.
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Corruption is one of the grand challenges facing global society (George, Howard-
4 Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016). It is a significant impediment to economic growth in
5 many countries (Mauro, 1995), undermines the proper functioning of governments
6 (Treisman, 2007), and, where it is widespread, can lead to the erosion of trust in societal
7 institutions (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Although difficult to measure, the World Economic
8 Forum (2018) has estimated that each year over US\$1 trillion is paid in bribes and that
9 corruption reduces global GDP by more than five percent. For companies conducting
10 business internationally, corruption adds significantly to the cost of doing business. For
11 example, a third of international resources business managers estimated corruption increases
12 international project costs by more than 10% (Bray, 2007). Furthermore, corruption can add
13 up to 25% to the cost of procurement contracts in some countries while moving business
14 from a country with a low level of corruption to a country with medium or high levels of
15 corruption is equivalent to a 20% tax on foreign business.¹

16
17 It is no surprise, therefore, that significant effort has gone into trying to reduce
18 corruption: inter-governmental organizations have sought to address this challenge by
19 drafting international conventions such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
20 Development's (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention (1997); national governments have
21 developed legislation to tackle corruption, for instance, the *American Foreign Corrupt
22 Practices Act* (1977); and NGOs have worked to reduce corruption, for example,
23 Transparency International's development of the *Global Corruption Barometer* (2018) to
24 gauge the level of corruption in different countries and to measure progress on reducing it.
25 Companies have also taken significant steps to stamp out corruption by supporting
26 responsible practices in their operations, launching anti-bribery programs, strengthening

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
¹International Chamber of Commerce, Transparency International, United Nations Global Compact, and World Economic Forum, *Clean Business is Good Business Report*

1
2
3 ethics and compliance practices (e.g., the ISO 37001 Anti-Bribery Management Systems
4 Standard) and building a culture of compliance (Venkatesan & Benton, 2018).
5
6

7
8 However, these measures have had limited efficacy in mitigating corruption
9
10 (O'Higgins, 2006) and the fight continues (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013). The reasons
11
12 for the lack of progress are manifold and complex, but what is clear is that more research is
13
14 needed to better understand corruption and, in particular, to develop evidence-based
15
16 approaches to eradicating it where possible and to mitigate its worst effects where it proves
17
18 impossible to stamp out.
19
20

21
22 This is not to say that there has not been extensive research on corruption in the social
23
24 sciences and humanities. Research on corruption in economics, political science,
25
26 anthropology, and sociology has provided a range of different ways of thinking about
27
28 corruption, its causes, and its prevention. At the same time, existing research has largely
29
30 focused on corruption in government (e.g., Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). However,
31
32 corruption can involve both public and private actors and much government corruption
33
34 involves either a firm providing improper incentives of some kind or an official “straddling”
35
36 (Andvig, Fjeldstad, Weltzien, Amundsen, Sissener, & Søreide, 2001) the boundary between
37
38 government and the private sector in order to benefit in some way. Furthermore, significant
39
40 instances of corruption occur both within (e.g., De Jong & van Ees, 2014) and between (e.g.,
41
42 Arnold, Neubauer & Shoenherr, 2012) firms, both large and small, with negative effects for
43
44 the societies in which they occur and often for the shareholders of the firms involved.
45
46
47
48

49
50 Thus, while much of the scholarly work on corruption focuses on governments,
51
52 corruption involving business is an important phenomenon and one that management scholars
53
54 are uniquely placed to investigate. This area of research – which we term ‘corporate
55
56 corruption’ – is growing but fragmented; there has been a general lack of recognition that this
57
58 form of corruption has distinctive characteristics and requires a coherent theory despite
59
60

1
2
3 repeated observations that corruption in firms should be a focus of research in future studies
4 (e.g., Cole & Tran, 2012, Rose-Ackerman, 2008). In fact, what is clear is that “the call for
5 more firm-level research has not been answered much to date” (De Jong & van Ees, 2014, p.
6 189). Here, we focus on this important but under-researched area in an attempt to encourage
7 more recognition of the potential impact of work on this topic and to provide suggestions for
8 the future research needed to develop a comprehensive theory of corporate corruption.
9

10
11 We believe corporate corruption is a distinct empirical phenomenon that requires
12 focused attention for a number of reasons. First, while both government and corporate
13 corruption involve people in positions of power abusing their authority, the contexts in which
14 the abuse occurs are fundamentally dissimilar. Government bureaucracies differ from
15 companies in terms of culture, incentives, governance, and logic, making the opportunities
16 for corruption, the decision to be corrupt, and the practicalities of acting corruptly, radically
17 different. Theories of corporate corruption must explicitly account for these differences to
18 better theorize how, when, and why decisions to act corruptly are taken in firms.
19

20
21 Second, unlike governments, firms face competitive pressures that can affect the
22 likelihood of corruption (Ades & Di Tella, 1999). This happens in a number of different
23 ways. First, intense competition leads firms to search for any advantage that might help them
24 to beat competitors (Oliver, 1997). One potential source of advantage is to engage in corrupt
25 activity that ensures access to a lucrative contract or excludes competitors from a normally
26 competitive process. Second, the impression (true or not) that competitors are engaging in
27 corrupt behavior can lead to pressure to follow suit in order to maintain the firm’s
28 competitive position (Collins, Uhlenbruck & Rodriguez, 2009). Finally, corrupt practices can
29 be seen to be a way to reduce risk and uncertainty (Søreide, 2009), and as such can be an
30 attractive option for firms whose managers (or cultures) are highly risk averse.
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Third, the role of companies in corruption is generally different. Companies are often
4 the source of the funds that corrupt governments (or other firms). They function as the
5 “supply-side” in corrupt transactions and how funds are made available for these transactions
6 in ways that bypass the generally well-developed financial management systems that exist in
7 most firms is an interesting and under-researched area. Closely related to this is the fact that
8 the negative impact of the corrupt activity is often on the shareholders of the company rather
9 than on the citizens of a government. Understanding the impact and degree of harm of
10 different forms of corruption on different stakeholders remain unexamined.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21 Combining all of these differences means that we need to understand the
22 particularities of corporate corruption as a complement to understanding corruption in
23 government.² Corruption in firms is distinctive just as the organizational form is distinctive,
24 and we, therefore, require a distinct and well-thought-out theory of corporate corruption that
25 is sensitive to these differences.
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 There is, of course, a growing stream of research in management that focuses on
34 corporate corruption recognizing the corporation’s role in enabling, or even causing,
35 government corruption (e.g., De Jong & Bogmans, 2011) and shedding light on high-profile
36 corporate failures and industry crises (e.g., Iriyama, Kishore & Talukdar, 2016). However,
37 the literature on corporate corruption remains fragmented and there has been only very
38 limited recognition of the potential of bringing together the various streams of existing
39 literature into an overarching theory of corporate corruption. As a result, the impact of
40 management research on thinking about corruption remains limited. We believe that
41 management scholars have an opportunity to draw on their specialized knowledge of the
42 corporation more systematically, as well as conduct new research using the specialized
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

59 ² A parallel argument also holds for charities and social enterprises of course. However, a proper discussion of
60 corruption in the third sector lies outside the focus of this paper.

1
2
3 research methods that exist in management, to shed light on this critically important problem
4
5 and to provide guidance as to how it might best be tackled.
6
7

8 In the remainder of this article, we will proceed in four steps. First, we develop a
9
10 definition of corporate corruption and identify the particularities and complexities of
11
12 corruption involving firms. Corporate corruption may be inside a single firm, maybe between
13
14 firms, or may involve a firm and the government. What is important is for management
15
16 researchers to focus on the actors within the firm, understand their motivation to engage in
17
18 corrupt activities, and to work towards a comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms
19
20 underlying corporate corruption.
21
22

23
24 Second, we review the existing literature in management and adjacent literatures to
25
26 identify four key perspectives on corporate corruption that span levels of analysis, deploy
27
28 different methodologies, and draw on different theoretical foundations: 1) corruption as
29
30 rational action; 2) corruption as institutionalized practice; 3) corruption as a cultural norm
31
32 and 4) corruption as a moral failure. To date, there have been few conversations between
33
34 these different perspectives, and it is important to begin these conversations to achieve a
35
36 comprehensive understanding of corporate corruption
37
38

39
40 Third, we discuss avenues for future research. We use the four theoretical
41
42 perspectives developed in our literature review to think through some of the more important
43
44 directions for future research. To do so, we use a simple taxonomy of empirical contexts to
45
46 organize our discussion: we discuss potential areas of research within established
47
48 corporations, between corporations, and between corporations and governments.
49
50

51
52 Finally, we discuss some areas of research in management that we believe have
53
54 particular promise for contributing to the development of a theory of corporate corruption,
55
56 but which currently play a limited role including entrepreneurship, innovation, CSR, and
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 organizational stigma. We also discuss some of the methodological challenges that
4
5 researchers face in researching corporate corruption.
6
7

8 9 **DEFINING CORPORATE CORRUPTION**

10
11 Corruption is a complex and contested construct in the academic literature with many
12
13 definitions proposed by different authors across multiple disciplines. Our objective in this
14
15 section is not to provide an exhaustive review of different conceptualizations of corruption
16
17 (see Rothstein & Varrach, 2017 for such a review), but rather to define corporate corruption
18
19 and show how it is distinct from some of the existing conceptualizations of corruption. We
20
21 will begin by discussing some common definitions of corruption and then introduce our
22
23 definition of corporate corruption.
24
25

26 27 **Existing Definitions of Corruption**

28
29 In much of the literature on corruption, the focus has been on the motivation and
30
31 activities of corrupt government officials from an economics perspective (e.g., Bardhan,
32
33 1997; Lambsdorff, 2007; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Svensson, 2005; Treisman, 2000). The
34
35 mechanism driving corruption from this perspective is a simple cost-benefit analysis:
36
37 corruption occurs when officials calculate that the gain from corruption exceeds the potential
38
39 loss from being caught. Corruption is defined as “the abuse of public power for private
40
41 benefit” (e.g., Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh & Eden, 2006, p. 402).
42
43
44
45

46
47 In anthropology and sociology, researchers have diverged from this approach and the
48
49 focus has been more on the social context in which corruption occurs. No longer is the
50
51 corrupt official a rational actor, but rather an actor embedded in a social system and a culture.
52
53 In other words, this approach “emphasizes the importance of context in a deep sense” (Muir
54
55 & Gupta, 2018, p. S13). Research on corruption becomes an exercise in interpretation in
56
57 order to understand the cultural schema of those involved and the social structure in which it
58
59 occurs (e.g., Fisman & Miguel, 2007).
60

1
2
3 Finally, in political science, corruption is again something involving government and
4 the abuse of a formal position for private gain. But, interestingly, corruption can also happen
5 at an institutional level: “Institutional corruption is manifest when there is a systemic and
6 strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical, that undermines the institution’s
7 effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose”
8 (Lessig, 2013, p. 553). This latter conceptualization of corruption would include the state
9 capture of government entities by private businesses that have been reported in some
10 countries or simply elites passing laws that are advantageous to their interests while
11 disadvantaging the majority of citizens even if the laws are seen as acceptable by citizens.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24 What is important to keep in mind is that these definitions lead researchers to focus on
25 different aspects of corruption, to propose different ideas about the mechanisms that underpin
26 corruption, and to use different methods to study it. To help highlight these differences, we
27 have summarized the different definitions of corruption in Table 1 in a stylized way including
28 our conceptualization of corporate corruption that we will turn to next.
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

36 -----
37 *Insert Table 1 about here*
38 -----

39 **Corporate Corruption**

40
41 In many instances of government corruption, corporations are central actors
42 representing the “supply-side” of corruption. For instance, a corporate official may pay a
43 bribe to a government official in return for a favor, even if it means a loss to other segments
44 of society. But corruption may also take place completely within a corporate setting without
45 the involvement of a government official at all. For example, corporate corruption occurs
46 when corporate officers under pressure to hit targets fake the results of safety tests on
47 products to avoid costly changes to products, when officials in gambling companies receive
48 bribes to allow illegal bets in the sports industry, or when company officials pay bribes to a
49 bank to ensure a positive decision on a loan application. We would argue that the corporate
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 context of at least part of the corrupt exchange delineates a type of corruption that deserves to
4
5 be recognized and studied in its own right.
6

7
8 Within the management literature, definitions of corruption vary but generally fail to
9
10 highlight the fact that corruption is happening within a corporation. For example, in a recent
11
12 paper, Cuervo-Cazurra reflects a common idea of corruption when he defines corruption as
13
14 “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (2016, p. 36). Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson and
15
16 Trevino broaden the discussion and define corruption as “both a state and a process” and
17
18 argue that “the concept of corruption reflects not just the corrupt behavior of any single
19
20 individual – defined as the illicit use of one’s position or power for perceived personal or
21
22 collective gain – but also the dangerous, virus-like 'infection' of a group, organization, or
23
24 industry” (2008, p. 671). Ashforth and Anand add an interesting aspect by including
25
26 organizational gain rather than simply personal gain defining corruption as “the misuse of
27
28 authority for personal, subunit and/or organizational gain” (2003, p. 2). In other words, there
29
30 may be cases where corruption is driven by a desire for organizational advantage rather than
31
32 individual profit.
33
34
35
36

37
38 Reflecting these discussions, we define corporate corruption as *the misuse of formal*
39
40 *power by a corporate representative for personal and/or organization benefit*. This definition
41
42 differs from more traditional definitions in two important ways. First, it focuses on an actor
43
44 located in a corporation and not in a government organization of some kind. This, as we
45
46 discussed above, has many important ramifications in terms of the organizational context that
47
48 this actor is embedded in and that shapes their motivations as well as the available resources,
49
50 organizational culture, and systems of governance. Theories of corruption in government may
51
52 hold in this very different environment, but often they will not, and we need theories that
53
54 explicitly take into account the corporate context of this sort of corruption.
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Second, this definition focuses explicitly on the important differences in the benefits
4 and harms of corporate corruption. As Gutman and Lucas (2018, p. 748-749) argue,
5
6 “[p]rivate-sector corruption can be distinguished from public-sector corruption in that the
7
8 individual abusing a position of power holds a private, not a public office, which implies that
9
10 the harmed principal is a private entity”. So, the harm caused by corporate corruption is often
11
12 at the expense of the shareholders and other stakeholders of the corporation rather than
13
14 society as in government corruption.
15
16

17
18 At the same time, it is not always this simple. It is not that the public loss of
19
20 government corruption simply becomes a private loss to the shareholders of the firm in
21
22 corporate corruption. In fact, some corrupt activities are actually carried out to benefit the
23
24 firm and its shareholders. Bribes paid to gain a contract that would otherwise have been lost
25
26 may be repaid many times over by the profit from the contract. So, this aspect of corporate
27
28 corruption is more complex and requires more attention and investigation to develop a theory
29
30 of the costs and benefits from corporate corruption of sufficient nuance to capture this
31
32 complex phenomenon.
33
34
35

36
37 To help clarify our definition and its relation to more traditional definitions of
38
39 corruption in government, we have depicted the traditional focus of corruption research with
40
41 corporate corruption in Figure 1. As the figure highlights, while there is an overlap between
42
43 corporate corruption and government corruption, we reverse foreground and background in
44
45 order to focus on the corporation as the unit of analysis. We argue in the remainder of this
46
47 article that this highlights a set of issues that deserve separate attention and recognition as a
48
49 separate theoretical domain.
50
51
52

53
54
55
56 -----
57 *Insert Figure 1 here*
58 -----
59
60

METHODOLOGY

In order to understand the “state of the art” in corporate corruption research, we began with an analysis of research on corruption in the broader social sciences. This literature is important for us here as it provides the foundation for much of the existing corporate corruption research in management. To reflect this, we have included the five most cited articles from the premier journals in sociology, economics, and political science in our corpus of articles. Additionally, we consulted experts in the field for direction on particularly important articles and themes. From this analysis, we were able to observe the influence of adjacent literatures on our understandings of corruption, refine our understanding of corporate corruption in management, and identify relevant research opportunities for management researchers.

Next, we reviewed the literature on corruption in the field of management. We began with a search of the standard management journals databases (e.g., Web of Science, Scopus, EBSCO) exploring articles that had *corrupt** in their title, abstract or as keywords and/or *nepotism, embezzlement, state capture* and *bribe(s)* (which corresponds to the ways that corruption is most commonly operationalized). Initially, we found 1693 management journal articles that mentioned corruption.

Given the large number of articles that we identified, we systematically limited our review to articles from high-quality journals following Short’s (2009) suggestion to minimize random sampling. More specifically, we restricted our review to top journals in management as defined by the ABS journals list (4 and 4*). We also included top journals in the fields of business ethics, international business, leadership, entrepreneurship/innovation, and marketing as these fields are key areas for understanding corruption in business. Due to its relevance to the topic of corruption, we also included the *Journal of Business Ethics*. We then discarded all of the articles where corporate corruption was not a core concern of the paper or

1
2
3 where the paper focused solely on topics adjacent to corruption. This left us with 144
4
5 articles³.
6
7

8 9 **CORRUPTION RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES**

10
11 In the period after the Second World War, interest in corruption increased rapidly
12
13 across the social sciences (Farrales, 2005; Odilla, 2016; Osrecki, 2017). In this section, we
14
15 explore the different perspectives on corruption that developed during this period. We begin
16
17 by looking at more macro approaches largely influenced by sociology and anthropology. We
18
19 then focus on the approaches developed at the individual level of analysis prevalent in
20
21 economics and political science. What is clear from our discussion is that corporations have
22
23 not been a key focus of study in the corruption literature in the social sciences to date.
24
25
26

27 **Macro-Societal Influences on Corruption**

28
29
30 *Sociology.* In sociology, the focus has largely been on the relation between societal
31
32 structures and corruption. Put simply, the interesting question from a sociological point of
33
34 view is how social structure shapes the probability and nature of corruption and how that, in
35
36 turn, affects the society in question. Many existing studies focus on how the behavior of
37
38 agents is conditioned by the normative rules of society and corruption is seen as a departure
39
40 from socially accepted norms. Empirical research is often based on large scale case studies of
41
42 societies and uses various forms of qualitative and quantitative data. At the same time, views
43
44 on corruption and how best to investigate it has varied dramatically.
45
46
47

48
49 While it might seem surprising from today's perspective, in the 1950s and 1960s there
50
51 was a debate in sociology about whether corruption could be functional for the societies in
52
53 which it occurred (Osrecki, 2017). Some researchers did not see corruption as necessarily
54
55 negative or bad (Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964; Nye, 1967), as it could be a means to create
56
57
58

59 ³ Please contact the authors for a complete list of the articles included and further details on the search
60 methodology.

1
2
3 cohesion in a conflicted society, enable social mobility, and allow stability by distributing
4 wealth that was too often concentrated in political centers. To Nye (1967, p. 417), for
5 example, “[c]orruption has probably been, on balance, a positive factor in both Russian and
6
7 American economic development.”
8
9

10
11
12 These scholars identified a number of positive impacts of corruption and studied the
13 use of corrupt practices to, for example, allow industrial elites to insert themselves into a
14 political system dominated by aristocrats by buying peerages in Europe (Scott, 1969). This
15 positive role was nicely summarized by Huntington (1968, p. 68) who argued: “Corruption
16 may be one way of surmounting traditional laws or bureaucratic regulations which hamper
17 economic expansion”. In other words, from this rather optimistic view, corruption could
18
19 “grease the wheels” and allow much needed change.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

28
29 Interestingly, more recently scholars have adopted a similar functionalist perspective
30 when talking about corruption in international business. Mungiu-Pippidi summarized this
31 functionalist view of corruption in the world of multinationals succinctly: “While the
32 international anticorruption community is putting unprecedented pressure on international
33 businesses not to bribe their way into foreign markets, such markets are often strictly
34 controlled by the favoritism of national governments...bribery is the only way in for
35 outsiders” (2006, p. 110). From this perspective, corruption is seen as an informal way of
36 changing entrenched and otherwise unchangeable social structures and practices, and not as
37 necessarily negatively impacting society on balance. And, interestingly, this functionalist
38 perspective has recently re-appeared in the innovation literature where Krammer (2019)
39 argues once again that corruption aids innovation by “greasing the wheels”.
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

54 However, among sociologists, this view lost support over time. Many scholars began
55 to argue that the overall impact of corruption was negative as well as highlighting the
56 immoral nature of this sort of activity. As Noonan argues:
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 [B]ribery is universally shameful...In no country do bribe takers speak
4 publicly of their bribes, or bribe givers announce bribes they pay. No
5 newspaper lists them. No one advertises that he can arrange a bribe. No one
6 is honored precisely because he is a big briber or pays a big bribe. (1984, p.
7 702).
8
9

10 Other researchers began to conduct empirical research on the economic implications
11 of corruption in societies, arguing that “corruption lowers private investment, thereby
12 reducing economic growth, even in subsamples of countries in which bureaucratic
13 regulations are very cumbersome” (Mauro, 1995, p. 683). Over time, the idea of a strong
14 negative association between corruption and investment and growth in a country was
15 accepted by the majority of sociologists (and other social scientists for that matter).
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24 In addition, the limitations of focusing on certain idiosyncratic case studies began to
25 be recognized by sociologists and the idea that corruption had positive effects was
26 increasingly seen as having limited generalizability (Krause Hansen & Tang-Jensen, 2015;
27 Jancsics, 2014). In response, quantitative studies that could claim a greater degree of
28 generalizability became increasingly popular. These studies focused largely on government
29 corruption and sought to use standard operationalizations of corruption and apply rigorous
30 quantitative methods to measuring and analyzing data:
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

40 [T]his reduction of complexity in analytically handling corruption had one
41 crucial advantage: it made corruption numerically measurable, comparable,
42 and transparent by skipping the fuzzy cases and concentrating on a single
43 bureaucratic form of corruption that could be treated as one-dimensional.
44 Instead of differentiating between diverse forms of corruption (within
45 nation-states or among them), this approach allowed to explain variations
46 in whole countries (Osrecki, 2017, p. 118).
47
48

49 While sociological research on corruption using these methods and with this
50 theoretical focus began to diminish in the late 1970s, the economics view of corruption
51 gained ground continuing the move towards mostly quantitative research based on principal-
52 agent theory.
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 More recently, however, a complement to principal-agent theory was developed as
4 social scientists started looking at corruption as a collective action problem (Olson, 2009). By
5 collective action, researchers mean a collaborative and sustained process of cooperation
6 between stakeholders. Collective action increases the impact and credibility of individual
7 action, brings potentially vulnerable organizations into an alliance of like-minded
8 organizations, and levels the playing field between competitors. Collective action “can
9 complement or temporarily substitute for and strengthen weak local laws and anti-corruption
10 practices” (World Bank, 2008, p. 4).

11
12 Furthermore, collective action theories challenge principal-agent theory in an
13 interesting and profound way. Put simply, they challenge the assumption that a group of
14 “principals” exists that are willing to enforce regimes of monitoring and punishment for
15 corrupt dealings. As Persson, et al. argue, this “is because, quite contrary to what principal-
16 agent theory suggests, collective action theory contests the view that strategic situations
17 always in themselves give the actors the answer to the question what strategy is the most
18 rational to opt for” (2013, p. 456). Rather, in a situation where corruption is widespread,
19 acting corruptly becomes the only sensible option even if individual actors believe corruption
20 is wrong and understand that everyone is worse off as a result. They understand that if they
21 do not act corruptly, the costs will be high, and the game will not change. In these contexts,
22 the monitoring devices and punishment regimes of principal/agent theory are of little use as
23 there are no principals to enact them.

24
25 Social structure matters in explaining the emergence and persistence of corrupt
26 practices. At the same time, and perhaps even more importantly, the social structure explains
27 why some countries have little corrupt behavior. In fact, from this perspective, and perhaps
28 ironically given our discussion in the preceding paragraph, the prevention of corruption also

1
2
3 requires collective action to enforce norms that prohibit corruption. As Mungiu-Pippidi
4
5 eloquently states:
6

7
8 A society capable of collective action is capable of controlling its most
9 violent or selfish tendencies, such as the extreme individualism and
10 divisiveness that pervades societies governed by a tyranny, where no one
11 trusts anyone else, and each person acts on his behalf and against anyone
12 who stands in his way. In short, the capacity for collective action is a public
13 good that derives from extensive social interaction (2013, p. 106).
14

15
16 *Anthropology.* Anthropologists focus on how corruption is perceived according to
17
18 different societal standards and beliefs, based on the point of view of an observed group
19 (Malinowski, 2013). Where sociologists focus on social structure, anthropologists focus
20 specifically on “a society’s culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in
21 order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members” (Goodenough, 1964, p. 36), as a way
22 to understand what corruption is and why it occurs. Anthropologists attempt to deemphasize
23 moral judgments by adopting a local perspective and recognizing that different cultures have
24 different moral values. Anthropologists use ethnography, participant observation, and face-
25 to-face or group interviews in an effort to come to a deep understanding of the social milieu
26 in which corruption takes place.
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

38
39 From this perspective, corruption is often understood as a tool for social cohesion in
40 society (closer to previous views of sociology). Moreover, corruption is dynamic and
41 heterogeneous and there is often a dichotomy between the public and private spheres (Nuijten
42 & Anders, 2007). At times, “corrupt” (from an external viewpoint) practices are accepted in
43 society and are even morally justified. What is, and what is not, corruption is decided based
44 on local meanings and local understandings and there is no one definition of corruption.
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

52
53 A contentious point in these analyses is the use of societal written laws to delineate
54 corruption. Law enforcement agents are not “neutral” beings and can be influenced by the
55 political elite (Moore, 2000). Through regulatory capture, rules can be fixed for the benefit of
56 the elite or can be increased in complexity to create additional opportunities for extorting
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 bribes. Furthermore, anti-corruption campaigns can be used selectively against political
4
5 enemies. Therefore, suggesting that something is corrupt because it is illegal, or not corrupt
6
7 because it is legal, has little meaning from this point of view.
8
9

10 Anthropologists also have an interest in the interaction of different levels of culture.
11
12 From this point of view, distinct cultures can develop at a societal level but also at the level
13
14 of subgroups like ethnic communities and organizations. For our discussions here,
15
16 organizational culture is particularly important as it affects both governmental and corporate
17
18 actors. An insider can often protect and justify deviance, including corruption, within an
19
20 organization.
21
22

23
24 Corporate culture may be equally or more important than one's cultural
25
26 heritage when it comes to guiding ethical behavior and shaping attitudes
27
28 about fraud. However, companies may not put sufficient emphasis on
29
30 establishing their own corporate culture and risk the local culture filling the
31
32 void (Lloyd Bierstaker, 2009, p. 247).

33 For these scholars, due to the complexities of culture, the imposition of anti-
34
35 corruption policies or universal standards are problematic and often a recipe for failure. There
36
37 is thus is a need for a "local" point of view in developing anti-corruption policies and
38
39 programs.

40 **Micro-Societal Influences on Corruption**

41
42 Rational theories of corruption at the micro-level mostly stem from agency theory
43
44 (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1978). In agency theory, the
45
46 principal-agent problem appears when there is a delegation of decision-making authority by a
47
48 "principal" to an "agent" through a contract to perform some service. If both parties to the
49
50 relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not
51
52 always act in the best interests of the principal. The principal can "limit divergences from his
53
54 interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs
55
56 designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent" (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308). At
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 its most basic, this perspective focuses on how the principal can ensure the agent acts in his
4
5 or her interests with a minimum of monitoring costs.
6
7

8 In the most common form of this problem, the principals are the owners, regulators,
9
10 or other actors in position of power, and agents are the business executives and decision-
11
12 makers engaged by the principals to run a firm. Principals offer incentives as a way to deter
13
14 agents from engaging in corruption. The magnitude of incentives is based on the trade-off
15
16 between the costs of incentives and the costs of monitoring agents. When incentives are not
17
18 aligned between the principal and the agent, it creates an opportunity for corrupt practices to
19
20 emerge.
21
22

23 Economists and political scientists generally focus on financial and managerial
24
25 incentives, and transactions between individuals and agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rose-
26
27 Ackerman, 1978). Discretion allows agents to exploit opportunities for personal gain
28
29 (Klitgaard, 1988) and corrupt benefits are positively associated with officials' degree of
30
31 control over services and discretion in choosing the distribution of resources (Neu, Everett,
32
33 Rahaman & Martinez, 2013). Government bureaucracies and their resource allocations,
34
35 therefore, lead to moral hazards (Banerjee, Hanna & Mullainathan, 2012), and the nature of
36
37 monitoring and punishment and the intrinsic motivation of bureaucrats matters in this line of
38
39 studies. Poor regulatory control can lead to ambiguity in institutional controls. Uncertainty
40
41 also provides discretion, which can lead to strategies and practices influenced by field
42
43 habitués, and corrupt processes may become part of the market itself (Goodrick & Salancik,
44
45 1996).
46
47
48
49
50

51 Finally, New Institutional Economics scholars view corruption as a deviation from
52
53 some sort of socially embedded rule, such as a contract, law, or moral code. In other words,
54
55 although the principal-agent relationship is important, so is the institutional context:
56
57

58 [P]rincipals and agents operate within an institutional context. The insights
59
60 of institutional economics are closely related to the economic analysis of

1
2
3 corruption. Institutional economists and their political science fellow
4 travelers stress the way the institutional context affects the behavior of
5 individuals. They respond to the incentives, both carrots, and sticks, created
6 by institutions, broadly defined (Rose-Ackerman, 2010, p. 49).
7

8
9 Scholars working from this perspective believe that corruption can be managed
10 through institutional design where appropriate arrangements reduce opportunistic incentives
11 for corrupt practices (Della Porta & Vannucci, 2012, p. 2). In other words, some institutional
12 arrangements encourage corruption, while others make it less likely. Researchers working
13 from this perspective focus on understanding how the institutional context shapes and limits
14 corrupt behavior by shaping the decision making of individuals.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23 **Summary**

24
25 In this section, we have briefly reviewed how corruption has been discussed by
26 various fields in the social sciences. Sociology's main contribution to the analysis is
27 examining the role of social structure and offering some explanations regarding the
28 mechanisms underpinning corrupt practices. Sociology also helps explain how corruption
29 develops over time based on societal and organizational changes. Public agents, even when
30 interacting with private parties, are at the center of most empirical and theoretical studies.
31 These studies tend to mainly focus on public corruption and tend to take for granted the role
32 of the corrupted agent. They assume that corruption can be reduced by interventions and
33 tweaks to the social structure. Among this community, there have been calls for a better
34 understanding of the underlying mechanisms of corruption (Philp & David-Barrett, 2015).
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48 Anthropology sheds light on the construction and acceptance of corrupt practices at
49 the boundaries of public and private spheres and points to the pivotal role of culture. It
50 provides a useful counter to the tendency in economics to make assumptions of “rational
51 actors” and highlights the importance of cultural context to what constitutes “rational” in
52 different groups. However, in many instances, the focus on meaning and individual
53 interaction limits observations to petty cases of corruption such as gift-giving as bribery
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 (Haller & Shore, 2005). As a result, it has provided little insight into major government
4 scandals or large-scale corporate graft involving corrupt insiders (although see Jackall, 1988
5 for an interesting corporate exception). This perspective also suffers from a tendency to a
6 kind of relativism where corruption is what is defined locally as corruption and therefore
7 undermines attempts to develop international standards for identifying and tackling
8 corruption.
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17 Economic approaches explain the use of incentives and are very helpful in
18 understanding the decision making that underlies individual decisions to engage in
19 corruption. Rational views advocating transparency, monitoring, and sanctions are important
20 and useful in reducing corruption. However, understanding the role of context is also
21 essential when exploring corruption (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015). Both social structure and
22 culture condition what is considered corruption and also the way individual decision-makers
23 evaluate a situation. Furthermore, issues regarding the public's perception of corruption have
24 a direct link to individual and firm expectations about the pervasiveness of corruption and
25 therefore their tendency to participate. Furthermore, although rational agents can engage in a
26 collective reform effort to coordinate efforts to fight corruption, both gradual changes and
27 shocks shape the macro perceptions of corruption and can have a huge impact on anti-
28 corruption efforts (Castro & Ansari, 2017).
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

45 **CORPORATE CORRUPTION IN MANAGEMENT RESEARCH**

46
47 During our review of the management literature on corruption, we identified four key
48 perspectives on corporate corruption: 1) corruption as rational action; 2) corruption as
49 institutionalized practice; 3) corruption as a cultural norm and 4) corruption as a moral
50 failure. These four perspectives are conceptually distinct and provide different, but
51 complementary, ways of conceptualizing corporate corruption. They are also at very different
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 levels of development, with some having received considerable attention from management
4
5 scholars while others are more nascent.
6

7
8 While all of the perspectives have clear connections to one or more of the social
9
10 science disciplines, it is not a one-to-one mapping. It also is clear from our analysis that while
11
12 the research produced by management scholars is beginning to make a distinct contribution to
13
14 our understanding of corruption by focusing on corruption involving firms, this is as much a
15
16 happy accident as it is a result of an awareness of the importance of corporate corruption as
17
18 an area of research or an understanding of the potential of management research to contribute
19
20 a new and valuable perspective to corruption research. And, much remains to be done. Our
21
22 goal in this section is to provide a typology of the approaches to corporate corruption we
23
24 identified in the management literature. We will then use the typology we develop here in the
25
26 next section when we discuss areas for further research.
27
28
29

30 31 **Corporate Corruption as Rational Action** 32

33
34 From this perspective, corporate corruption is perpetrated by rational actors who act
35
36 corruptly due to the benefit they receive from corruption (Vogt, 1997). Actors conduct a cost-
37
38 benefit calculation that includes the potential gain from corrupt actions, the probability of
39
40 being caught (including, at the extreme, a perception of impunity), and potential penalties.
41
42 The severity of the potential penalties matters since it will directly affect the expected returns
43
44 of the agent when deciding whether to engage in corrupt activities (Jeong & Weiner, 2012).
45
46 The size of the gain also directly influences the perception of the attractiveness of corrupt
47
48 behavior – a high bribe, for example, will lead to higher temptation and make it more likely
49
50 that the agent will act in a corrupt manner (Rabl & Kuhlmann, 2008; Rabl, 2011).
51
52
53

54 ***Legal enforcement and punishment.*** Scholars working from this perspective tend to
55
56 focus on the legal system and argue that law abidance by firms and their representatives
57
58 depends on the penalties and incentives that exist in different countries (Biswas, 2017;
59
60

1
2
3 Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1978). If there are significant incentives for corruption,
4
5 then there must be similarly significant penalties and the penalties must be public and likely
6
7 to occur to stop corruption. As Biswas argues:
8
9

10 Knowledge of repeated violations of the law in public places without any
11 accompanying punishment within a reasonable time span takes away the
12 incentives for the common people to obey the law. This creates a vicious
13 cycle of non-compliance and mass imitation that touches every sphere of
14 social life (2017, p. 565).
15

16 Many rational actor studies of corruption look at different aspects of the situation that
17 affect the likelihood of corruption occurring such as the risk of corporations being penalized
18 and the transaction costs involved (Lambsdorff, 2002), the difficulty of performing the
19 corrupt act (Ajzen, 1991), risk of disclosure (Carrillo, 1999), and expected penalties (Goel &
20 Rich, 1989). Therefore, the structure and effectiveness of the legal system are key to
21 deterring corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Tanzi, 1998; Treisman, 2000) and the legal and
22 normative context directly affects agent behavior (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

32 The legal system also has an international dimension and research suggests that when
33 many countries enforce anti-corruption treaties together – such as OECD’s (1997) *Anti-*
34 *Bribery Convention* – it tends to deter cross-border corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). Also,
35 there is evidence that multinational corporations consider the risks of cross-border bribery
36 and how well anti-bribery laws are enforced at home (Jeong & Wiener, 2012). Therefore,
37 uncertainty in applying the law, perceptions of corruption, or low compliance by others, and a
38 lack of effectiveness of enforcement can encourage corrupt practices in international
39 business.
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

50 ***Entering new markets.*** There is also evidence that corruption not only affects existing
51 international activity but also plays an important role in decisions to enter new markets.
52 When deciding to engage in business abroad, managers see corruption as a part of the rules of
53 the game, a “pay to play” arrangement, or a “tax” that must be included when accessing
54 the game, a “pay to play” arrangement, or a “tax” that must be included when accessing
55 the game, a “pay to play” arrangement, or a “tax” that must be included when accessing
56 the game, a “pay to play” arrangement, or a “tax” that must be included when accessing
57 the game, a “pay to play” arrangement, or a “tax” that must be included when accessing
58 the game, a “pay to play” arrangement, or a “tax” that must be included when accessing
59 the game, a “pay to play” arrangement, or a “tax” that must be included when accessing
60

1
2
3 future business activity (Jeong & Weiner, 2012; Spencer & Gomez, 2011). Rational analysis
4
5 sees corruption as a cost of doing business that is factored into the decision to enter (Jensen,
6
7 Li & Rahman, 2010; Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
8
9

10 However, contrary to a tax, it has an extra layer of complexity due to the secrecy and
11
12 illegality of corrupt behaviors (Schleifer & Vishny, 1993). Corruption can lead to decreases
13
14 in the amount firms are willing to invest or the amount they will pay during mergers and
15
16 acquisitions in countries abroad (Weitzel & Berns, 2006). National laws, therefore, have a
17
18 strong impact on the decision of firms to invest abroad. Furthermore, firms whose parent
19
20 offices operate or are headquartered in countries with strong anti-corruption standards
21
22 (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006) face more significant consequences of engaging in corruption
23
24 internationally making it less attractive for them to engage in activity in corrupt jurisdictions.
25
26
27

28 In order to mitigate the risk of engaging in corrupt activities abroad, firms use
29
30 different strategies. These can range from outsourcing the corruption risk via the use of
31
32 middlemen (Biswas, 2017) to various forms of partnership with local business to exploit a
33
34 corrupt market:
35
36

37 [F]irms sometimes adapt to corruption not by avoiding entry altogether, but
38 by choosing nonequity entry instead. Nonequity entry provides an
39 opportunity for firms to participate in economies where corruption is high
40 while avoiding some of the costs of corruption. (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006, p.
41 410)
42
43

44 ***Ownership structure of firms and corruption.*** Several studies of corruption as
45
46 rational action explore the relationship between a corporation's ownership structure and
47
48 corrupt behavior (Clarke & Xu, 2004; Martin, Cullen, Johnson & Parboteeah, 2007; Wu,
49
50 2009). This relationship is important but complex and difficult to unpack. In particular, the
51
52 impact of ownership structure on the motivations of managers to engage in corruption is
53
54 important and only partially understood.
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 For example, if a manager in a publicly owned firm acts in a corrupt manner that
4 benefits the firm, it is he or she that will bear the brunt of the consequences if discovered.
5
6 The manager will be punished while the owners are not, due to limited liability contracts and
7
8 the presumption that shareholders are not accountable for managers' corrupt behaviors
9
10 (although fines paid by the firm are not uncommon). Shareholders will, therefore, receive the
11
12 majority of the benefits of corruption but bear little of the risk. It, therefore, stands to reason
13
14 that a manager will have more incentive to act in a corrupt manner if they have a larger
15
16 ownership stake in the firm (Randami & Witteloostuijn, 2012). This, of course, raises
17
18 important questions for those who argue for significant compensation in shares for top
19
20 management in order to align their incentives with those of the firm. While aligning
21
22 incentives, it also increases the benefits for corrupt activities and, according to this
23
24 perspective, increases the chances of corruption.
25
26
27
28
29

30 Managers in large, publicly listed companies and managers at state-owned firms are,
31
32 from this perspective, less likely to engage in corrupt behavior than owner-managers
33
34 (including entrepreneurs) with large stakes in the firm. Furthermore, some recent studies
35
36 examine how the likelihood of corrupt behavior increases when employee compensation is
37
38 perceived as poor despite the firm performing well as in some Chinese state-controlled
39
40 enterprises (SOEs) (Feng & Xu, 2018). Therefore, the firm's ownership affects managerial
41
42 behavior and incentives vis-à-vis corruption, and compensation levels matter in shaping
43
44 managers' behaviors (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, there is
45
46 some evidence that family ownership may have an effect on the likelihood of corruption and
47
48 the effectiveness of anti-corruption activities (Richards & Schembera, 2019).
49
50
51
52
53

54 Extending the analysis, transparency can decrease corruption since it increases the
55
56 risk of corrupt agents' activities being disclosed to the public and corporate investors and
57
58 increasing transparency has been identified as a lever to fight corruption (Halter, Arruda &
59
60

1
2
3 Halter, 2009; Klitgaard, 1988). Transparency studies and surveys on corruption have been
4
5 used in several studies of corruption that analyze external and internal factors affecting a
6
7 corporation's corrupt behaviors. The most widely used of the current surveys on corruption
8
9 are from Transparency International and the World Bank.
10
11

12 ***Summary and Limitations.*** The greatest strength of this perspective is that it is simple
13
14 to understand and apply, and it provides significant insight into the dynamics of corruption in
15
16 firms. At the same time, its simplicity is also its weakness. From this perspective, all firms
17
18 will engage in corruption if the incentives are high and the probability of detection or
19
20 penalties for corrupt behavior is low. Yet this is obviously not the case. Conversely, from this
21
22 perspective, if there is a low potential rent to be extracted from corruption, agents likely will
23
24 not be corrupt. Again, anecdotal evidence says otherwise.
25
26
27

28 In fact, different managers in different firms have very different responses to the same
29
30 situation meaning that while theorizing about rational agents may be a useful place to start in
31
32 understanding corporate corruption, there is more going on than a simple rational calculation.
33
34 Another limitation of rational analysis is the exclusive focus on financial incentives for
35
36 managers and firms, while both the incentives and the penalties for corporate corruption are,
37
38 in reality much more complex than simply financial gain or loss. Not all companies decide to
39
40 engage in corrupt practices even if financial incentives are high, or the risk of being caught
41
42 for corruption is low. We thus need other views for understanding corporate corruption to
43
44 capture other aspects of the complex dynamics of this phenomenon.
45
46
47
48

49 **Corporate Corruption as Institutionalized Practice**

50
51
52 The corporate corruption as an institutionalized practice perspective grows out of the
53
54 extensive literature on neoinstitutional theory that has developed in sociology and
55
56 management (Greenwood, Lawrence & Meyer, 2017). This perspective highlights the fact
57
58 that corporate corruption does not happen exclusively as a result of strategic calculation, but
59
60

1
2
3 is also affected by the institutionalized practices that characterize the organizational field –
4
5 the “community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose
6
7 participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside
8
9 the field” (Scott, 1995, p. 56) – in which an organization is embedded (Moy, Lam & Chu,
10
11 2008). Certain practices become the legitimate way business is done in this community of
12
13 organizations and organizations face significant pressures if they deviate from these
14
15 practices.
16
17

18
19 ***Corrupt behavior and institutionalized practices.*** Institutions, from this perspective,
20
21 are “agreements about the correct way to do things” (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996, p. 1) within
22
23 an organizational field. Institutionalized practices, in turn, are “relatively widely diffused
24
25 practices, technologies, or rules” (Lawrence, Hardy, Phillips, 2002, p. 282) that have become
26
27 entrenched and taken-for-granted. Any agent’s behavior is strongly conditioned by the
28
29 institutionalized practices in place in the field of which their organization is a part (Scott,
30
31 2008). As agents, managers respond to their social environment, including the institutional
32
33 pressures from the institutional context (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).
34
35
36

37
38 From this perspective, even “bad” social behavior, such as corrupt practices, may
39
40 become institutionalized – that is, they can attain a “‘social fact’ quality [that] renders them
41
42 as the only conceivable, ‘obvious,’ or ‘natural’ way to conduct an organizational activity”
43
44 (Oliver, 1991, p. 148) – within an organizational field, leading to their becoming “the way we
45
46 do things around here”. While societal structures and institutions (e.g., well-functioning laws,
47
48 courts, prosecutors, police, etc.) may successfully prevent corruption in society, other
49
50 societies may lack such well-functioning bureaucracies and accountable institutions allowing
51
52 corrupt practices to flourish and, over time, become taken for granted. This process of
53
54 institutionalization is an important part of the explanation for the difficulty of stopping
55
56 corruption in fields where it has become common and widely accepted.
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 ***The influence of institutional context on managers.*** Organizations do not, of course,
4
5 take action independently of the individuals who run them. Managers are affected by
6
7 influences from the social environments in which they operate including the institutionalized
8
9 practices that exist within their field. Institutional elements have an impact on the
10
11 interpretation of corrupt actions and influence the boundaries between ethical and unethical
12
13 behavior in organizations (Scott, 2001). They may also be taken-for-granted as normal while
14
15 being recognized as corrupt. In settings where corruption flourishes, institutionalized corrupt
16
17 practices can be particularly hard to stop:
18
19

20
21 When a practice is widely seen as the way things are done, even harsh
22 sanctions may fail to change behaviors. Managers' perception of corruption
23 as taken for granted may lead them to believe that these acts are less likely
24 to be discovered or punished. (Collins et al., 2009, p. 102)
25
26

27 From this perspective, understanding the institutional pressures that lead to an
28
29 increase in the pervasiveness of corrupt practices within a firm or an industry is key. For
30
31 example, a high-status firm whose status is threatened will want to maintain its status and
32
33 will, therefore, have a higher probability of engaging in corrupt behaviors as the firm has
34
35 extensive resources and a strong motivation to be corrupt. High-status firms often have a
36
37 strong network and powerful mechanisms for engaging successfully in corrupt behavior
38
39 (Becker, 1963; Jeong & Siegel, 2018). Initial and limited corrupt acts may easily become
40
41 accepted and legitimated when carried out by high status firms. If lower status firms believe a
42
43 high-status firm has successfully maintained its position in this way, they will then be
44
45 motivated to engage in these behaviors also. The initial cost-benefit analysis of the first firm
46
47 will be replaced by a generalized belief that this is an acceptable way to conduct business and
48
49 the corrupt practices become institutionalized in the field.
50
51
52
53

54 The institutionalization of corruption might also occur due to a corporation's exposure
55
56 to intense competitive rivalry. As we discussed above, managers may begin to see corruption
57
58 as a way to marginally increase competitive advantage, especially if they believe that other
59
60

1
2
3 actors seem to be engaging in it (Iriyama et al., 2016). When several firms are involved in
4
5 this sort of situation, a corrupt activity can easily become seen as normal or “standard
6
7 practice” and institutionalized in an industry or organizational field. When making this
8
9 decision, there are several important factors that affect the probability of corruption including
10
11 organizational structure, environmental pressures, industry norms and structure, and financial
12
13 performance (Tonoyan, Strohmeier, Habib & Perlitz , 2010; Wu, 2009). Thus, there is both
14
15 the influence of the environment but also internal factors regarding the perceived competitive
16
17 advantage from corrupt actions.
18
19
20

21
22 Another area where institutional practices affect corporate corruption is when
23
24 dysfunctional practices become institutionalized that allow corrupt practices to be concealed.
25
26 For example, accounting professionals that should be auditing corporations and uncovering
27
28 any misbehavior may end up enabling corruption if their auditing practices become
29
30 institutionalized in a way that undermines their correct functioning (Gabbioneta, Greenwood,
31
32 Mazzola & Minoja, 2013). In the Enron (USA) and Parmalat (Italy) bankruptcy cases, for
33
34 example, institutional ascription – when professionals incorrectly “ascribe probity and
35
36 diligence to the behavior of other professionals” (Gabbioneta, Prakash & Greenwood, 2014,
37
38 p.16) – is one reason the accounting professionals in question failed to identify massive levels
39
40 of corruption.
41
42
43

44
45 *The effect of institutionalized corrupt practices on corporations.* In recognizing the
46
47 important role of the institutional context in corruption, this perspective also highlights the
48
49 importance of understanding the effects of institutionalized corrupt practices within
50
51 organizations and in particular the sorts of group dynamics enabling the adoption of corrupt
52
53 institutionalized practices. While the institutionalized practices exist at the field level, it is
54
55 actors within organizations that implement these practices. There are, therefore, important
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 questions about how corrupt practices in the environment come to be taken-for-granted in the
4
5 organization.

6
7
8 An organization where corrupt institutional practices are widely implemented – a
9
10 corrupt organization rather than a single corrupt manager – generally requires a powerful
11
12 collusive group that will act for the benefit of the group to the detriment of other
13
14 stakeholders. There have been several studies on the coordination of corrupt activities since
15
16 corruption requires systematic and institutionalized coordination of the dynamics inside
17
18 organizations. Even with highly institutional practices at the field level, everyone in the
19
20 organization is unlikely to be sanguine about the adoption of these practices. As Aven argues:
21
22

23
24 A central challenge of organizational criminals is to remain undetected
25 while simultaneously addressing the requirement of group coordination. In
26 contrast to noncorrupt project members, the members of corrupt projects
27 must account for the additional risk of discovery. Because organizational
28 crime increases the cost of information sharing for the individual, corrupt
29 members are motivated to limit communication behaviors that are
30 positively associated with group coordination and knowledge transfer
31 (2015, p. 933).
32
33

34 Institutionalized corruption relies on group collaboration (Granovetter, 2007). As
35
36 members spend more time as part of the corrupt group, reciprocity and transitivity increase in
37
38 an ongoing process that helps build insider trust (Molm, Takahashi & Peterson, 2000). The
39
40 more institutionalized corrupt practices become, the more excuses come from executives to
41
42 justify their deviant behaviors (Bernard, 2006; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). In fact, this is often
43
44 an important warning sign that corruption is happening within a corporation.
45
46
47

48 Another important aspect of the institutionalization of corruption is the socialization
49
50 of new members into corrupt practices. This process of socialization occurs through a number
51
52 of mechanisms including social network mechanisms, cognitive mechanisms, and emotional
53
54 mechanisms (Pinto, Leana & Pil, 2008). As these processes of socialization and
55
56 institutionalization proceed and deepen, actors become more tolerant of moral transgressions.
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 This is known as the “slippery slope” effect. (Gino & Bazerman, 2009) and can lead to
4
5 overconfidence, where people tend to underestimate the likelihood of being caught.
6
7

8 Communication among members is also essential for corporate corruption to happen
9
10 since there is a need to coordinate activities within the group. At the same time, there is an
11
12 incentive to limit information flows and interactions to limit the risk of detection (DiRienzo,
13
14 Das, Cort & Burbridge, 2007). Thus, there is a duality of keeping the corrupt information
15
16 hidden while sharing other necessary information for the execution of the practices with
17
18 noncorrupt members. For example, at Enron, researchers found that corrupt members reduced
19
20 the level of interaction they had with noncorrupt members (Aven, 2015).
21
22

23 ***Summary and limitations.*** The corruption as an institutionalized practice perspective
24
25 highlights the fact that corporate corruption does not necessarily or exclusively happen as a
26
27 rational strategic action, but also reflects the institutional environment that managers inhabit
28
29 (Moy, et al., 2008). So, while financial gain is an important driver of corporate corruption,
30
31 institutionalized practices at the organizational field level provide an important context that
32
33 shapes the behaviors of managers and can either encourage or discourage corruption (Collins
34
35 et al., 2009).
36
37
38

39 While this perspective adds an important dimension to discussions of corporate
40
41 corruption, it also has important theoretical and practical limitations. While it is useful for
42
43 understanding how corrupt practices become normalized and difficult to eradicate, it also
44
45 highlights institutional processes at the expense of agency. Corruption all too often seems to
46
47 be a natural consequence of organizational processes and the role of individual decision
48
49 making and the importance of norms and values becomes secondary. From a practical point
50
51 of view, institutional explanations can begin to sound like a defense of corrupt behavior and
52
53 this perspective has done little practically to help in the fight against corruption.
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Corruption as Cultural Norm

The corruption as a cultural norm perspective highlights the important role of culture in corporate corruption. According to Greve, Palmer and Pozner (2010, p. 66), “culture can be said to consist of assumptions about the nature of the world (e.g., the extent to which human nature is fundamentally competitive as opposed to cooperative), as well as norms, values, and beliefs about the kinds of attitudes and behaviors that are appropriate and good.”

Rooted in anthropology and more interpretive traditions in sociology, culture is symbolic and constructed in the communicative interaction of members of a society, organization, or group. Research into culture is therefore about understanding the meaning of things to members of a group and is generally qualitative and focused on a single case (although the case may be a society, an ethnic group, or an organization). As Geertz (1973, p. 5) eloquently observed, “Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning”.

The importance of culture in the study of corporate corruption is obvious: in defining what is appropriate and good, culture defines the line between correct behavior and corrupt behavior in the minds of organizational members. However, in any social group, the violation of some norms, values, and rules will be condemned, but the transgression of others will be overlooked (Vaughan, 1999). This degree of sanctioning is also culturally conditioned making the link between culture and corruption a complex one.

National cultures and corruption. The influence of national culture on corporations, both at their headquarters in their home country and in their operations in the countries in which they operate, is well established in the international business literature. This influence, of course, extends to corruption, and writers have made strong claims that “[h]igher levels of

1
2
3 informal corruption commonly occur in environments where culture, tradition, history, and
4
5 social norms reflect an acceptance and perhaps even encourage lower standards of ethical
6
7 behaviors that at best result in neutralizing firms' attempts to enforce formal standards”
8
9
10 (Keig, Brouthers & Marshall, 2015, p. 97).
11

12
13 Scholars generally agree that widespread petty corruption is positively correlated with
14
15 more significant corporate corruption. In fact, some authors have argued that this is a causal
16
17 relationship. For example, Keig et al., (2015, p. 90) observe that for multinational enterprises
18
19 “a continual flow of smaller, frequently occurring, common, local, corruption experiences,
20
21 observations, and perceptions” leads to higher levels of corporate corruption both in terms of
22
23 a larger transaction between individuals with significant formal power and in terms of
24
25 everyday “interactions between the firm’s employees, suppliers, customers, public, and other
26
27 stakeholders”.
28
29

30
31 It is also important to highlight that corruption is perceived differently in different
32
33 countries and culture is one explanation for these differences. Culture has been linked to
34
35 enabling or encouraging corruption (for example, the role of *guanxi* in corporate corruption
36
37 in China) at a national level. Studies on the relationship of culture and corporate corruption
38
39 have been conducted at the national or regional levels range in a range of countries including
40
41 Colombia, South Africa and USA (Bernardi, Witek & Melton, 2009), Japan (Black, 2004),
42
43 Russia (Venard, 2009), Korea (Horak, 2018), China (Huang & Rice, 2012; Steidlmeier, 1999;
44
45 Zhou, Han & Wang 2013) and also in broader regions of the world such Asia and Africa
46
47 (Birhanu, Gambardella & Valentini, 2016; Dela Rama, 2012).
48
49

50
51 Many empirical studies of national culture and corporate corruption use the
52
53 dimensions of culture developed by Hofstede (1980, 1991, 2001) to explore how culture
54
55 impacts corruption. Other studies focus on the importance of history in explaining these
56
57 corrupt social practices. For example, when dealing with long-ingrained practices such as
58
59
60

1
2
3 *guanxi* in China (Smart & Hsu, 2007), scholars argue that *guanxi* has played an important
4
5 role in China as an informal governance mechanism that has been far more important than
6
7 formal procedures and rules. But, from a Western perspective, these practices are seen as a
8
9 violation of bureaucratic norms and therefore a form of corruption. This also relates to the
10
11 question of gift-giving more generally, as is common in many cultures, which functions as a
12
13 bonding mechanism in society rather than a negative element or exchange of power and
14
15 influence. Gifts can contribute to increased cooperation and reciprocity, yet can be seen as
16
17 corrupt from a developed, Western point of view when they create a social debt (Mauss,
18
19 1990).
20
21
22

23
24 ***Organizational cultures and corruption.*** Culture is not simply something that occurs
25
26 at a societal level. Organizations also develop cultures and there is a growing literature on the
27
28 role of organizational culture in facilitating or preventing corrupt behaviors. Organizational
29
30 culture, in a commonly cited definition, is the “pattern of basic assumptions which a given
31
32 group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of
33
34 external adaptation and internal integration, which have worked well enough to be considered
35
36 valid, and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and
37
38 feel in relation to those problems” (Schein, 1985, p. 14).
39
40
41

42
43 In just the same way that societal culture shapes corruption, organizational culture
44
45 plays a central role in how likely corruption is to occur in an organization. For example,
46
47 organizations that have an overly competitive culture can foster organizational misconduct,
48
49 rule-breaking, and corrupt activities (Zahra, Priem & Rasheed, 2005), as can a culture which
50
51 encourages setting unrealistic financial goals (Vaughan, 1983). The recent VW diesel
52
53 emissions scandal is a compelling case in point.
54
55

56
57 The role of organizational culture in corporate corruption is an important
58
59 counterbalance to the idea that actors decide to be corrupt based simply on a rational
60

1
2
3 calculation of risks and benefits. While organizational culture doesn't determine whether
4 corruption occurs within a company, it plays a centrally important role by providing a context
5 where corruption is likely or unlikely: "as abundant interdisciplinary literature and case
6 studies have suggested, seeking for a general ethical standpoint in business relations is one
7 thing, creating the environment in which an organization builds up a compliance and integrity
8 culture is another" (Torsello, 2018).
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
There is also a growing literature on how to change culture in order to discourage
corruption. To change a corrupt culture, it may be necessary to modify ingrained habits and
practices:

[E]ndemic corruption requires changes in both the symbolism and
substance of corrupt institutional orders—through the creation of
alternative identities that cognitively and morally frame action differently,
and through the development of noncorrupt habits and practices rooted in
such newly constructed frameworks of meaning." (Misangyi, Weaver &
Elms, 2008, p. 751)

Other studies of corrupt corporate cultures have focused on the context of
international business (see Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016 for a review), where it is used to examine
corruption cross-culturally and, in particular, to understand the problems that multinationals
face when they encounter cultural differences and contrasting local beliefs about what
constitutes corruption.

Summary and limitations. The corruption as a cultural norm perspective makes an
important contribution to our understanding of corporate corruption. By highlighting the role
of culture, this perspective brings to the fore a number of important questions about what
corruption is and how cultural differences create important differences in understandings of
what constitutes corruption and in terms of what reaction is appropriate when corruption is
uncovered. At the same time, cultural perspectives can too easily blame corruption on culture
and relieve individuals of responsibility. It can also result in a form of cultural relativism
where corruption is defined by the local culture and as a result "anything goes".

Corruption as a Moral Failure

From this perspective, corruption is understood as rooted in a failure to apply ethical principles correctly and researchers seek to understand the failure of moral reasoning that led to the corrupt act. Based largely on moral philosophy, at the core of this perspective is the idea that what is corrupt can be defined *a priori* and the agreed principles applied in any situation. For instance, from this perspective, a moral failure occurred when the US business community complained that “U.S. firms were often put at a disadvantage in bidding for international contracts since their international competitors did not face such penalties for bribery, and that foreign competitors could often deduct bribes as a legitimate business expense” (McKinney & Moore, 2008, p.105). Clearly, from an ethical perspective, losing international competitiveness should not be a consideration when thinking about the moral wrong of paying bribes. Being ethical is not a matter of costs and benefits.

Exceptions notwithstanding (e.g., Li, 2009), most management research takes a highly negative stance on corruption, describing it as morally reprehensible, treating it as a moral failure, or a “social disease” (McKinney & Moore, 2008; Nielsen, 2003). This negative portrayal of corruption is often based on a particular moral philosophy – universal, Kantian type rules– with little engagement with other moral philosophies and ethical frameworks.

For instance, bribery has long been illegal and publicly frowned upon in Germany. However, up to 1995, international (but not domestic) bribes were considered to be tax-deductible by corporations (OECD, 2011), creating a tax subsidy for companies acting in corrupt ways outside of Germany that were considered immoral in Germany. At Siemens, a German multinational conglomerate, bribery was described as its “business model” and “line item” before it got caught and ended up paying \$1.6 billion in one of the largest fine for bribery in modern corporate history (Schubert & Millers, 2008). Thus, before the new legislation arrived to prohibit this practice, German law shielding corrupt practices abroad by

1
2
3 German firms, violated the Kantian categorical imperative: “Act only according to that
4 maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”.

5
6
7
8 ***Ethical decision making.*** Ethics relates to “right and wrong, moral duty and
9 obligation, moral principles and values, and moral character” (Beck, 2002, p. 13). These
10 principles are primarily developed during an individual’s process of cognitive moral
11 development (Blasi, 1980). Thus, ethical decision making is the process through which
12 individuals use their moral principles to determine whether a certain action is right or wrong.
13
14
15
16
17
18

19 Studies taking an ethical perspective on corruption have addressed the relationship
20 between “ought” and “is” in ethical philosophy, where the discrepancies between the values
21 and practices of corruption are taken into account as in logical positivism, and the two are not
22 treated as naturally consistent as they are in pragmatist philosophy (Gelbrich, Stedham &
23 Gätke, 2016). Differentiating “ought” and “is” helps explain that it is not just cultural
24 dimensions (e.g., power distance, individualism vs. collectivism, etc.) that explain corruption
25 propensities, but also corruption types such as whether it is pervasive or arbitrary, leading to
26 different prescriptions on how best to manage corruption in different contexts (Gelbrich et al.,
27 2016).
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

39 Various moral philosophies provide different, and sometimes conflicting, bases for
40 what is considered ethical, making the process highly complex. Coping with ethical
41 complexity is often inevitable and, at times, the unwelcome task confronting managers
42 (Treviño & Weaver, 2003). Ethical complexity describes situations where disagreements
43 occur over which norms and values are at stake, or which ethical principles should be given
44 priority (Gehman, Trevino & Garud, 2013). For example, when does a tip to show
45 appreciation for good service become a bribe? How should this decision be made?
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

55 Because of indeterminacy and equivocality, no predefined universally accepted or
56 Kantian principle can completely resolve moral ambiguity and ethical complexity (Clegg,
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Kornberger & Rhodes, 2006). The particulars of any given situation or context are mutable,
4
5 indeterminate, and nonrepeatable. However, this does not mean that any or every kind of
6
7 behavior can be justified in morally complex situations such as grey areas of corruption.
8
9 Moral standards are socially and culturally constructed, and different societal contexts can
10
11 have diverse and multiple moralities. Thus, in some cultures, petty corruption may be
12
13 acceptable and even justified due to its role in enabling social exchange or compensating
14
15 people on low incomes.
16
17

18
19 ***Multiple moralities.*** To accommodate multiple moralities, discourse ethics, and its
20
21 more pragmatic variant of deliberative democracy, has sought to bridge universalistic and
22
23 particularistic perspectives (e.g., Habermas, 1992; Scherer & Patzer, 2011), where no norm
24
25 or principle can, a priori, be regarded as morally superior. The deliberative approach to ethics
26
27 emphasizes debate over contentious ethical issues, whereby ethical meaning is established
28
29 intersubjectively through rationally achieved consensus (e.g., Habermas, 1992). Whether a
30
31 belief or a practice can be regarded as corrupt can be evaluated from an “ethics as
32
33 sensemaking” (Reinecke & Ansari, 2015) perspective, whereby actors need to make
34
35 decisions based on a sensemaking process (Weick, 1995). At times, what may be seen as
36
37 corrupt practices such as giving extra money or expensive gifts in return for say better
38
39 service, may be morally justified by being framed as acts of generosity or charitable giving.
40
41 The resolution of ethical dilemmas lies in communication and consensus, not in the
42
43 straightforward applications of a rule.
44
45
46
47
48

49 From this perspective, the widespread moral condemnation of corruption based on a
50
51 “good-bad” dichotomy impedes research by not allowing an objective examination of the
52
53 concept. Not all decisions to engage in corruption may be intrinsically “bad” and to refrain
54
55 from corruption inherently “good.” The same practices may have different meanings in
56
57 particular contexts. For instance, corrupt practices may be rooted in “Confucian” ideals of
58
59
60

1
2
3 connectivism, reciprocity, and personal ties of obligation (Smart & Hsu, 2007; Yang, 2002)
4
5 and may not just be morally acceptable but also functional and socially cohesive for a society
6
7 (Torsello & Venard, 2016). As we mentioned above, gift giving in China forms part of being
8
9 in a network of personal relationships (*guanxi*), where nurturing these relationships and
10
11 strengthening the trust, caring, reciprocity and commitment between the parties are
12
13 considered to be a “moral” obligation (Steidlmeier, 1999). However, in other contexts, the
14
15 same action could easily be interpreted as a bribe.
16
17
18

19 ***Summary and limitations.*** The corruption as a moral failure perspective focuses on
20
21 the ethical and moral dimension of corporate behavior and seeks to define what corrupt
22
23 behavior is and how individuals can engage in good moral decision making in order to avoid
24
25 corrupt behavior. This perspective is rational, yet far from the rational decision-maker who
26
27 simply weighs up the benefits and costs of a certain path. From this perspective, the decision
28
29 to be ethical should be made without recourse to any consideration of benefits or costs.
30
31 Instead, one should do the right thing because it is the right thing and there is always a right
32
33 thing if we apply the right ethical principles in a situation.
34
35
36

37 The corruption as a moral failure perspective is an important part of the discussion of
38
39 corporate corruption as it brings an emphasis on the moral correctness of behavior and on the
40
41 role and moral responsibility of the individual. This is particularly important as it means that
42
43 ethical decision making can be deliberated, principles agreed, and better decision making
44
45 potentially taught. In this way, this perspective has important theoretical, practical, and
46
47 pedagogical implications.
48
49
50

51 **Conclusion**

52 The four perspectives we identified are different, yet, for the most part,
53
54 complementary. They provide alternative and practical views on important aspects of
55
56 corporate corruption. They are also interesting to us here as they include a distinctly
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 corporate perspective that provides insights into how corruption happens in corporations or
4
5 between corporations and governments or other organizations. We provide a summary of our
6
7 taxonomy in Table 2 below.
8
9

10 -----
11 Insert Table 2 about here
12 -----
13
14

15 **CORPORATE CORRUPTION: A RESEARCH AGENDA**

16
17 Up to this point, our focus has been on defining corporate corruption and exploring
18
19 the existing research on the topic. But differentiating corporate corruption from corruption
20
21 more generally provides opportunities not only to map the landscape of the existing literature
22
23 in a new way but also to explore new research directions for management research.
24
25

26
27 In this section, we will discuss some of the more interesting gaps in the study of
28
29 corporate corruption that we have identified within the four existing theoretical perspectives
30
31 presented earlier. We structure this discussion using the three different contexts where most
32
33 corporate corruption occurs – within corporations, between corporations, and between
34
35 corporations and governments.
36
37

38 **Corruption as Rational Action.**

39
40
41 Rational action is the dominant theoretical perspective in the study of corporate
42
43 corruption and there is an extensive literature examining a range of topics related to this
44
45 perspective. Although many of the central questions have received considerable attention,
46
47 more nuanced areas still deserve further research. We will focus on a few of the more
48
49 promising areas for further research here.
50
51

52
53 Beginning with research that focuses on corruption within corporations, scholars can
54
55 draw on the rational action perspective to explore how reputational concerns among peers
56
57 and stakeholders affect an agent's incentives and cost-benefit analyses to engage in
58
59 corruption (Singh, 2017). For example, large shareholders, such as pension funds and
60

1
2
3 sovereign wealth funds, are likely to be unwilling to risk their reputation by engaging with
4 companies suspected of corruption (Barnett & King, 2008). How does this affect the
5 calculations of costs and benefits by managers and what factors change this calculation?
6
7

8
9
10 Alternatively, if a corporation is embedded in a corrupt field, it might simply comply
11 with “industry standards” and as a result miscalculate the risk of engaging in corruption by
12 narrowly focusing on the company and its competitors rather than including broader
13 stakeholders who may be powerful (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). It is also possible that
14 companies and executives have an “optimism bias” (Flyvbjerg, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman,
15 1974) and underestimate the broader risks involved. How these sorts of factors affect
16 decisions to engage in corruption are important areas where management scholars can
17 contribute.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

28
29 It would also be useful to look at the outcomes that result from the exposure of
30 corruption in companies and how agents within companies calculate the potential impact of
31 being found out. On one hand, some companies get away relatively unscathed when corrupt
32 business practices are exposed. For example, the business development team of Airbus (2020)
33 was caught engaging in corrupt acts – in this case, bribery to win contracts – and the company
34 recovered quickly. They paid a fine and, as the news coverage died out, the company's stock
35 price recovered. The firm suffered little lasting damage. On the other hand, Odebrecht, one of
36 the 10 largest construction companies in the world at the time (2014), was caught in a
37 corruption scandal and was forced into selling substantial assets and filing for bankruptcy
38 protection. While studies from a rational action perspective consider the corporate risk of being
39 caught from acts of corruption, it would be useful to examine both what factors affect the
40 degree of damage that firms suffer when corruption is exposed and also how actors estimate
41 the potential damage of being caught engaging in corrupt practices.
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Moving to phenomena that occur between corporations, economists have extensively
4 examined collusion among corporations to maximize profits through cartels and trusts.
5
6 However, fewer studies focus on inter-firm corruption in supply chains and we believe there
7
8 is a real opportunity for researchers to examine this important area. A growing body of
9
10 research has begun to develop looking at the dark side of business-to-business practices, and
11
12 one interest of these researchers is corruption in supply chains (Sharma, 2020). But much
13
14 more work is needed. How should firms evaluate the risk of corruption in their supply
15
16 chains? And, even more fundamentally, if corruption is suspected in a supply chain over
17
18 which a firm has limited control, how should the corporation manage the risk? Furthermore,
19
20 as supply chains become more complex with the advent of new technologies and innovations
21
22 in supply chain management (Roy, Sivakumar & Wilkinson, 2004), how will these
23
24 technologies affect the probability of corruption? More positively, can these new
25
26 technologies help reduce or even eradicate corruption?
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 Finally, moving on to the relations between corporations and government, this is an
34
35 area where it is somewhat more challenging to identify new research topics as corruption in
36
37 government has received so much attention and much of that attention has included the
38
39 companies involved. At the same time, as we discussed earlier, our definition of corporate
40
41 corruption reverses figure and ground and in doing so exposes new areas for research. First,
42
43 while the rational action perspective has been used at length to understand why government
44
45 officials are corrupt in particular circumstances, the same questions have not been asked as
46
47 rigorously about corrupt actors. In particular, when firms act to corrupt governments (rather
48
49 than simply responding to a context where corruption is the norm), what factors lead
50
51 managers to decide to begin acting corruptly? While there has been some research looking at
52
53 the likelihood of firms from corrupt contexts corrupting governments when they enter new
54
55 countries, the initial decisions to attempt to corrupt governments deserve attention as these
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 critical moments best match the assumptions of the rational actor perspective. These
4
5 moments are particularly critical as they can set a firm and a government on a path to ever
6
7 deepening corruption.
8
9

10 Second, and perhaps more interestingly, with the rollback of the welfare state
11
12 corporations have begun to play a more active role in the self-regulation of their supply
13
14 chains (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). More specifically, there is been an increase in the role of
15
16 voluntary industry codes and public disclosure of activities by firms which often involves
17
18 governments in some way. Yet, we know little about the effectiveness of this sort of activity
19
20 in reducing corruption and this is an important future area of research. For example, the
21
22 “conflict minerals” amendment to the *2010 Dodd-Frank Act (USA)*, Section 1502 declared
23
24 gold, tin, tantalum, and tungsten were “conflict minerals” and mandated US-listed companies
25
26 to voluntarily disclose whether they sourced minerals from conflict zones. This measure,
27
28 while not legally binding, led to competition among corporations such as Intel and Phillips to
29
30 top the reputation tables on the ethical corporate use of conflict minerals and show greater
31
32 transparency in their sourcing practices (Reinecke & Ansari, 2016). To what degree did this
33
34 reduce corruption in their supply chains? What other strategies can be deployed to
35
36 eliminating corrupt practices in supply chains through multi-stakeholder cross-sector
37
38 initiatives and a more active role of corporations in regulation and governance?
39
40
41
42
43
44

45 **Corruption as an Institutionalized Practice**

46

47 Corrupt practices that have become institutionalized in an organizational field are one
48
49 of the most challenging problems facing those fighting corporate corruption. By definition,
50
51 institutionalized practices are resistant to change and, therefore, institutionalized corrupt
52
53 practices are difficult to change or replace with other practices, and purposefully changing
54
55 institutionalized practices is complex and uncertain (Dacin, Goodstein & Powell, 2002).
56
57 While some research has been done on corruption from this point of view, and much is
58
59
60

1
2
3 known about institutional practices more generally, there is still much work to be done in this
4
5 area. This is, therefore, an area where management researchers can significantly contribute
6
7 although much work remains to be done to connect the well-developed literature on
8
9
10 neoinstitutional theory to corporate corruption.
11

12 Looking within corporations raises an important question about how institutionalized
13
14 practices, once adopted, are protected from pressures for change. We know from work in
15
16 neoinstitutional theory that changes in the institutions that characterize a field may only be
17
18 adopted “ceremonially” by organizations as organizational members protect the “technical
19
20 core” of the firm from disruption by the new practice (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). But how and
21
22 when does this decoupling happen with anti-corruption efforts? When is the corrupt technical
23
24 core of the organization protected from the new anti-corruption practices and by whom?
25
26

27
28 For example, it has become common for large corporations to appoint anticorruption
29
30 agents to safeguard the corporation against corrupt practices. These agents generally form
31
32 part of the team dealing with activities like compliance, legal, risk, and internal audits. This
33
34 practice has become so widespread that it is arguably institutionalized in many organizational
35
36 fields. Yet existing institutionalized corrupt practices seem to be able to co-exist alongside
37
38 this new practice despite the purpose of the new practice being specifically to drive out
39
40 corrupt practices.
41
42

43
44 Managers at Siemens, for example, opened several parallel offshore accounts and
45
46 engaged in corruption at multiple levels despite having anti-corruption teams in place
47
48 (Schembera & Scherer, 2017). An important question, therefore, is how anticorruption agents
49
50 can be empowered within organizations to break the stranglehold of deeply embedded and
51
52 highly institutionalized corrupt practices? Furthermore, what is the role of different
53
54 stakeholders in this process? How do we make sure the new practices that are becoming
55
56 institutionalized in the organizational field are adopted in the technical core of the firm?
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Moving to phenomena that occur between corporations, there are several different
4 areas that this perspective highlights where management researchers can contribute. First, all
5 corporations follow accounting standards and periodically engage professional service firms
6 such as the “Big 4” to audit firm activities and ensure accountability. However, in an
7 increasing number of cases, professional service firms have failed to uncover even
8 widespread corruption. As Gabbioneta et al. (2014, p. 16) argue, “though these firms usually
9 did not ... wittingly and actively participate in fraud, they nevertheless failed to perceive and
10 expose it”. Neoinstitutional theory provides a useful theoretical frame for examining why
11 “regulatory gatekeepers, collectively, fail to uncover and expose sustained corporate
12 corruption” (Gabbioneta et al., 2014, p. 16). Networks of professional services firms
13 sometimes get things wrong and the role of institutionalized practices that may not
14 themselves be corrupt in allowing corruption to go undiscovered, is an important area of
15 research to better understand corporate corruption.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 Second, when corruption becomes standard business practice across an industry, the
34 resistance to change becomes extremely difficult to overcome and there are few cases of
35 government regulators and anticorruption advocates succeeding in this instance. This
36 situation – sometimes referred to as a “bad orchard” or a “bad cellar” to distinguish it from
37 the much simpler problem of an individual “bad apple” or “bad barrel” (Muzio,
38 Faulconbridge, Gabbioneta & Greenwood, 2016) – has received little attention to date. A
39 neoinstitutional perspective is particularly useful in this sort of situation. But more research is
40 required to understand the institutional barriers to change in this context and the levers that
41 exist for reducing corruption once it is deeply institutionalized in an organizational field.
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

54 Additionally, more research is needed in contexts that are characterized by high levels
55 of institutionalized corruption and low levels of institutional development, such as
56 tradespeople and micro-entrepreneurs that operate in “institutional voids” (Mair, Marti &
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Ventresca, 2012) in many urban areas around the world, and especially in countries where the
4 informal and unorganized sector is a substantial part of the economy (Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland,
5 & Sirmon, 2009). An institutional perspective can be usefully deployed to study corruption in
6 these kinds of contexts that have so far received scant attention in our field.
7
8
9
10

11
12 Finally, looking at the relationship between corporations and governments, studies
13 demonstrate that corporations who do business in a home context characterized by corrupt
14 relations with their home government develop a set of capabilities for dealing with
15 government corruption (Mellahi, Frynas, Sun & Siegel, 2016). Once this capability in dealing
16 with corrupt governments is honed and deeply embedded in the firm, it can impact the
17 corporation's internationalization strategies, where they have to deal with foreign
18 governments. Will these corrupt corporations have higher or lower propensities to conduct
19 FDI? Conversely, do more socially responsible firms that might not have such skills or
20 expertise deliberately select countries with lower levels of corruption for their
21 internationalization ambitions? (Keig et al., 2015). Questions about how institutionalized
22 corruption in a corporation's home country affects their dealings with other governments
23 deserve more scholarly attention.
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

40 **Corruption as a Cultural Norm**

41
42 There are extensive literatures in management on both the influence of national
43 cultures on organizations (Chen, Leung & Chen, 2009) and the important role of
44 organizational culture (Giorgi, Lockwood & Glynn, 2015) in organizational and
45 interorganizational activity. As national culture and organizational culture can impede or
46 facilitate corporate corruption, there are many opportunities to further explore the role of
47 culture in corruption in and around corporations.
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

56 Within corporations, a culture of corruption may develop where "employees see
57 corruption as a customary behavior" (Campbell & Goritz, 2014, p. 292). Furthermore, when
58
59
60

1
2
3 cultures of corruption develop it is not uncommon that much of the corrupt activity may be
4
5 for the benefit of the company rather than particular individuals. But how do cultures of
6
7 corruption develop and what are the characteristics of these cultures? Taking a broader view,
8
9 surprisingly little has been done to understand the connection between organizational culture
10
11 and corruption and this is an area where management researchers can contribute significantly
12
13 to our understanding of corruption in an organization and to thinking about how to deal with
14
15 a culture of corruption once it has appeared.
16
17

18
19 At a national culture level, research has shown that culture affects both the incidence
20
21 of corruption (Sims, Gong & Ruppel, 2012) and perceptions of corruption (Guerber,
22
23 Rajagoplan, & Anand, 2016). Furthermore, there are many different aspects of national
24
25 culture that affect the likelihood of corruption and there is some evidence that national
26
27 culture also moderates the effects of anticorruption efforts (Smits, 2013). Yet many questions
28
29 remain. For example, if gift-giving is part of national culture, does that necessarily translate
30
31 into a higher propensity to engage in questionable activities at the corporate level such as
32
33 expensive gifts to curry favors? Also, different models of corporate governance such as
34
35 Continental European and Anglo-American models (Fiss & Zajac, 2004) are closely linked to
36
37 national culture. Do they lead to different levels of corruption? It is also important to
38
39 understand how the culture at national and organizational levels affect anti-corruption
40
41 programs. Put another way, how should these programs and practices be adapted for different
42
43 national cultures?
44
45
46
47
48

49 Finally, there is an interesting connection between different dimensions of national
50
51 culture that could be investigated. For example, in some cultures and political contexts,
52
53 people experience certain emotions such as shame and “losing face” or fear of retribution
54
55 from exposing acts of corruption. These emotions are differentially perceived by different
56
57 cultures (Creed, Hudson, Okhuysen & Smith-Crow, 2014). Studies can explore how culture
58
59
60

1
2
3 affects the willingness to “blow the whistle” on acts of corruption and, conversely, influences
4
5 the propensity to accept corrupt actions and look the other way even when corruption is
6
7 obvious.
8
9

10 Looking at corruption between corporations, many parallel research opportunities
11 exist. National culture and organizational culture shape the interactions between companies
12 whether they are part of a supply chain or competitors. How does national culture affect the
13 likelihood of corruption in supply chains? How does national culture affect interactions
14 between competitors? What role does organizational culture play in making corruption in
15 supply chains more or less likely? This becomes critically important when looking at supply
16 chains that span multiple countries and that are, therefore, exposed to multiple national
17 cultures. How do these cultures affect the probability and type of corruption and how does
18 the cultural difference along the supply chain affect the likelihood of corruption? For
19 example, will the involvement of firms from low corruption countries reduce corruption in
20 the supply chain or simply lead to more covert forms of corruption?
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

35 Moving on to the relationship between corporations and the government, national
36 culture and organizational culture are key factors in both the likelihood and acceptance of
37 corruption. The role of national culture has received some attention (e.g., Husted, 1999)
38 although many questions remain. The role of organizational culture in increasing the chance
39 that a corporate agent is involved in corrupt dealings with government remains largely
40 unexamined (Campbell & Goritz, 2014). Are there assumptions, values, and norms that are
41 part of certain organizational cultures and that make corrupt dealings with government more
42 likely? Are there assumptions, values, and norms that make corrupt dealing with government
43 less likely? There is real potential for researchers working on national culture or
44 organizational culture to provide deeper insight into corruption between firms and
45 governments and how it might be reduced.
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 But there is also a subtler “second-order” corruption that involves corporate leaders
4 influencing the government to change laws in favor of their corporate interests
5
6 (Zyglidopoulos, 2016). The culture at a national level plays an important role in this activity
7
8 as it defines a particular country where the boundary between lobbying and corruption lies.
9
10 This can differ dramatically from country to country. Similarly, leaders often move from
11
12 business to politics and back again, potentially with time in government benefiting their
13
14 businesses. What is acceptable behavior in one national context may not be at all acceptable
15
16 in another. Other leaders keep their government positions while also retaining corporate
17
18 leadership positions. Yet the corporate aspect of this practice of “straddling” and when it is
19
20 seen as acceptable and when it is seen as inappropriate has hardly been explored by
21
22 management scholars.
23
24
25
26
27
28

29 **Corruption as a Moral Failure.**

30
31 Corruption as a moral failure perspective focuses on understanding the ethical
32
33 principles underlying moral action in corporations and the way ethical reasoning is carried
34
35 out by managers. It also focuses on the ways in which corrupt acts and the guilt and sense of
36
37 wrongdoing are justified by corrupt managers. There has been a limited amount of research
38
39 done on these questions, but many opportunities exist for management researchers to further
40
41 contribute.
42
43
44

45 Beginning with moral and ethical practices in corporations, there are a number of
46
47 areas that deserve further research. First, can an organization be constructed to reflect a
48
49 strong ethical framework in order to reduce the chance of corruption? Azim and Kluvers
50
51 (2019) propose a model to do just that based on a study of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.
52
53 But while this work provides some insight into how this might happen, there is much more
54
55 work to be done to understand how strong ethical frameworks and ethical decision-making
56
57 can be integrated into organizations. Furthermore, what about existing firms? Can an existing
58
59
60

1
2
3 firm be restructured to make it more ethical? Management research on the structure, process,
4 routines, and other aspects of organizations are all relevant to this question and could
5 profitably be brought to bear to address this question.
6
7

8
9
10 Second, while family business is a common form of business globally, there are
11 important ethical dilemmas that occur in the context of family businesses that have received
12 little attention from management scholars. For example, while nepotism is included in most
13 definitions of corruption, few studies have examined the relationship between nepotism and
14 corruption. For example, it would be very interesting to examine internal promotion
15 procedures in family businesses as there are difficult to reconcile trade-offs between the job
16 competencies of a new external hire versus the level of trust or familiarity that management
17 has with family members. When is it morally justifiable to hire or promote family members
18 in these contexts? And how do ethical dilemmas of decisions to choose between family
19 loyalty to family members versus fairness to non-family play out in family firms? The ethical
20 question of when preferential treatment for the family becomes corruption and who benefits
21 and who suffers in this is a promising research avenue.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

38 Many interesting ethical questions also exist in the relationships between
39 corporations. Corporations in many industries are becoming increasingly intertwined and
40 interdependent leading to higher levels of collaboration and partnering. But how can
41 collaboration be differentiated from collusion in inter-firm networks? While collusion is a
42 legal issue, at times, it not easy to distinguish between collaboration and collusion. The same
43 goes for “inside trading” – a form of private corruption that relies on insider’ knowledge to
44 take an unfair advantage in trading securities, and while illegal, it is difficult to eliminate
45 information asymmetries in these contexts. Few studies have examined the moral dimensions
46 of these practices.
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Perhaps even more interesting are the issues that arise around the responsibilities of
4 ethical corporations to ensure the provenance of their supply chains. One area where this
5 problem has become very public and visible is around “conflict minerals” (Hofmann,
6 Schleper & Blome, 2018). What are the ethical principles that a company should apply? And
7 how can they manage a supply chain that is both efficient and ethical? The challenges around
8 the ethics of supply chain management are a great example of the opportunities to apply
9 management research to corruption in the relations between corporations.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19 Finally, there are important opportunities for management researchers to contribute to
20 the extensive literature on corruption in the relations between corporations and governments.
21 Again, as discussed in earlier sections, while the literature on corruption in government is
22 well developed, there are opportunities to contribute by reversing figure and ground and
23 focusing on the role of corporations in corruption in government. While the existing
24 corruption literature talks extensively about the motives and ethical reasoning of government
25 officials, there is little work done on the ethical issues that surround the corporate partner in
26 these arrangements.
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

37 For example, there is a limited amount of research on the motivations and ethical
38 reasoning of corporate managers in corrupt interactions with governments. While recent
39 research has found that the motivations of corporate employees and government officials
40 were similar (e.g., Gorsira, Denkers & Huisman, 2018), there remains much to be done to
41 understand more completely how managers in firms decide to engage in corruption with
42 government officials and how they make sense of their decision afterward. Researchers
43 looking at decision-making and motivation in management have much to say about the topic
44 of motivation and have the opportunity to focus on decisions to act corruptly and contribute
45 an important perspective to our understanding of corporate corruption and its effects on
46 government.
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Second, one of the common corporate responses to ethical breaches is to mandate or
4 encourage corporate employees to take some form of ethical training. From the viewpoint of
5 ethicists with an interest in corruption, this is, of course, strongly supported. Governments
6 also encourage this type of training as they believe it will reduce corruption. However, the
7 question has arisen as to whether or not ethical training for managers helps? Currently, "both
8 researchers and practitioners still have a limited understanding of the effectiveness of anti-
9 corruption training efforts" (Hauser, 2019, p. 282). Researchers who are working to
10 understand the impact of management education have much to contribute here both regarding
11 whether it is effective and how to make it as effective as possible.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24 **Summary.** In the table below (Table 3), we summarize the four theoretical
25 perspectives at different levels of analysis and identify areas of research that have been well-
26 explored and those that are less explored and therefore of more potential interest to
27 management scholars.
28
29
30
31
32

33 -----
34 Insert Table 3 about here
35 -----
36

37 **OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN CORPORATE CORRUPTION**

38 **RESEARCH**

39
40
41
42 In this section we will discuss several research areas within management that we think
43 have particular potential but where corporate corruption has received relatively little attention
44 to date from management researchers. More specifically, we discuss the potential for research
45 on corporate corruption by researchers from entrepreneurship, technology and innovation
46 management, CSR, and stigma and deviance. In addition, we will discuss the methodological
47 challenges that face corporate corruption researchers. The nature of corporate corruption
48 makes gaining research access and data availability significant problems that remain to be
49 solved.
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Integration of Corporate Corruption studies with Existing Research

In this section, we build on the gaps uncovered in our literature review but move on to discuss some more ambitious ways to develop new lines of inquiry in the study of corporate corruption. We discuss the possibility of investigating corporate corruption while drawing on existing and well-developed theoretical areas in management like entrepreneurship, innovation, CSR, stigma, and organizational deviance. From our literature review and analysis, we observed that these are areas have received little attention, but we believe they hold real promise in the development of new streams of research on corporate corruption.

Corporate corruption and entrepreneurship. While research in entrepreneurship has grown rapidly in the last decade, the topic of corruption has received surprisingly little attention. There are some exceptions such as Anokhin and Schulze (2009) who use a rational perspective to study corruption and entrepreneurs' decision making but the intersection of corporate corruption and entrepreneurship has been largely ignored. We believe that this gap needs to be redressed as corruption has a significant impact on entrepreneurship and innovation.

While entrepreneurship may create wealth, jobs, and provide new products and services that improve everyday life, this is far from being universally the case. In many parts of the world, not only are many entrepreneurs corrupt, but entrepreneurship is often highly corrosive of the institutions that support fair and regulated markets. Rather than driving innovation and development, in much of the world, corrupt entrepreneurs are a significant factor in restricting innovation and development. Yet, these negative impacts of corrupt entrepreneurship have hardly been acknowledged by entrepreneurship researchers, especially in terms of the informal economy (Webb et al., 2009), and raise several important questions for further research that can draw on several theoretical perspectives.

1
2
3 First, why do some entrepreneurs engage in corruption? Mayer, Siegel and Wright
4 (2018, p. 516-517), while noting that “defining an entrepreneur is notoriously difficult”,
5
6 emphasize that it is not just about being self-employed or about firm size, but rather that
7
8 “entrepreneurship involves the discovery of pre-existing opportunities or the creation of new
9
10 opportunities that previously did not exist, rather than just the formation of new companies.”
11
12 Why do some entrepreneurs identify opportunities that involve corruption while other
13
14 entrepreneurs in the same context do not? Understanding why the entrepreneurs who engage
15
16 in corruption do so is an important first step in addressing and stamping out this problem. An
17
18 initial intuitive way of looking at this problem is with a rational “what causes what”
19
20 perspective.
21
22
23
24
25

26 Second, it is clear from studies of areas dominated by corrupt entrepreneurs that it is
27
28 difficult, if not impossible, to create a non-corrupt business in a system where corruption is
29
30 rife, pervasive and taken-for-granted (Nielsen, 2003), or even tolerated or encouraged by the
31
32 government (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck & Eden, 2005). Understanding more about how to
33
34 create legitimate businesses in corrupt contexts is another area that deserves attention from
35
36 researchers. A cultural perspective can be useful to study corruption in such contexts.
37
38
39

40 Third, entrepreneurship scholars have an opportunity to contribute to our
41
42 understanding of how the government can identify and reform “bad apples.” If new ventures
43
44 engaging in corrupt business are identified, it is important to reform the business in a way
45
46 that preserves jobs and revenues and relationship building but also eliminates corruption. But
47
48 how should the government, or other actors respond? What levers exist to move a business
49
50 into less corrupt activities? These are questions that tie to many of the theoretical
51
52 perspectives we have discussed.
53
54
55

56 ***Corporate corruption and innovation.*** Innovation can happen in start-ups or
57
58 established firms and corruption negatively affects both types of firms. Corruption is also a
59
60

1
2
3 hindrance to innovation as it allows firms to avoid regulations and sell substandard goods.
4
5 However, Krammer (2019) recently argued that there are positive impacts of corruption
6
7 including “greasing the wheels” and therefore speeding up the process of innovation. This
8
9 counterintuitive finding, using a rational action perspective, highlights the need for more
10
11 research on the nexus between innovation and corporate corruption to understand how and
12
13 under what circumstances corruption may have positive and negative impacts on innovation.
14
15 Research can further explore how adopting questionable tactics (e.g., erecting entry barriers
16
17 to deter competitors, avoiding labor taxes, or relaxing safety standards and sidestepping
18
19 regulations) affects the performance of innovators in these markets.
20
21
22

23
24 Furthermore, a key step in addressing the grand challenge of corruption is the
25
26 development of better anti-corruption technologies. Emerging digital technologies can be
27
28 applied to expose and prevent corrupt practices. Management scholars, mostly in ICT, have
29
30 deployed a corruption as institutionalized practice or corruption as rational action perspective
31
32 to study how technologies can increase the transparency of practices and mitigate corruption
33
34 (Bertot, Jaeger & Grimes, 2010). But we believe there is also interesting work to be done
35
36 around emerging technologies like blockchain and artificial intelligence. Studies should
37
38 examine how these technologies can track and increase transparency across transactions to
39
40 expose and prevent corporate corruption and reduce corruption opportunities. Access to
41
42 digitized organizational records may reveal systematic patterns, network dynamics,
43
44 communication structures, and concealment tactics. Therefore, this area offers a fertile
45
46 research avenue and we hope management scholars will take up the challenge.
47
48
49

50
51 ***Corporate corruption and CSR.*** Another area where opportunities exist for
52
53 management scholars to contribute to understandings of corporate corruption is the large and
54
55 growing field of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as well the closely related field of
56
57 Corporate Political Responsibility (CPR). CSR focuses attention on the “social and
58
59
60

1
2
3 environmental consequences” of corporate activities (Porter & Kramer, 2006, p. 1) and can
4 be defined as “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the
5 firm and that which is required by law” (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001, p. 117). CPR focuses
6 on how firms also operate “politically” interacting with governmental decision-makers (Den
7 Hond, Rehbein , de Bakker & Lankveld, 2014).

8
9
10 Some limited academic work tied to corporate corruption exists in this area.
11
12 Rodriguez et al. (2005) have looked at three aspects of multinational enterprises: politics,
13 corruption, and corporate social responsibility using a cultural and institutional perspective.
14
15 Keig, et al. (2015) also analyzed multinational enterprise social “irresponsibility” in corrupt
16 environments. While on first blush, studies with an explicit connection between CSR and
17 corporate corruption are limited, we believe that the connections are significant, and any
18 work done to further explore the connections is worthwhile.

19
20
21 ***Corporate corruption and organizational stigma.*** Another research subfield in
22 management that could be more closely connected to corporate corruption is the literature on
23 organizational stigma. This literature focuses on an extreme kind of social disapproval
24 defined as “a collective stakeholder group-specific perception that an organization possesses
25 a fundamental, deep-seated flaw that deindividuates and discredits the organization” (Devers,
26 Dewett, Mishina & Belsito 2009, p. 157). One of the common sources of “event stigma”
27 (Hudson, 2008) is corporate corruption. Research in this area has the potential to contribute
28 both insights into what happens to firms when corporate corruption is uncovered and also
29 how the fear of stigma may work to prevent corrupt activities in the first place. Also,
30 returning to our discussion of corrupt entrepreneurship, the concept of stigma raises the
31 question of why corruption in some contexts is not stigmatized despite being illegal (for
32 example, the Mafia in southern Italy). This seems a potential subfield that lends itself well to
33 the *institutional* and *cultural* perspectives, but other perspectives can also be useful.

1
2
3 The literature on workplace deviance (e.g., Roulet, 2020) and organizational
4 misconduct (e.g., Greve, Palmer & Pozner, 2010) are distinct but related streams of literature
5 that overlap in potentially productive ways with the field of corporate corruption. In the
6 workplace deviance literature, the focus is on “voluntary behavior that violates significant
7 organizational norms and, in doing so, threatens the well-being of the organization or its
8 members, or both” (Bennett & Robinson, 2000, p. 349); in the organizational misconduct
9 literature, the focus is on “behavior in or by an organization that a social-control agent judges
10 to transgress a line separating right from wrong” (Greve et al., 2010, p. 56). At least some
11 aspects of corporate corruption fall within both of these areas and as such both of these areas
12 of research are relevant to our understanding of corporate corruption. Using an institutional
13 perspective, Voliotis (2017) has examined antisocial or unethical behaviors in organizations
14 by looking at normative standards that determine deviance. It is important to avoid “re-
15 inventing the wheel” when much insight into corporate corruption can be gleaned from these
16 areas. In addition, there is an opportunity for researchers in these areas to begin to explicitly
17 link their research to corporate corruption and to draw out the relevant contributions of their
18 research to corporate corruption.

40 **Methodological Challenges in research on corruption**

41
42 While management researchers have the potential to make a significant contribution
43 to the development of a deeper understanding of corporate corruption, it is also an area where
44 researchers face significant methodological issues. The nature of corruption, and the contexts
45 in which it occurs, are by their nature secretive, covert, and clandestine, and thus not easy to
46 study. This is an area where management researchers will need to develop innovative
47 solutions if corporate corruption research is to make the sort of contribution it has the
48 potential to make. We will begin by describing the problem and then suggest some limited
49 solutions.

1
2
3 First, for quantitative researchers, there are significant challenges around data
4 availability and data reliability (Richards, 2017). While management researchers routinely
5 use surveys to generate data for statistical analysis, this is often highly unreliable in
6 corruption research as corrupt behavior is underreported due to the concerns about getting
7 caught or retribution from colleagues accused of corruption. Similarly, little publicly
8 available data exists and whatever does exist tends to be limited and based on self-report
9 instruments that are generally unreliable. This makes quantitative research in this area highly
10 challenging and solutions need to be devised to make research in this area work.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21 Second, for qualitative researchers, the nature of the context often makes traditional
22 approaches to data collection either difficult, dangerous, or unethical. While there are calls
23 for more qualitative case studies to develop a more nuanced understanding of corruption (e.g.
24 Srivastava, Teo & Devaraj, 2016), interviews and participant observation are difficult in
25 settings where corruption occurs. Respondents are not likely to be completely truthful given
26 the nature of the topic. There are also ethical issues that arise if researchers find out about
27 corrupt behaviors as there is a strong case that this knowledge should be shared with the
28 relevant authorities. While these challenges are not new – sociologists and anthropologists
29 studying illegal and immoral activity have faced since their inception as disciplines – they are
30 particularly salient in this setting and care must be taken in designing research to ensure it is
31 ethical, safe, and defensible to both those studied as well as colleagues, journals, and others.
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

47 The challenges around traditional approaches to data collection make some new
48 approaches to research particularly relevant. There are, increasingly, transcripts of trials and
49 investigations that various governments are making available and these can be very useful
50 provided the context of their collection is taken into account (Gephart, 1993). Investigative
51 journalists and the corruption they expose can be another valuable source of data such as the
52 “Panama papers” and the publicly available prosecutor's reports based on them. Experiments
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 in social psychology or behavioral economics can also bring insights into corporate
4
5 corruption. While some corruption studies have been conducted at the individual level of
6
7 analysis (Kubbe & Gross, 2017), these methodologies can also be fruitfully applied to
8
9 corporate settings. Finally, various approaches to social media collection and analysis are
10
11 highly useful in this sort of research and as little has been done using these alternative
12
13 approaches to data collection and analysis, there are significant opportunities here.
14
15
16
17

18 CONCLUSION

19
20 Corruption is a topic of great theoretical interest across the social sciences and
21
22 humanities and, even more importantly, of urgent practical importance for international
23
24 institutions, national governments, and corporations. Corporate corruption – defined as the
25
26 misuse of formal power by a corporate representative for organizational or private benefit – is
27
28 an important type of corruption. Management research, with its well-developed theories of
29
30 the corporation and established research methodologies, is in a unique position to contribute
31
32 to enhancing our understanding of this important societal challenge. At the same time, for
33
34 management research to have the sort of impact it has the potential to make, it is critically
35
36 important that researchers recognize corporate corruption as a separate area of research and
37
38 that we move towards a shared understanding of what constitutes corporate corruption, how
39
40 existing research connects, and what issues are most pressing to investigate going forward.
41
42
43
44

45
46 Based on our review, we have pointed to some of the important new directions for
47
48 research that our definition of corporate corruption reveals. In particular, building on the
49
50 “corporate” focus on corporate corruption research, we have highlighted a set of research
51
52 themes that require further investigation and integration with existing areas. However,
53
54 perhaps the most important potential contribution of corporate corruption research is to
55
56 inform practice.
57
58
59
60

Contributing to Practice

We believe that corporate corruption is a topic of significant theoretical interest and critical practical importance. We also believe this is an exciting research area where management researchers are in a unique position to contribute to solving an important global challenge. By bringing existing theories of organization and management to bear on the problem of corruption and using the well-developed tools in our methodological toolkit, management researchers have the opportunity to make a real contribution to improving what is a dire situation.

This is a particularly important point to emphasize as the challenge of relevance in management research is considerable. As Kieser and Leiner (2009, p. 516) argue, after being accused of lacking methodological rigor and a firm theoretical foundation in 1959, management may have “overcompensated.” Management research became focused on rigor, but in the process lost some of its relevance for organizations, managers, or governments. By the first decade of the 21st century, the President of the Academy of Management was asking what the world would look like “If the Academy Actually Mattered?” (Hambrick, 1994) and Rynes, Bartunek, and Daft (2001) were writing about “the great divide” between management practice and academe. In other words, in working to become rigorous, management as an academic field has become too distant from practice and increasingly irrelevant for practitioners.

One solution to this problem is to pick questions that are relevant to practice and come up with good answers by conducting rigorous academic research (Vermeulen, 2005). By being rigorous about relevant questions, we can bridge the divide between relevance and rigor. The good news for research in corporate corruption is that this field of research is closely aligned with the needs and interests of governments, NGOs, companies, and citizens. It is highly relevant, rigorous, and high-quality research in this area that has the potential to

1
2
3 have a direct effect “on life in organizations” as well as life in society more broadly. This is
4
5 an area where more research can make a real contribution and we would encourage
6
7 researchers interested in relevance to thinking about how their research might connect to and
8
9 help understand and stop corporate corruption.
10
11

12 This is also a particularly good time for management researchers to take corporate
13
14 corruption seriously as a research area. Consider how disruptive events and economic
15
16 slowdowns such as the 2008 financial crisis and the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 affect
17
18 corruption. Booms help corrupt managers conceal corrupt activities, while slowdowns can
19
20 expose them (The Economist, 2020). Indeed, many corporate corruption scandals (e.g., Enron
21
22 and WorldCom) of the past 20 years emerged in downturns. This is an area ripe for further
23
24 research given the recent pandemic and its aftermath.
25
26
27
28

29 **Final Comments**

30
31 In closing, we hope we have succeeded in convincing readers that corporate
32
33 corruption is an important area of research that deserves more attention from management
34
35 scholars. While an integral part of the broader field of corruption research, corporate
36
37 corruption has particular characteristics given the corporate context in which it (at least
38
39 partially) occurs and management researchers are uniquely positioned to contribute to this
40
41 area. The corporate aspect of corruption has, we believe, received insufficient attention and
42
43 by focusing on it, management researchers can have a real impact on an important real-world
44
45 problem that blights society and affects billions of people worldwide.
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

REFERENCES

- 1
2
3
4
5 Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents, competition, and corruption. *American Economic Review*, 89(4), 982-993.
6
7
8
9 Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 50(2), 179-211.
10
11
12 Andvig, J. C., Fjeldstad, O. H., Weltzien, Å., Amundsen, I., Sissener, T. K., & Søreide, T. (2001). *Corruption. A review of contemporary research*. Retrieved from
13 <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/861-corruption-a-review-of-contemporary-research.pdf>
14
15
16 Anokhin, S., & Schulze, W. S. (2009). Entrepreneurship, innovation, and corruption. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 24(5), 465-476.
17
18
19
20 Arnold, U., Neubauer, J., & Schoenherr, T. (2012). Explicating factors for companies' inclination towards corruption in Operations and supply chain management: An exploratory study in Germany. *International Journal of Production Economics*, 138(1), 136-147.
21
22
23
24
25 Ashforth, B. E., & Anand, V. (2003). The normalization of corruption in organizations. *Research in Organizational Behaviour*, 25, 1-52.
26
27
28
29 Ashforth, B. E., Gioia, D. A., Robinson, S. L., & Trevino, L. K. (2008). Re-viewing organizational corruption. *Academy of Management Review*, 33(3), 670-684.
30
31
32 Azim, M. I., & Kluvers, R. (2019). Resisting corruption in Grameen bank. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 156(3), 591-604.
33
34
35 Aven, B. L. (2015). The paradox of corrupt networks: An analysis of Organizational Crime at Enron. *Organization Science*, 26(4), 980-996.
36
37
38
39 Banerjee, A., Mullainathan, S., & Hanna, R. (2012). *Corruption* (No. w17968). National Bureau of Economic Research.
40
41
42 Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and development: A review of issues. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 35(3), 1320-1346.
43
44
45 Barnett, M. L., & King, A. A. (2008). Good fences make good neighbors: A longitudinal analysis of an industry self-regulatory institution. *Academy of Management Journal*, 51(6), 1150-1170.
46
47
48
49 Beck, A., & Lee, R. (2002). Attitudes to corruption amongst Russian police officers and trainees. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 38(4), 357-372.
50
51
52
53 Becker H. (1963). *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*. New York: Free Press.
54
55 Bennett, R. J., & Robinson, S. L. (2000). Development of a measure of workplace deviance. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 85(3), 349.
56
57
58 Bernard, T. (2006). Shell shock: Why do good companies do bad things? *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, 14(3), 181-193.
59
60

- 1
2
3 Bernardi, R. A., Witek, M. B., & Melton, M. R. (2009). A four-country study of the
4 associations between bribery and unethical actions. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 84(3), 389-
5 403.
6
7 Bertot, J. C., Jaeger, P. T., & Grimes, J. M. (2010). Using ICTs to create a culture of
8 transparency: E-government and social media as openness and anti-corruption tools for
9 societies. *Government Information Quarterly*, 27(3), 264-271.
10
11 Biswas, M. (2017). Are they efficient in the middle? Using propensity score estimation for
12 modeling middlemen in Indian corporate corruption. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 141(3),
13 563-586.
14
15 Black, W. K. (2004). The Dango Tango: Why corruption blocks real reform in Japan.
16 *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 14(4), 603-623.
17
18 Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging moral cognition and moral action: A critical review of the
19 literature. *Psychological Bulletin*, 88(1), 1-45.
20
21 Bray, J. (2007). *Facing up to corruption 2007: A practical business guide*. London: Control
22 Risks.
23
24 Campbell, J. L., & Göritz, A. S. (2014). Culture corrupts! A qualitative study of
25 organizational culture in corrupt organizations. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 120(3), 291-
26 311.
27
28 Carrillo, J. (2000). Corruption in hierarchies. *Annales D'Économie Et De Statistique*, (59),
29 37-61.
30
31 Castro, A., & Ansari, S. (2017). Contextual “readiness” for institutional work. A study of the
32 fight against corruption in brazil. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 26(4), 351-365.
33
34 Chen, Y. R., Leung, K., & Chen, C. C. (2009). 5 Bringing national culture to the table:
35 Making a difference with cross-cultural differences and perspectives. *Academy of*
36 *Management Annals*, 3(1), 217-249.
37
38 Clarke, G. R., & Xu, L. C. (2004). Privatization, competition, and corruption: how
39 characteristics of bribe takers and payers affect bribes to utilities. *Journal of Public*
40 *Economics*, 88(9-10), 2067-2097.
41
42 Clegg, S., Kornberger, M., & Rhodes, C. (2006). Business ethics as practice. *British Journal*
43 *of Management*, 18(2), 107-122.
44
45 Cole, S., & Tran, A. (2011). Evidence from the Firm: A New Approach to Understanding
46 Corruption. In: R. Ackerman & T. Soreide (Eds.), *International Handbook on the*
47 *Economics of Corruption* (pp. 408-427). Edward Elgar Publishing
48
49 Collins, J. D., Uhlenbruck, K., & Rodriguez, P. (2009). Why firms engage in corruption: A
50 top management perspective. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 87(1), 89-108.
51
52 Creed, D., Hudson, W. E., Okhuysen, B. A. & Smith-Crowe, K. (2014). Swimming in a sea of
53 shame: Incorporating emotion into explanations of institutional reproduction and change.
54 *Academy of Management Review*, 39(3), 275-301.
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2006). Who cares about corruption? *Journal of International Business*
4 *Studies*, 37(6), 807-822.
5
6 Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2008). The multinationalization of developing country MNEs: The case
7 of multilatinas. *Journal of International Management*, 14(2), 138-154.
8
9 Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2016). Corruption in international business. *Journal of World Business*,
10 51(1), 35-49.
11
12
13 Dacin, T. M., Goodstein, J., & Richard Scott, W. (2002). Institutional theory and institutional
14 change: Introduction to the special research forum. *Academy of Management Journal*,
15 45(1), 45-56.
16
17 De Jong, E., & Bogmans, C. (2011). Does corruption discourage international trade?
18 *European Journal of Political Economy*, 27(2), 385-398.
19
20 De Jong, G., & van Ees, H. (2014). Firms and corruption. *European Management Review*,
21 11(3-4), 187-190.
22
23 Dela Rama, M. (2012). Corporate governance and corruption: Ethical dilemmas of Asian
24 business groups. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 109(4), 501-519.
25
26 Della Porta, D., & Vannucci, A. (2012). Political corruption. In: Amenta, E, Nash, K, Scott,
27 A (Eds) *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology* (pp. 130–143). Malden,
28 MA: Blackwell Publishing.
29
30 Den Hond, F., Rehbein, K. A., de Bakker, F. G., & Lankveld, H. K. V. (2014). Playing on
31 two chessboards: Reputation effects between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and
32 corporate political activity (CPA). *Journal of Management Studies*, 51(5), 790-813.
33
34
35 Devers, C. E., Dewett, T., Mishina, Y., & Belsito, C. A. (2009). A general theory of
36 organizational stigma. *Organization Science*, 20(1), 154-171.
37
38 DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1991). Introduction. The new institutionalism in
39 organizational analysis. In P. DiMaggio, W. Powell(Eds.), *The New Institutionalism in*
40 *Organizational Analysis*, (pp. 1-38), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
41
42 DiRienzo, C. E., Das, J., Cort, K. T., & Burbridge, J. (2007). Corruption and the role of
43 information. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 38(2), 320-332.
44
45
46 Elsbach, K. D., & Sutton, R. I. (1992). Acquiring organizational legitimacy through
47 illegitimate actions: A marriage of institutional and impression management theories.
48 *Academy of Management Journal*, 35(4), 699-738.
49
50 Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. *The Journal of*
51 *Law and Economics*, 26(2), 301-325.
52
53 Farrales, M. J. (2005). *A history of corruption studies and the great definitions debate*. San
54 Diego: University of California.
55
56 Feng, D., & Wu, X. (2018). Weibo interaction in the discourse of internet anti-corruption:
57 The case of “Brother Watch” event. *Discourse, Context & Media*, 24, 99-108.
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 Fisman, R., & Miguel, E. (2007). Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: Evidence from
4 diplomatic parking tickets. *Journal of Political Economy*, 115(6), 1020-1048.
5
6 Fiss, P. C., & Zajac, E. J. (2004). The diffusion of ideas over contested terrain: The (non)
7 adoption of a shareholder value orientation among German firms. *Administrative Science*
8 *Quarterly*, 49(5), 501-534.
9
10 Flyvbjerg, B. (2008). Curbing optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation in planning:
11 Reference class forecasting in practice. *European Planning Studies*, 16(1), 3-21.
12
13 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, US House of Representatives (1977).
14
15 Gabbioneta, C., Greenwood R., Mazzola, P. & Minoja, M. (2013). The influence of the
16 institutional context on corporate illegality. *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 38(6-
17 7), 484-504.
18
19 Gabbioneta, C., Prakash, R. & Greenwood, R. (2014). Sustained corporate corruption and
20 processes of institutional ascription within professional networks. *Journal of Professions*
21 *and Organization*, 1(1), 16-32.
22
23 Gehman, J., Trevino, L. K., & Garud, R. (2013). Values work: A process study of the
24 emergence and performance of organizational values practices. *Academy of Management*
25 *Journal*, 56(1), 84-112.
26
27 Gelbrich, K., Stedham, Y., & Gäthke, D. (2016). Cultural discrepancy and national
28 corruption: Investigating the difference between cultural values and practices and its
29 relationship to corrupt behavior. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 26(2), 201-225.
30
31 Gephart, R. (1993). The textual approach: Risk and blame in disaster sensemaking. *Academy*
32 *of Management Journal*, 36(6), 1465-1514.
33
34 Geertz, C. (1973). *The interpretation of cultures*. New York: Basic books.
35
36 George, G., Howard-Grenville, J., Joshi, A., & Tihanyi, L. (2016). Understanding and tackling
37 societal grand challenges through management research. *Academy of Management Journal*,
38 59(6), 1880-1895.
39
40 Gino, F., & Bazerman, M. H. (2009). When misconduct goes unnoticed: The acceptability of
41 gradual erosion in others' unethical behavior. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*,
42 45(4), 708-719.
43
44 Giorgi, S., Lockwood, C., & Glynn, M. A. (2015). The many faces of culture: Making sense
45 of 30 years of research on culture in organization studies. *Academy of Management*
46 *Annals*, 9(1), 1-54.
47
48 Goel, R. K., & Rich, D. P. (1989). On the economic incentives for taking bribes. *Public*
49 *Choice*, 61(3), 269-275.
50
51 Goodenough, W. H. (1964). Cultural anthropology. In D. Hymes (Ed.), *Language in culture*
52 *and society* (pp. 36-39). Mumbai: Allied Publishers Private.
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 Goodrick, E., & Salancik, G. (1996). Organizational discretion in responding to institutional
4 practices: Hospitals and cesarean births. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 41(1), 1-28.
5
6
7 Gorsira, M., Denkers, A., & Huisman, W. (2018). Both sides of the coin: Motives for
8 corruption among public officials and business employees. *Journal of Business*
9 *Ethics*, 151(1), 179-194.
10
11 Granovetter, M. (2007). The Social construction of corruption. In V. Nee, & R. Swedberg
12 (Eds.), *On capitalism* (pp. 152-172). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
13
14 Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Lawrence, T. B., & Meyer, R. E. (Eds.). (2017). *The Sage*
15 *handbook of organizational institutionalism*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
16
17
18 Greve, H. R., Palmer, D., & Pozner, J. E. (2010). Organizations gone wild: The causes,
19 processes, and consequences of organizational misconduct. *The Academy of Management*
20 *Annals*, 4(1), 53-107.
21
22 Guerber, A., Rajagoplan, A., & Anand, V. (2016). The influence of national culture on the
23 rationalization of corruption. In R. J. Burke, E. C. Tomlinson, & C. L. Cooper (Eds.),
24 *Crime and corruption in organizations: Why it occurs and what to do about it* (pp.143–
25 162). Farnham, UK: Gower.
26
27
28 Gutmann, J., & Lucas, V. (2018). Private-sector corruption: Measurement and cultural
29 origins. *Social Indicators Research*, 138(2), 747–770.
30
31
32 Habermas, J. (1992). *Postmetaphysical thinking: Philosophical essays*. MIT Press.
33
34 Haller, D., & Shore, C. (Eds.). (2005). *Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives*. London,
35 England: Pluto Press.
36
37 Halter, M., De Arruda, M., & Halter, R. (2009). Transparency to reduce corruption?. *Journal*
38 *of Business Ethics*, 84(3), 373-385.
39
40 Hambrick, D. C. (1994). What if the academy actually mattered?. *Academy of Management*
41 *Review*, 19(1), 11-16.
42
43 Hofmann, H., Schleper, M. C., & Blome, C. (2018). Conflict minerals and supply chain due
44 diligence: an exploratory study of multi-tier supply chains. *Journal of Business Ethics*,
45 147(1), 115-141.
46
47
48 Hofstede, G. (1980) *Culture's consequences: international differences in work-related*
49 *values*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
50
51 Hofstede, G. (1991) *Culture and Organizations: Software of the mind*. New York:
52 McGraw-Hill.
53
54 Hofstede, G. (2001) *Culture's Consequences: comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and*
55 *organizations across nations*. California: Sage Publications
56
57
58 Hauser, C. (2019). Fighting against corruption: does anti-corruption training make any
59 difference?. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 159(1), 281-299.
60

- 1
2
3 Horak, S. (2018). Join in or opt out? A normative–ethical analysis of affective ties and
4 networks in South Korea. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 149(1), 207-220.
5
6 Huang, F., & Rice, J. (2012). Firm networking and bribery in China: Assessing some
7 potential negative consequences of firm openness. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 107(4),
8 533-545.
9
10 Hudson, B. A. (2008). Against all odds: A consideration of core-stigmatized organizations.
11 *Academy of Management Review*, 33(1), 252-266.
12
13 Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale
14 University Press.
15
16 Husted, B. W. (1999). Wealth, culture, and corruption. *Journal of International Business*
17 *Studies*, 30(2), 339-359.
18
19 Birhanu, A. G., Gambardella, A., & Valentini, G. (2016). Bribery and investment: Firm-level
20 evidence from Africa and Latin America. *Strategic Management Journal*, 37(9), 1865-
21 1877.
22
23 Iriyama, A., Kishore, R., & Talukdar, D. (2016). Playing dirty or building capability?
24 Corruption and HR training as competitive actions to threats from informal and foreign
25 firm rivals. *Strategic Management Journal*, 37(10), 2152-2173.
26
27 Jackall, R. (1988). *Moral mazes: The world of corporate managers*. Oxford: Oxford
28 University Press.
29
30 Jancsics, D. (2014). Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Corruption. *Sociology Compass*, 8,
31 358–372.
32
33 Jensen, N. M., Li, Q., & Rahman, A. (2010). Understanding corruption and firm responses in
34 cross-national firm-level surveys. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 41(9), 1481-
35 1504.
36
37 Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs,
38 and ownership structure. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 3(4), 305-360.
39
40 Jeong, Y., & Siegel, J. I. (2018). Threat of falling high status and corporate bribery: Evidence
41 from the revealed accounting records of two South Korean presidents. *Strategic*
42 *Management Journal*, 39(4), 1083-1111.
43
44 Jeong, Y., & Weiner, R. J. (2012). Who bribes? Evidence from the United Nations' oil-for-
45 food program. *Strategic Management Journal*, 33, 1363-1383.
46
47 Keig, D. L., Brouters, L. E., & Marshall, V. B. (2015). Formal and informal corruption
48 environments and multinational enterprise social irresponsibility. *Journal of Management*
49 *Studies*, 52(1), 89-116.
50
51 Kieser, A., & Leiner, L. (2009). Why the rigour–relevance gap in management research is
52 unbridgeable. *Journal of Management Studies*, 46(3), 516-533.
53
54 Klitgaard, R. E. (1988). *Controlling Corruption*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 Krammer, S. M. (2019). Greasing the wheels of change: bribery, institutions, and new
4 product introductions in emerging markets. *Journal of Management*, 45(5), 1889-1926.
5
6 Krause Hansen, H., & Tang-Jensen, M. H. (2015). Making up corruption control: Conducting
7 due diligence in a Danish law firm. *Ephemera: Theory & politics in organization*, 15(2),
8 365-385.
9
10 Kubbe, I., & Gross, J. (2017). Experimental Research on Corruption. In A. Schwickerath, A.
11 Varraich, L. L. Smith *Proceedings How to research corruption?* (pp.21-24), Amsterdam:
12 Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network .
13
14
15 Lambsdorff, J. G. (2002). Making Corrupt Deals - Contracting in the Shadow of the Law.
16 *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 48, 221-41.
17
18
19 Lambsdorff, J. G. (2007), *The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory,*
20 *Evidence and Policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
21
22 Lawrence, T. B., Hardy, C., & Phillips, N. (2002). Institutional effects of interorganizational
23 collaboration: The emergence of proto-institutions. *Academy of Management*
24 *Journal*, 45(1), 281-290.
25
26
27 Leff, N. H. (1964). Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. *The American*
28 *Behavioral Scientist*, (8), 8-14.
29
30
31 Lessig, L. (2013). "Institutional corruption" defined. *Journal of Law, Medical & Ethics*, 41,
32 553-55.
33
34
35 Li, P. P. (2009). The duality of crony corruption in economic transition: Toward an integrated
36 framework. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 85(1), 41-55.
37
38
39 Lloyd Bierstaker, J. (2009). Differences in attitudes about fraud and corruption across
40 cultures: Theory, examples and recommendations. *Cross Cultural Management: An*
41 *International Journal*, 16(3), 241-250.
42
43
44 Mair, J., Marti, I., & Ventresca, M. J. (2012). Building inclusive markets in rural Bangladesh:
45 How intermediaries work institutional voids. *Academy of Management Journal*, 55(4),
46 819-850.
47
48
49 Malinowski, B. (2013). *Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise*
50 *and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea [1922/1994]*. Routledge.
51
52
53 Marquette, H. and Peiffer, C. (2015), 'Corruption and Collective Action'. DLP and U4 Anti-
54 *corruption Resource Centre. Research Paper 32*. Retrieved from
55 <https://res.cloudinary.com/dlprog/image/upload/corruption-and-collective-action>
56
57
58 Martin, K. D., Cullen, J. B., Johnson, J. L., & Parboteeah, K. P. (2007). Deciding to bribe: A
59 cross-level analysis of firm and home country influences on bribery activity. *Academy of*
60 *Management Journal*, 50, 1401-1422.
- Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(3), 681-712.

- 1
2
3 Mauss, M (1990 [1925]) *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*.
4 London; New York: Routledge.
5
6 Mayer, C., Siegel, D. S., & Wright, M. (2018). Entrepreneurship: an assessment. *Oxford*
7 *Review of Economic Policy*, 34(4), 517-539.
8
9 McKinney, J. A., & Moore, C. W. (2008). International bribery: Does a written code of ethics
10 make a difference in perceptions of business professionals. *Journal of Business Ethics*,
11 79(1-2), 103-111.
12
13 McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2001). Corporate social responsibility: A theory of the firm
14 perspective. *Academy of Management Review*, 26(1), 117-127.
15
16 Mellahi, K., Frynas, J. G., Sun, P., & Siegel, D. (2016). A review of the nonmarket strategy
17 literature: Toward a multi-theoretical integration. *Journal of Management*, 42(1), 143-173.
18
19 Misangyi, V. F., Weaver, G. R., & Elms, H. (2008). Ending corruption: The interplay among
20 institutional logics, resources, and institutional entrepreneurs. *Academy of Management*
21 *Review*, 33(3), 750-770.
22
23 Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder
24 identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. *Academy*
25 *of Management Review*, 22(4), 853-886.
26
27 Molm L., Takahashi D., & Peterson, G. (2000). Risk and trust in social exchange. *American*
28 *Journal of Sociology*. 105(5), 1396–1427.
29
30 Moore, S. F. (2000). *Law as process: an anthropological approach*. LIT Verlag Münster.
31
32 Moy, J., Lam, K., & Chu, W. C. (2008). Institutional pillars and corruption at the societal
33 level. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 83(2), 327-339.
34
35 Muir, S., & Gupta, A. (2018). Rethinking the anthropology of corruption: an introduction to
36 supplement 18. *Current Anthropology*, 59(S18), S4-S15
37
38 Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2013). Controlling corruption through collective action. *Journal of*
39 *Democracy*, 24(1), 101-115.
40
41 Mungiu-Pippidi., A. (2006). Corruption: diagnosis and treatment. *Journal of Democracy*
42 17(3), 86–99.
43
44 Muzio, D., Faulconbridge, J., Gabbioneta, C., & Greenwood, R. (2016). Bad apples, bad
45 barrels and bad cellars: A “boundaries” perspective on professional misconduct. In D.
46 Palmer, K. Smith-Crowe, & R. Greenwood (Eds.), *Organizational Wrongdoing: Key*
47 *Perspectives and New Directions* (Cambridge Companions to Management, pp. 141-175).
48 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
49
50 Neu, D., Everett, J., Rahaman, A. S., & Martinez, D. (2013). Accounting and networks of
51 corruption. *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 38(6-7), 505-524.
52
53 Nielsen, R. P. (2003). Corruption networks and implications for ethical corruption reform.
54 *Journal of Business Ethics*, 42(2), 125-149.
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 Noonan, J. T.. (1984) *Bribes*. New York: Macmillan Publishing.
4
5 Nuijten, M., & Anders, G. (Eds.). (2007). *Corruption and the secret of law: A legal*
6 *anthropological perspective*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
7
8 Nye, J. S. (1967). Corruption and political development: A cost benefit analysis. *The*
9 *American Political Science Review*, 67(2), 417-427.
10
11
12 O'Higgins, E. (2006) Corruption, Underdevelopment, and Extractive Resource Industries:
13 Addressing the Vicious Cycle. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 16, 235-254
14
15 Odilla (2016) *Out of water: 'Fish' size matters in the fight against corruption in Brazil*. 66th
16 PSA Annual International Conference Brighton. Retrieved from:
17 [https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2016/PSA%20BIG%20FISH%](https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2016/PSA%20BIG%20FISH%20FINAL_0.pdf)
18 [20FINAL_0.pdf](https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2016/PSA%20BIG%20FISH%20FINAL_0.pdf)
19
20
21 Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. *Academy of Management*
22 *Review*, 16(1), 145-179.
23
24 Oliver, C. (1997). Sustainable competitive advantage: combining institutional and
25 resource-based views. *Strategic Management Journal*, 18(9), 697-713.
26
27 Olson, M. (2009). *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*,
28 Second Printing with a New Preface and Appendix (Vol. 124). Harvard University Press.
29
30 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (1997). *Anti-Bribery Convention*.
31 Retrieved from <http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/>.
32
33
34 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2011). *Update On Tax*
35 *Legislation on the Tax Treatment of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials in Countries*
36 *Parties to the OECD Anti Bribery Convention Retrieved from*
37 <https://www.oecd.org/tax/crime/41353070.pdf>
38
39
40 Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why anticorruption reforms fail—systemic
41 corruption as a collective action problem. *Governance*, 26(3), 449-471.
42
43 Philp, M., & David-Barrett, E. (2015). Realism about political corruption. *Annual Review of*
44 *Political Science*, 18, 387-402.
45
46 Pinto, J., Leana, C. R., & Pil, F. K. (2008). Corrupt organizations or organizations of corrupt
47 individuals? Two types of organization- level corruption. *Academy of Management*
48 *Review*, 33, 685-709.
49
50
51 Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. (2006). The link between competitive advantage and
52 corporate social responsibility. *Harvard Business Review*, 84(12), 78-92.
53
54 Powell, W., & DiMaggio, P. (1991). *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*.
55 University of Chicago Press.
56
57 Rabl, T. (2011). The impact of situational influences on corruption in organizations. *Journal*
58 *of Business Ethics*, 100(1), 85-101.
59
60

- 1
2
3 Rabl, T., & Kuhlmann, T. M. (2008). Understanding corruption in organizations:
4 Development and empirical assessment of an action model. *Journal of Business Ethics*,
5 82, 477-495.
6
7
8 Ramdani, D., & Van Witteloostuijn, A. (2012). The shareholder–manager relationship and its
9 impact on the likelihood of firm bribery. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 108(4), 495-507.
10
11 Reinecke, J. & Ansari, S. (2015). What is a "fair" price? Ethics as sensemaking. *Organization*
12 *Science*, 26(3), 633-940.
13
14 Reinecke, J., & Ansari, S. (2016). Taming wicked problems: The role of framing in the
15 construction of corporate social responsibility. *Journal of Management Studies*, 53(3),
16 299-329.
17
18
19 Richards, L.(2017) Using Survey Methods to Research Corruption. In: Schwickerath, A.,
20 Varraich, A., Smith, L.-L. (eds.) *How to Research Corruption* (pp. 4–13), .
21 ICR_Forum_Amsterdam_Conference_Proceedings, retrieved from [http://nbn-](http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-52393-1)
22 [resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-52393-1](http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-52393-1).
23
24
25 Richards, M., & Schembera, S. (2019). *Managing Legitimacy Through Conventionality*
26 *Rather Than Alignment: Anti-Corruption at Family Versus Non-Family Firms*. Available
27 at SSRN <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3484973>
28
29 Rodriguez, P., Uhlenbruck, K., & Eden, L. (2005). Government corruption and the entry
30 strategies of multinationals. *Academy of Management Review*. 30 (2), 383–396.
31
32
33 Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Political Corruption and Democracy. *Connecticut Journal of*
34 *International Law*. 14, 363-377.
35
36
37 Rose-Ackerman, S., & Palifka, B. J. (2016). *Corruption and government: Causes,*
38 *consequences, and reform*. Cambridge University Press.
39
40
41 Rothstein, B., & Uslaner, E. M. (2005). All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust.
42 *World Politics*, 58(1), 41-72.
43
44
45 Rothstein, B. and Varraich, A., (2017). *Making sense of corruption*. Cambridge University
46 Press.
47
48
49 Roulet, T. J. (2020) *The power of being divisive: understanding negative social evaluations*.
50 Stanford University Press.
51
52
53 Roy, S., Sivakumar, K., & Wilkinson, I. F. (2004). Innovation generation in supply chain
54 relationships: a conceptual model and research propositions. *Journal of the Academy of*
55 *Marketing Science*, 32(1), 61-79.
56
57
58 Rynes, S. L., Bartunek, J. M., & Daft, R. L. (2001). Across the great divide: Knowledge
59 creation and transfer between practitioners and academics. *Academy of Management*
60 *Journal*, 44(2), 340-355.
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000

- 1
2
3 Schembera, S., & Scherer, A. G. (2017). Organizational strategies in the context of
4 legitimacy loss: Radical versus gradual responses to disclosed corruption. *Strategic*
5 *Organization*, 15(3), 301-337.
6
7 Scherer A. G., & Palazzo, G. (2007). Toward a political conception of corporate
8 responsibility: Business and society seen from a Habermasian perspective. *Academy of*
9 *Management Review*, 32(4), 1096–1120.
10
11 Scherer, A. G., & Patzer, M. (2011). Where is the theory in stakeholder theory?—A meta-
12 analysis of the pluralism in stakeholder theory. In R. Phillips (Ed.) *Stakeholder Theory.*
13 *Impact and Prospects* (pp. 140-162). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
14
15 Scott, J. C. (1969). The analysis of corruption in developing nations. *Comparative Studies in*
16 *Society and History*, 11(3), 315–341.
17
18 Scott, W. Richard. 1995. *Institutions and Organizations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
19 Publications.
20
21 Scott, W. R. (2001). *Institutions and organizations*, 2nd eds. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
22
23 Scott, W.R. (2008). *Institutions and organizations* .3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
24
25 Schubert, S. and Miller, T. C. (2008). At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item. Dec 20,
26 New York Times. Retrieved from
27 <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html>
28
29 Singh, S. (2017). Competition in corruptible markets. *Marketing Science*, 36(3), 361-381.
30
31 Sharma, P. (2020). Proposed Special Issue Dark Side of Business to Business, *Journal of*
32 *Business Research*. Retrieved from: [https://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-](https://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-business-research/call-for-papers/proposed-special-issue-dark-side-of-business-to-business-b2b)
33 [business-research/call-for-papers/proposed-special-issue-dark-side-of-business-to-](https://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-business-research/call-for-papers/proposed-special-issue-dark-side-of-business-to-business-b2b)
34 [business-b2b](https://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-business-research/call-for-papers/proposed-special-issue-dark-side-of-business-to-business-b2b)
35
36 Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993). Corruption. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*,
37 108(3), 599-617.
38
39 Short, J. (2009). The art of writing a review article. *Journal of Management*, 35(6), 1312-
40 1317.
41
42 Smart, A., & Hsu, C. L. (2007). Corruption or social capital? Tact and the performance of
43 guanxi in market socialist China. In G. Anders (Ed.) *Corruption and the secret of law: A*
44 *legal anthropological perspective*, (pp. 167-190), London: Routledge.
45
46 Smits, C. W. D. (2013). The effect of national culture on the implementation of anti-
47 corruption policies (Master's thesis, University of Twente).
48
49 Sims, R. L., Gong, B., & Ruppel, C. P. (2012). A contingency theory of corruption: The
50 effect of human development and national culture. *The Social Science Journal*, 49(1), 90-
51 97.
52
53 Søreide, T. (2009). Too risk averse to stay honest?: Business corruption, uncertainty and
54 attitudes toward risk. *International Review of Law and Economics*, 29(4), 388-395.
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 Spencer, J., & Gomez, C. (2011). MNEs and corruption: the impact of national institutions
4 and subsidiary strategy. *Strategic Management Journal*, 32(3), 280–300.
5
6
7 Srivastava, S. C., Teo, T. S., & Devaraj, S. (2016). You Can't Bribe a Computer: Dealing
8 with the Societal Challenge of Corruption Through ICT. *MIS Quarterly*, 40(2), 511-526.
9
10 Svensson, J., (2005). Eight questions about corruption. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19
11 (3), 19–42.
12
13 Tanzi, A. (1998). Corruption around the world: Causes, consequences, scope and cures. *IMF*
14 *Staff Papers*, 45(4), 20-23. Retrieved from
15 <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9863.pdf>
16
17 The Economist. (2020). *The economic crisis will expose a decade's worth of corporate fraud*.
18 Retrieved from [https://www.economist.com/business/2020/04/18/the-economic-crisis-](https://www.economist.com/business/2020/04/18/the-economic-crisis-will-expose-a-decades-worth-of-corporate-fraud)
19 [will-expose-a-decades-worth-of-corporate-fraud](https://www.economist.com/business/2020/04/18/the-economic-crisis-will-expose-a-decades-worth-of-corporate-fraud).
20
21
22 Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. (1983). Institutional sources of change in the formal structure
23 of organizations: The diffusion of civil service reform, 1880-1935. *Administrative Science*
24 *Quarterly*, 28, 22-39.
25
26 Tonoyan, V., Strohmeier, R., Habib, M., & Perlitz, M. (2010). Corruption and
27 entrepreneurship: How formal and informal institutions shape small firm behavior in
28 transition and mature market economies. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 34(5),
29 803-832.
30
31
32 Torsello, D. (2018). Organizational Culture and Corruption. In: Poff D., Michalos A. (eds)
33 *Encyclopedia of Business and Professional Ethics*. Springer, Cham.
34
35 Torsello, D., & Venard, B. (2016). The anthropology of corruption. *Journal of Management*
36 *Inquiry*, 25(1), 34-54.
37
38
39 Transparency International. (2018). *Global corruption report*. Transparency International.
40 Retrieved from <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018>
41
42 Torsello, C. (2018) Organizational culture and Corruption. Retrieved from:
43 https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-319-23514-1_136-1
44 ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA.
45
46
47 Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. *Journal of Public*
48 *Economics*, 76(3), 399-457.
49
50 Treisman, D. (2007). What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of
51 cross-national empirical research?. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10, 211-244.
52
53 Treviño, L. K., & Weaver, G. R. (2003). *Managing ethics in business organizations: Social*
54 *scientific perspective*. Stanford University Press.
55
56
57 Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
58 biases. *Science*, 185(4157), 1124-1131.
59
60

- 1
2
3 Steidlmeier, P. (1999). Gift giving, bribery and corruption: Ethical management of business
4 relationships in China. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 20(2), 121-132.
5
6 Uhlenbruck, K., Rodriguez, P., Doh, J., & Eden, L. (2006). The impact of corruption on entry
7 strategy: Evidence from telecommunication projects in emerging economies. *Organization*
8 *Science*, 17(3), 402-414.
9
10 Vaughan, D. (1999). The dark side of organizations: Mistake, misconduct, and disaster.
11 *Annual Review of Sociology*, 25(1), 271-305.
12
13
14 Vaughan, D. (1983). *Controlling unlawful organizational behavior: Social structure and*
15 *corporate misconduct*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
16
17 Venard, B. (2009). Organizational isomorphism and corruption: An empirical research in
18 Russia. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 89(1), 59-76.
19
20 Venkatesan, R., & Benton, L. (2018). How companies can take a stand against bribery.
21 *Harvard Business Review*, 9 (17), Retrieved at: [https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-companies-](https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-companies-can-take-a-stand-against-bribery)
22 [can-take-a-stand-against-bribery](https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-companies-can-take-a-stand-against-bribery)
23
24
25 Vermeulen, F. (2005). On rigor and relevance: Fostering dialectic progress in management
26 research. *Academy of Management Journal*, 48(6), 978-982.
27
28 Vogt, A. O.: (1997), *Korruption im Wirtschaftsleben. Eine betriebswirtschaftliche Schaden-*
29 *Nutzen-Analyse*, Verlag, Wiesbaden:Deutscher Universitäts.
30
31 Voliotis, S. (2017). Establishing the normative standards that determine deviance in
32 organizational corruption: Is corruption within organizations antisocial or unethical?.
33 *Journal of Business Ethics*, 140(1), 147-160.
34
35
36 Webb, J. W., Tihanyi, L., Ireland, R. D., & Sirmon, D. G. (2009). You say illegal, I say
37 legitimate: Entrepreneurship in the informal economy. *Academy of Management Review*,
38 34(3), 492-510.
39
40 Weick, K. E. (1995). *Sensemaking in organizations* (Vol. 3). Sage.
41
42 Weitzel, U., & Berns, S. (2006). Cross-border takeovers, corruption, and related aspects of
43 governance. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 37(6), 786-806.
44
45
46 World Bank. (2008). *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*. Washington: World Bank.
47
48 World Economic Forum (2018). *Corruption is costing the global economy \$3.6 trillion*
49 *dollars every year*. Retrieved from: [https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/12/the-global-](https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/12/the-global-economy-loses-3-6-trillion-to-corruption-each-year-says-u-n)
50 [economy-loses-3-6-trillion-to-corruption-each-year-says-u-n](https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/12/the-global-economy-loses-3-6-trillion-to-corruption-each-year-says-u-n)
51
52
53 Wu X. (2009). Determinants of bribery in Asia: evidence from business environment survey.
54 *Journal of Business Ethics* 87(1), 75–88.
55
56 Yang, M. M. H. (2002). The resilience of guanxi and its new deployments: A critique of
57 some new guanxi scholarship. *The China Quarterly*, 170, 459-476.
58
59
60

1
2
3 Zahra, S. A., Priem, R. L., and A. A. Rasheed. (2005). 'The Antecedents and Consequences
4 of Top Management Fraud.' *Journal of Management*, 31(6), 803–28.

5
6 Zhou, X., Han, Y., & Wang, R. (2013). An empirical investigation on firms' proactive and
7 passive motivation for bribery in China. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 118(3), 461-472.

8
9 Zyglidopoulos, S. (2016). Toward a theory of second-order corruption. *Journal of*
10 *Management Inquiry*, 25(1), 3-10.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

TABLES

Table 1 – Different Academic Approaches to Defining Corruption

Field	Unit of Analysis	Mechanism
<i>Economics</i>	Individual	Cost-Benefit Maximization
<i>Anthropology</i>	Clan	Relations and Meaning
<i>Sociology</i>	Society	Social Structure
<i>Political Science</i>	Political System	Distortion of the Public Realm
<i>Corporate Corruption</i>	Firm	Conditioned Decision-Making by Managers

Table 2: The Different Perspective on corporate corruption

	<i>Rational Action</i>	<i>Cultural Norm</i>	<i>Institutionalized Practice</i>	<i>Moral Failure</i>
Basic Viewpoint	Corruption is viewed as resulting from a rational cost/benefit analysis by individuals	The role of organizational or national culture in enabling or discouraging corruption.	Behavior in organizations is strongly conditioned by the institutionalized practices in place in the organizational field.	It focuses on the way that individuals are able to engage in ethical dilemmas and immoral behaviors despite knowing they are wrong.
Mechanism	When the potential benefits of corruption outweigh the potential penalties, then they will be corrupted	Culture shapes understandings and provides norms that determine what corruption is and the degree to which it is sanctioned.	Firms respond to the cognitive, normative, and regulatory pressures of the environment	Ethical principles guide managers to make good decisions in complex situations.
Academic Fields	Economics and Political Science	Anthropology and Sociology	Sociology	Moral Philosophy

Table 3 – Summary table


Perspectives		Research Within Corporations	Research Across Corporations	Research in Corporations and Government
Rational Action	<i>Frequency of studies</i>	High	Medium	Low
	<i>Example of Potential gap to be further explored</i>	Reputation and risk calculations in a new ethical world of responsible investors (sovereign wealth funds, pension, etc)	Corrupt supply chains	Calculations made by companies when engaging in deals involving highly corrupt areas such as conflict minerals
Institutionalized Practice	<i>Frequency of studies</i>	High	Medium	Low
	<i>Example of Potential gap to be explored</i>	How to strengthen and make more effective compliance and anticorruption departments	Role of professional service firms in maintaining/fighting corporate corruption	How capabilities to dealing with corruption in the home country are exported/ translated when a corporation does dealing abroad
Cultural Norm	<i>Frequency of studies</i>	High	Medium	Low
	<i>Example of Potential gaps to be explored</i>	The different role of emotions in societies such as guilt in the spread of corruption	Lessons from corporations that resisted corruption and did not survive.	Corporate straddling between businessmen that become a politician
Moral Failure	<i>Frequency of studies</i>	High	Medium	Low
	<i>Example of Potential gap to be explored</i>	Is nepotism always a corrupt way of promoting staff when there is low trust in society	What are guilt and shame and their relationship to engaging in a corrupt act	How the government hires corporation that by engaging in corrupt practices benefits it economically in the short term (Waste disposal for cheaper)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Figure 1 – Corporate Corruption as a Research Focus



Overlapping area is area of contribution to understandings of corruption in government