

A practical approach for applying Bayesian logic to determine the probabilities of subsurface scenarios: example from an offshore oilfield

P. Craig Smalley* - BP Centre for Business and Technology, Sunbury TW16 7LN, UK

Christopher D. Walker & Paul G. Belvedere - BP America, 501 Westlake Park Blvd, Houston, Texas, 77079, USA

* Current address: Department of Earth Science & Engineering, Imperial College, London SW7 2AZ, UK

Abstract

During appraisal of an undeveloped segment of a producing offshore oilfield, three well penetrations revealed unexpected complexity and compartmentalization. Business decisions on whether and how to develop this segment depended on understanding the possible interpretations of the subsurface. This was achieved using the following steps that incorporated a novel practical application of Bayesian logic:

1. Scenarios were identified to span the full range of possible subsurface interpretations. This was achieved through a facilitated cross-disciplinary exercise including external participants. The exercise generated 12 widely differing subsurface scenarios, which could be grouped into 4 types of mechanism: slumping, structural, depositional and diagenetic.
2. Prior probabilities were assigned to each scenario. These probabilities were elicited from the same subsurface team and external experts who performed (1), using their diverse knowledge and experience.
3. The probabilities of each scenario were updated by evaluating them sequentially with 21 individual pieces of evidence, progressively down-weighting belief in scenarios that were inconsistent with the evidence. For each piece of evidence the likelihood (chance that the scenario could produce the evidence) was estimated qualitatively by the same team using a “traffic light” high-medium-low assessment. Offline, these were converted to numerical likelihood values. Posterior probabilities were derived by multiplying the priors by the likelihoods and renormalizing to sum to unity across all the scenarios.
4. The most probable scenarios were selected for quantitative reservoir modelling, to evaluate the potential outcomes of business decisions, given each scenario.

Of the 12 scenarios identified in step 1, most were strongly down-weighted by the sequential revisions against evidence in step 3; after this, only scenarios in the “slumping” group retained significant posterior probabilities. The data showed minimal sensitivity to the initial assumption of prior probability in step 2.

This process had several benefits. Firstly, it encouraged the subsurface team to imagine a full range of scenarios that were likely to bracket the actual subsurface “truth”, something that is critical for subsequent decision making. Secondly, it allowed belief in the probability of each scenario to be updated systematically in a way that was strongly conditioned to the evidence, so that the choice of scenarios to take through to reservoir modelling was more objective and evidence-based. Thirdly, it

41 allowed an assessment of the usefulness of individual pieces of evidence, which could be used to
42 guide value-of-information assessments for subsequent data acquisition. Finally, the process
43 enabled rigorous Bayesian revision methods to be applied in a simple practical way that engaged the
44 subsurface team without exposing them to the underlying mathematics. During field appraisal and
45 development, when the subsurface is revealed gradually as more data are acquired and studied, the
46 process outlined here provides a practical way of generating and modifying belief in a range of
47 subsurface scenarios while minimizing exposure to potential biases and logical fallacies that could
48 affect subsequent decision quality. It also helps to decide which scenarios are sufficiently probable
49 that they need to be represented by detailed reservoir models.

50

51 **Introduction**

52 Describing and understanding the subsurface of an oil and gas asset is necessarily an incremental
53 process, as gradually more data become available through time. For example, prior to exploration
54 drilling, knowledge of the subsurface of a prospect may be based on seismic data and, if available,
55 information from wells in other parts of the play. After the exploration well has been drilled and a
56 discovery has been made, new information is available from the well, increasing knowledge of the
57 subsurface. During appraisal, this may be augmented by improved seismic coverage and quality,
58 more well penetrations, core analysis and well test data. During development and production there
59 will be further well penetrations and dynamic production data, all of which progressively increase
60 the understanding of the subsurface, constraining the possible subsurface scenarios that could be
61 present and their probabilities. (Note that in this paper, the term “subsurface scenario” is used to
62 describe a discrete internally consistent view of the subsurface)

63 At each of these stages of field development various business decisions need to be made. Making
64 wise decisions using rigorous decision risk analysis methods requires a good quantification of
65 uncertainty at each stage (Spetzler et al., 2016; SPE, 2016). This paper examines the process by
66 which knowledge of, and uncertainty in, the subsurface is updated as new data or the results of
67 technical studies become available. In particular, the question is addressed of how to apportion
68 appropriate weight between previous existing information and the new information. We focus on
69 field appraisal, a time when there is usually a rapid influx of new information.

70 There is a standard way of approaching such problems, using Bayesian updating (e.g. Van Wees et
71 al., 2008; Willigers et al., 2013). Nevertheless, examination of the relevant literature indicates that
72 this is not routinely applied in practice in subsurface teams. Possibly this is because the
73 mathematics of probability is perceived as difficult, and the relevance of the Bayesian logic to real
74 subsurface situations is not immediately evident to non-specialists.

75 This paper describes a simplified intuitive Bayesian approach that, whilst being technically rigorous,
76 is easy to adopt in practice by subsurface teams; this is demonstrated through a case study of the
77 appraisal of an offshore oil field.

78

79 **Current pitfalls**

80 There are presently various pitfalls that can cause problems when trying to quantify changes to
81 uncertainty in response to new information. These are usually related to various motivational and
82 cognitive biases that are well known to affect perceptions of uncertainty in general and of the

83 subsurface in particular (Milkov, 2015; Montibeller and von Winterfeldt, 2015; see also the chapter
84 “Behavioral Challenges in Decision Making” in Bratvold & Begg, 2010). Examples with potentially
85 serious consequences for subsurface description include:

86 **Not identifying the full range of uncertainty.** Many surprises in field development and performance
87 outcomes can be traced back to a subsurface scenario occurring that was never envisaged (Caers,
88 2011). Scenarios that have never been conceived cannot be planned for or managed. This problem
89 has its roots in biases such as overconfidence (we think we know more than we do) and anchoring
90 (we have an irrational attachment to one particular scenario and thus consciously or sub-consciously
91 ignore scenarios that are significantly different from this).

92 **Over-weighting prior information.** This is reflected in a reluctance to change from an existing view,
93 despite new information to the contrary, resulting in an inaccurate assessment of remaining
94 uncertainty. This situation may be in some cases attributable to the degree of personal investment
95 in current scenarios and models; if a large amount of resource has been expended to work up a
96 scenario and to build static or dynamic models to represent it, there may be a “sunk cost” effect
97 (Montibeller and von Winterfeldt, 2015) leading to a conscious or unconscious motivational bias to
98 stick with the modelled scenario rather than creating more work by considering new scenarios.

99 **Over-weighting new information.** Having often worked hard to justify expensive data acquisition,
100 and having invested in state of the art data, there may be a tendency to overweight information
101 from this source compared to prior data. This is a manifestation of the availability bias, where
102 excessive weighting is given to information that is more easily called to mind or favoured. This pitfall
103 can lead to lurching from over-belief in one scenario to another with every new piece of information.

104 These pitfalls can be avoided by adopting two measures: (1) Identifying the full range of subsurface
105 scenarios at the outset, before building detailed reservoir models, through a facilitated cross-
106 disciplinary team exercise with representation from external experts, and (2) using a practical
107 implementation of Bayes’ Rule to update the probabilities of each scenario so that the probabilities
108 are appropriately supported by the available data. Step 2 involves viewing relevant data and
109 interpretations as individual pieces of evidence that can systematically be evaluated as to their
110 likelihood of supporting each possible scenario. The process described here is best applied at an
111 early stage, before complex reservoir models have been created; it can be used to help decide which
112 are the most probable subsurface scenarios need to be taken through to more detailed reservoir
113 modelling. The actual reservoir modelling is not addressed in this paper. The theoretical basis for
114 step 2 is described in the following section. This process is then illustrated through a worked case
115 study.

116

117 **Theoretical basis**

118 The purpose of this paper is to present an approach to Bayesian updating of probabilities that is
119 accessible to subsurface teams. We believe an important element in achieving engagement with
120 such teams is to avoid the explicit use of mathematical formulae, and to keep the process visual,
121 using images rather than numbers. However, some background to the theoretical approach is
122 useful.

123 When updating probabilities based on new information, Bayes Rule is applicable:

124 $P(S|E) = P(E|S) \times P(S) / P(E)$ (1)

125 Where $P(S|E)$ is the **posterior** (updated) probability of scenario S being true, given that evidence E
126 has been observed; $P(E|S)$ is the **likelihood** that, if scenario S was true, evidence E would be
127 observed; $P(S)$ is the **prior** probability of scenario S being true before evidence E has been
128 considered, and $P(E)$ is the probability of evidence E being observed.

129 In practice, $P(E)$ is often similar between the different scenarios that are being evaluated. Bearing
130 this in mind, and making the assumption that the identified subsurface scenarios cover the full range
131 of possible subsurface realities, $P(E)$ can be substituted by a normalising factor to ensure the
132 posterior probabilities $P(S|E)$ for all scenarios sum to unity. This leaves:

133 $P(S|E) \propto P(E|S) \times P(S)$ (2)

134 which can be read as the posterior probability being proportional to the likelihood multiplied by the
135 prior probability (Lee, 2002).

136 In the approach used here, the scenarios are identified first, making a concerted effort to include all
137 possible scenarios. Then a prior probability is assigned to each scenario based on expert opinion. It
138 is known that such probability estimation can be adversely affected by cognitive and motivational
139 biases. Steps are taken at this stage to minimise the effects of bias (e.g., Baddeley et al., 2004;
140 Curtis & Wood, 2004).

141 Next, a new piece of evidence is considered. For this evidence, the likelihood is estimated by making
142 the assumption that the scenario being considered is true, and then eliciting from experts the
143 probability that the observed evidence could be explained by that scenario. A likelihood of 1 means
144 that the evidence is completely consistent with the what would be expected if the scenario was true,
145 and 0 means that it is impossible that the scenario could have generated the observed evidence;
146 there is, of course, a gradation in between these extremes. The estimated likelihood is generated
147 for each scenario and then multiplied by the prior probabilities. The products for each scenario,
148 when normalized to sum to one, become the posterior probabilities in equation 2. This process is
149 repeated sequentially for each piece of evidence. At each step, the posterior from the previous
150 iteration becomes the prior for the next.

151 In practice, it is difficult to elicit a completely unbiased view of the initial prior probability. However,
152 if the process described above is repeated for numerous pieces of evidence, the posterior
153 probabilities progressively become dominated by the evidence and less dependent on the initial
154 assumed priors. The scenarios that are the most probable, once they have been through several
155 cycles of updating against the evidence, are the ones that may then be selected for more detailed
156 quantitative reservoir modelling.

157 Consideration of Equation 2 demonstrates the importance of identifying all relevant scenarios in the
158 first place. If not identified, their prior probability $P(S)$ is effectively zero, and so new data can never
159 change their probability.

160 This process is now applied in a case study.

161

162

163 Case study from an undrilled segment of a producing oil field

164 *Background*

165 The methods described above were applied in a case study of an offshore oil field. The field in
166 question has been producing for over a decade. This study focuses on the appraisal of an
167 undeveloped fault-bounded extension to the producing field. Figure 1 shows the expected fluid
168 distribution in the potential field extension before appraisal drilling. The area to be appraised was
169 predicted to contain oil down to the regional oil-water contact (OWC) in all three of the known
170 reservoir sands, by analogy with most of the rest of the field. However, the presence of water could
171 not be discounted, as an adjacent area shown in blue on Figure 1 had previously been found
172 unexpectedly to contain water at a level structurally higher than the regional OWC. Three appraisal
173 penetrations were made in the field extension – the original hole (OH) plus sidetracks 2 and 3 (ST2,
174 ST3); these are shown in map form on Figure 2 and cross section in Figure 3.

175 The OH results came in largely as expected, with all three reservoir sands (upper, middle and lower)
176 present and full to the base of the well with oil. The sands were variably depleted from production
177 in the main part of the field, and this was interpreted to indicate that the mapped fault separating
178 the extension from the producing part of the field (Figs. 1 and 2) had only had a baffling effect to
179 pressure transmission on a production timescale and would probably not form a significant barrier
180 to oil flow over geological time (i.e. during reservoir filling).

181 The results for ST2 and ST3 were much more complex than expected. ST2 found oil in the upper
182 sand, but water in the middle and lower sands. Frustratingly, oil-water contacts were not observed,
183 and it was not possible to determine whether the contacts differed significantly from the
184 extrapolated regional OWC (Fig. 3). Pressures were only slightly depleted in each sand, not as much
185 as would have been expected if this part of the reservoir was well connected to the producing area
186 of the field or to the OH, so the existence of production timescale flow restrictions between ST2 and
187 the OH was interpreted. The ST3 penetration was placed between ST2 and the OH, in an attempt to
188 tag the OWC. It encountered all three reservoir sands, with oil in the upper and middle sands, and
189 water in the lower sand, but the highest known water in the lower sand was higher than the lowest
190 known oil in ST2 (Fig. 3). The measured or inferred OWC depths (Fig. 3) are comparable with the
191 regional OWC in ST2, but several hundred feet higher in ST3, indicating that the lower sands in ST3
192 are isolated from the regional aquifer. Using the analytical expression for equilibration of OWCs
193 from Smalley and Muggerridge (2010), the OWC would be expected to equilibrate over the ~400m
194 (1300 ft) inter-well distance in a few tens of thousands of years, so the preservation of OWC
195 differences over geological timescales indicates a significant barrier between the lower sand in the
196 OH and middle sand in ST3. Pressures in ST3 were less depleted than in the OH, and yet more
197 depleted than in ST2. The differences in pressure depletion laterally within each sand indicate flow
198 baffles between the wells on a production timescale.

199

200 Water samples from the OH spun from core have higher salinities than those sampled from other
201 parts of the field, including the regional aquifer; this also suggests that the OH is isolated from the
202 main aquifer over a geological timescale, assuming that any mixing is driven by aquifer flow rather
203 than much slower diffusion (Go et al., 2014).

204 Key development decisions needed to be made for this part of the field: for example, should it be
205 developed at all? If so, should it be developed as a subsea satellite tied back to the main field, or
206 should it be developed by drilling from the existing platform? Would water injection be required and
207 in what pattern? Such decisions are strongly affected by the view of reservoir flow barriers and
208 baffles, the potential mechanisms causing them, and how they might affect the distribution of fluids.
209 This necessitated an examination of possible compartmentalization scenarios.
210 Compartmentalization here refers to the presence of any features that could prevent (barriers) or
211 inhibit (baffles) fluid flow on a production timescale, or on a geological timescale sufficient to affect
212 fluid distribution.

213 ***Step 1. Identify scenarios***

214 Based on the data from the wells, a variety of subsurface scenarios were conceived that could
215 potentially explain the mechanisms of reservoir compartmentalization.

216 When identifying scenarios, motivational and cognitive biases can come into play. An example of
217 motivational bias might be that, because the field team have a stake in the project and may benefit
218 from a successful development of the area being appraised, they may consciously or subconsciously
219 skew the interpretations to be more favourable to development. An example of a cognitive bias
220 could be that the field team are anchored to an existing geological interpretation of the field, and
221 thus fail to identify scenarios that vary significantly from this, thus underestimating the uncertainty
222 in the subsurface.

223 The effects of biases were minimized by assembling a multidisciplinary team who were familiar with
224 the field, plus others who were familiar with the regional geology, but worked outside the field
225 team. In addition, external (to the region) experts were included. The intent was that the inclusion
226 of different disciplines and external expertise would reduce the chance that the group was anchored
227 towards one particular type of interpretation. The use of external experts who did not have a stake
228 in the success of the project was designed to minimize motivational bias.

229 The result was a very wide range of possible subsurface scenarios, listed in Table 1, which covered all
230 of the key mechanisms that could cause the observed compartmentalization effects. The scenarios
231 fell into 4 groups, based on mechanisms related to (1) slumping, (2) faulting, (3) deposition or (4)
232 diagenesis. Each scenario was visualized by generating a simple graphic (Figs. 4-7) so that the team
233 all had a common understanding of how that scenario could lead to the observed flow barrier and
234 baffle effects.

235 The four slumping related scenarios (1a-d) relate to movement soon after deposition due to various
236 mechanisms (Fig. 4):

- 237 • Scenario 1a involves small-displacement slumps triggered by movement off a
238 paleobathymetric high causing imbricate faults that act as flow barriers.
- 239 • Scenario 1b is where a retrogressive slump failure is initiated by channels down-cutting into
240 earlier layers, creating a gravitational instability that causes movement over the top of an
241 overpressured shale. The resulting faults become flow barriers.
- 242 • Scenario 1c is where a large-scale gravity slide down a regional bathymetric gradient is
243 interrupted by encountering another high. The resulting down-dip compression creates
244 thrust faults that compartmentalize the reservoir.

- 245 • Scenario 1d involves rapid turbidite deposition onto unstable substrate which then initiates
246 local subsidence, disruption and mud injection; in this scenario, it is the injected mud that
247 creates flow barriers.

248 The three faulting scenarios (2a-c) relate to structuration after deposition and consolidation of the
249 reservoir sands (Fig. 5):

- 250 • Scenario 2a invokes large faults between the appraisal wells that are sufficiently large to
251 compartmentalize the reservoir but are just below the threshold for being visible given the
252 resolution of the seismic data.
- 253 • Scenario 2b involves zones of smaller-scale deformation between the wells, for example
254 small faults that are well below the current seismic resolution (“sub-seismic faults”),
255 deformation bands related to bending stresses, or boudinage in sands created by flexural
256 slip in bounding shales.
- 257 • Scenario 2c relates to tar-filled fractures, where overpressured source rock from depth has
258 hydraulically fractured into the overburden, and created continuous, through-going,
259 impermeable, bitumen-filled fractures.

260 The stratigraphic scenarios (3a-c) involve depositional architecture creating compartments by means
261 of off-lapping or down-cutting channels that are lined with shale. These are illustrated in Figure 6:

- 262 • Scenario 3a has compartmentalization caused by zones of amalgamation in stacked channel
263 deposits with long axes oriented normal to the line of appraisal wells. In this scenario, there
264 are short-distance facies variations and clay-prone sands and silts deposited towards the
265 edges of the channels.
- 266 • Scenario 3b involves shale drapes over compensation lobes. In this scenario, the reservoir
267 sands would be deposited towards the edges of submarine fans where sands are less
268 channelized and shales with larger lateral extent can be developed and preserved. The
269 preserved shale drapes cause the compartmentalization.
- 270 • Scenario 3c is where turbidite deposition is influenced by paleotopography of the sea bed.
271 Syn-depositional paleobathymetric relief caused decreased flow velocity as the turbidites
272 approached the topographic high. Finer material was preferentially deposited along
273 particular zones, degrading reservoir quality sufficiently to affect reservoir connectivity.

274 Two diagenetic scenarios were also identified (4a,b), illustrated in Figure 7:

- 275 • Scenario 4a is where the aquifer is heavily cemented and the resulting low permeability
276 creates a bottom seal, inhibiting pressure support from the aquifer being transmitted to the
277 wells.
- 278 • Scenario 4b involves differential diagenesis. Small scale variations in primary sediment
279 composition or subsurface conditions (e.g. waters moving up fractures) enhanced diagenesis
280 (e.g. quartz or carbonate cementation) in certain areas, causing permeability reduction
281 between the well locations.

282 The team was confident that this wide range of diverse scenarios covered all the possible
283 compartmentalization mechanisms that could account for the observations from the appraisal wells.

284

285 ***Step 2. Assign prior probabilities***

286 Based on experience from elsewhere in the field, and in the wider region, it was evident to the team
287 that the 12 scenarios identified were not equiprobable, so the probability of each scenario was
288 estimated. This was done in a workshop environment facilitated by an expert in probability and
289 uncertainty. The team was made aware of cognitive biases that can influence the behaviour of
290 groups, such as anchoring, the authority fallacy, herding and trust heuristics (Milkov, 2015). To
291 minimize these effects, the prior probabilities for each scenario were estimated individually by
292 members of the multi-disciplinary team in isolation. Their estimates were then averaged after
293 eliminating anomalies, rather than being adjusted by group consensus. The probabilities were then
294 normalized to sum to one across all the scenarios. These estimated prior probabilities are shown in
295 Table 1. Clearly, the scenarios related to slumping were seen as the front runners, followed by
296 scenario 2a that invoked larger but un-imaged faults.

297 The sensitivity to the estimates of prior probabilities is examined later, as are possible improvements
298 to the estimation methodology.

299

300 ***Step 3. Update probabilities by sequential consideration of evidence***

301 The scenarios identified in step 1 and assigned prior probabilities in step 2 were then tested against
302 various pieces of evidence – observations and interpretations derived from a range of data types,
303 shown in Figure 8. For each piece of evidence, the subsurface team as a facilitated group made a
304 qualitative estimate of the likelihood (i.e. $P(E|S)$ in Equation 2) that each scenario could be capable
305 of generating that evidence, by assigning a traffic-light (red, yellow or green) colour to each
306 evidence-to-scenario combination. An assessment of “red” means that it is judged highly unlikely
307 that the scenario could have generated the observed evidence, yellow means that it is somewhat
308 likely, and green means that the evidence is exactly what would be expected if the scenario were
309 true. In addition, some pieces of evidence were marked as “grey”, where it was felt that the
310 scenario had no bearing on the evidence.

311 The first 19 pieces of evidence were available at or soon after the time that the scenarios were
312 identified. Sometime later, reprocessed seismic data became available which had better resolution
313 and definition, allowing improved imaging of the reservoir layering and faulting, which were two key
314 uncertainties. This dataset provided two important new pieces of evidence. In map view, the two
315 down-dip sidetracks were seen to be situated in an almond-shaped area of poor and disturbed
316 reflectivity. In cross section view, the boundary between the disturbed and background reflectivity
317 was interpreted as a scoop-shaped detachment. Both pieces of evidence were judged as consistent
318 with the slumping-related scenarios, but inconsistent with the faulting-, deposition- and diagenesis-
319 related scenarios, leading to red traffic light assessments (Fig. 8).

320 To use the evidence to update quantitatively the probabilities for each scenario, it was necessary to
321 convert the indicative traffic light colours (Fig. 8) into numerical likelihood values. This was done
322 offline, after the elicitation workshops described above. In this analysis, the following assumptions
323 were made. “Red” was assigned a likelihood of 0.1, indicating that it was unlikely that the evidence
324 could be consistent with the scenario. Note that no zero likelihoods were assigned; this would have
325 rendered the posterior probability for the affected scenario as zero, and this was seen as
326 unreasonably definite given the uncertainty involved in all of the pieces of evidence. “Yellow” was
327 assigned a value of 0.7, and “Green” was given a 1.0, signifying complete consistency between the

328 scenario and the evidence. “Grey” was also assigned a likelihood of 1, as lack of relevance should
329 not be regarded as positive evidence against a scenario. The likelihoods are shown on Figure 8.

330 Using these likelihoods, the probabilities of each scenario were updated sequentially for each piece
331 of evidence, i.e. in 21 steps. In each step, the previous posterior probability was used as the new
332 prior, this prior was multiplied by the likelihoods (Fig. 8), and the products normalized to sum to one
333 across all the scenarios, following Equation 2. With the application of each piece of evidence the
334 relative probabilities of each scenario changed (Fig. 9).

335 After the first 19 pieces of evidence, that is having considered all the data initially available, but prior
336 to the reprocessed seismic data becoming available, the scenario with the highest probability was 2a
337 (large faults) at 0.45, followed by the slumping-related scenarios 1a and 1b. The large faults scenario
338 (2a) involves having faults large enough to compartmentalize the reservoir and cause the observed
339 variations in pressure and fluid distributions, but just below seismic resolution. The reprocessed
340 seismic information was thus a potentially critical piece of evidence, as the improved resolution of
341 the reprocessed seismic data could have revealed such faults. Despite its higher resolution there
342 was still no evidence for such faulting from the reprocessed seismic data. The likelihood that
343 scenario 2a could explain the observations from the reprocessed seismic data (evidence 20, scoop-
344 shaped detachment, and evidence 21, arcuate low reflectivity zone) was thus expressed as a “red”
345 (Fig. 8). The depositional and diagenetic scenarios (3a-c, 4a-b) similarly are unable to explain these
346 observations. On the other hand, the reprocessed seismic observations were consistent with the
347 slump-related scenarios 1a-c, though less consistent with 1d (local subsidence), which would have
348 been unlikely to have resulted in the scoop shaped detachment. The result of applying the two
349 critical pieces of evidence (items 20 and 21 on Fig. 8) was thus quite dramatic, in that the slumping-
350 related scenarios 1a and 1b rose to become the most probable scenarios (~0.4 each), overtaking the
351 large fault scenario 2a, which dropped from a prior probability (after 19 iterations) of 0.45 to a
352 posterior probability (after 21 iterations) of ~0.1 (Fig. 9).

353 Note that the probability aggregation process, being purely multiplicative, is unaffected by the order
354 in which the pieces of evidence are considered. Whatever the order, the final posterior probabilities
355 are the same.

356 The posterior probabilities were used to guide the choice of which scenarios to take forward into
357 geocellular and reservoir simulation models. These were, in turn, used to help make development
358 decisions about this field segment.

359

360 **Discussion**

361 *Sensitivities*

362 The approach used here for estimating the probabilities of the identified subsurface scenarios – by
363 estimating an initial prior probability for each scenario, and then using sequential Bayesian updating
364 against different types of evidence to generate improved posterior probabilities – is potentially
365 sensitive to two probability estimations: (1) the initial prior probabilities, and (2) the numerical
366 likelihood values assigned to the qualitative likelihood assessment (i.e. red, yellow, green in Fig. 8).

367 In the analysis presented so far, and shown in Fig. 9, the initial prior probabilities were estimated by
368 the subsurface team using judgement, based on their own experience and knowledge of the field

369 and region. Whilst steps were taken to try to minimize motivational and cognitive biases (e.g.
370 including the views of independent external experts), assessing prior probability remains a
371 problematic area (e.g., Baddeley et al., 2004; Curtis & Wood, 2004). To test the sensitivity to the
372 priors, the sequential Bayesian updating was repeated but using different values for the priors.
373 Figure 10 shows one such case where the scenarios were initially assumed to be equally probable.

374 Comparison of Figures 9 and 10 shows that for the first few iterations the probabilities are strongly
375 influenced by the assumed prior probabilities. With subsequent iterations the initial prior becomes
376 less of a control, and the probabilities become dominated by the cumulative effect of the Bayesian
377 updates. This means that, by including many types of evidence, and thus many iterations of
378 sequential Bayesian updating, the scenario probabilities become strongly aligned with the
379 interpretations of the individual pieces of evidence. This is desirable, as this will be less susceptible
380 to the possible systematic biases affecting the prior probability estimation.

381 Sensitivities were also run on different assignments of numerical values to the red, yellow or green
382 assessments (Fig. 8). The results (not shown) indicate some effect on the absolute scenario
383 probabilities, but minimal effect on the relative order of the scenario probabilities. Indeed, for all
384 reasonable values, the top 5 most probable scenarios were the same. As long as the conversion
385 from qualitative to numerical values is applied consistently, this should not be a dominant factor on
386 the outcomes and the subsequent business decisions made as a result.

387 ***Identifying the full range of scenarios***

388 Making good field development decisions, and managing the risks around the outcomes of such
389 decisions, demands a good understanding of the relevant subsurface uncertainties. A common
390 problem with subsurface modelling (described for example in Caers, 2011) is that the full range of
391 uncertainties is not fully comprehended; consequently, they are not incorporated into reservoir
392 uncertainty modelling, resulting in non-optimal decisions and surprise business outcomes.
393 Anecdotal evidence points to two possible causes for this. Firstly, anchoring – where one particular
394 subsurface scenario dominates, perhaps because it was the first one thought up, or because it
395 reflects the interpretational experience of the individuals in the subsurface team (Bond et al., 2002).
396 With anchoring, the team finds it difficult to imagine different scenarios because they are anchored
397 to the existing one. A second potential cause is perhaps more of a motivational bias related to a
398 sunk cost effect – where a complex reservoir model already exists and has had much investment of
399 resources to build and calibrate it. *Within* the existing model it may be possible, or even easy, to
400 investigate the impact of some uncertainties by running numerous cases where the uncertain input
401 values are varied. However, it may be very difficult to model truly different subsurface scenarios, as
402 this could demand building completely new models. Thus, the motivational bias, whether conscious
403 or subconscious, is to restrict the imagination of alternative scenarios that cannot be represented by
404 the existing model.

405 For good decision making and risk management, it is crucial that the subsurface “truth” lies within
406 the imagined range of possibilities (Spetzler et al., 2016). If the “truth” lies outside the imagined
407 range, there is a large scope for poor decisions and unpleasant surprise outcomes. Consequently,
408 perhaps the most important part of the process outlined in this paper is the scenario identification
409 step. It is critical that this looks wide enough to ensure that all subsurface possibilities are
410 embraced. The benefit of the current process is that any number of scenarios can be imagined
411 without inhibition, safe in the knowledge that: (a) the sequential Bayesian updating process will
412 systematically narrow the wide initial range of scenarios (12 in the present case study) down to a

413 smaller, more manageable number, before starting to build reservoir models; and (b) that this will
414 be done in an objective manner, strongly linked to evidence from subsurface observations and
415 measurements. This process thus helps to mitigate the aforementioned biases.

416 ***The impact of different data types***

417 The way in which a particular type of data affects the understanding of the subsurface is readily
418 gleaned from Figure 8. Data that are not relevant to a particular scenario (grey in Fig. 8) have no
419 effect on the posterior probability of that scenario. Where this is repeated across many scenarios,
420 that piece of evidence is less valuable, relative to other data types that have a stronger effect on the
421 posterior probabilities. Perhaps counter-intuitively, though, observations that are consistent with a
422 particular scenario also do not necessarily effect its posterior probability greatly; with a likelihood of
423 1 (green on Fig. 8) these are equivalent to irrelevant grey data. On the other hand, “red” evidence
424 that cannot be explained by a particular scenario can have a great effect (reduction) on its posterior
425 probability, and data that do this across many scenarios are of particular value in constraining
426 uncertainty. Thus, the product of the likelihoods for each piece of evidence across all scenarios is an
427 indication of how useful that evidence was in distinguishing between the scenarios. For the
428 different types of evidence in Figure 8, the products of the likelihoods vary from 5×10^{-10} to 1 (Table
429 2), with the most useful (lowest likelihood product) being evidence derived from the reprocessed
430 seismic data.

431 It would be very interesting and useful to gather such likelihood data over many studies in a wide
432 range of situations to create a database of types of evidence and their potential usefulness for
433 constraining different types of subsurface scenario. This would be of benefit for designing data
434 acquisition programs, which could use such analogue information to determine what data would
435 have the greatest chance of providing good evidence to constrain the subsurface uncertainties. This
436 could provide a quantitative basis for estimates of data reliability that are needed for Value of
437 Information studies (e.g. Coopersmith & Cunningham, 2002; Grose & Smalley, 2017).

438 ***Potential improvements to the process***

439 **Elicitation of priors.** In the current implementation of the process, the prior probabilities of each
440 scenario were generated by estimations from team members. No weighting was used, so each team
441 member’s estimate was given equal weight. Theoretically, the most correct way of doing this is to
442 rank the individual experts in terms of their estimating reliability (e.g. Bordley, 1982) or the quality
443 of the estimating heuristics they use (Baddeley et al., 2004), and weight their estimates accordingly
444 (see Delfiner, 2008, for a practical example). However, the effectiveness of weighting depends on
445 the ability of the overall process facilitator to assign objective reliable weighting to each contributor
446 (Bolger and Rowe, 2015), which is exceedingly difficult in any situation, but more so in a subsurface
447 team consisting of multiple disciplines, backgrounds and experiences. Without reliable weightings,
448 weighted aggregations of probabilities are not significantly better than unweighted aggregations. As
449 Bolger and Rowe (2015, p10) observed, “good things do not come to those who weight”! In any
450 case, in the current process, the updating of prior probabilities with numerous steps of Bayesian
451 updating renders the final posterior probabilities insensitive to the initial assumption of priors
452 (compare Figures 9 and 10). We thus do not see benefit from expending resources in generating
453 weightings for the prior probability estimates. The current method of using averaged individual
454 estimates, rather than a group consensus, avoids many of the issues with estimating in groups (e.g.
455 Delfiner, 2008) and is a good practical compromise.

456

457 **Elicitation of likelihoods.** For each piece of evidence that was considered, the team made a
458 judgement concerning each scenario in turn: if the scenario was true, what would be the likelihood
459 that the evidence would be observed. In the current case study, this was done in a facilitated group
460 meeting. Such situations are potentially vulnerable to various group biases (e.g. Baddeley et al.,
461 2004), though this was mitigated to some degree by using trained facilitators well acquainted with
462 such potential biases. As discussed previously for elicitation of prior probabilities, a more rigorous
463 approach would be to use likelihood estimates from individuals, and weight these according to their
464 expertise. However, without actual data on the reliability of predictions from each individual, this
465 would be subjective. Furthermore, the process would be highly complex, with the reliability of each
466 team member having to be judged for all 21 individual types of data being considered, potentially
467 hundreds of permutations. We currently feel this complexity would be counter-productive. Our use
468 of the simple traffic-light system scoring system for likelihood estimation (Fig. 8) is not only
469 extremely simple, but avoids many of the issues with quantitative probabilistic elicitations because
470 the three categories (red, yellow, green) are sufficiently distinct that the appropriate category is
471 usually fairly obvious. However, a future possibility would be to track the probability estimating
472 record of individuals through multiple exercises, so that their estimates could be calibrated and
473 weighted appropriately using unobtrusive software tools that did not interfere with the flow of the
474 team workshop.

475

476 **Quantification of likelihoods.** In the current process, likelihoods are elicited as red, yellow or green
477 categories, as described above, and these are translated offline to numerical values (0.1, 0.7 and 1.0
478 respectively). A future improvement could be to develop a more rigorous process for converting
479 the categories to numbers, which could potentially incorporate different numerical scales for
480 different types of data. The principles of fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1978) may be helpful in this regard,
481 though the mathematics would need to be performed in the background to avoid compromising the
482 simple flow of the process for subsurface teams.

483

484 **Aggregation of probabilities.** In the approach used here, the likelihood estimated for each piece of
485 evidence is incorporated simply by applying Equation 2 iteratively. The final posterior probabilities
486 are then the products of the arrays of prior probabilities and likelihoods. While some authors have
487 used broadly similar methods (e.g. Curtis and Wood, 2004), some have proposed more sophisticated
488 methods to aggregate probabilities (e.g. Bordley, 1982; Allard et al., 2012). More sophisticated
489 aggregation techniques are advantageous for two main reasons: (1) they allow weighting of inputs
490 from different estimators based on their reliability; and (2) they can account for data redundancy
491 related to the lack of independence between some of the pieces of evidence, and indeed between
492 members of the team providing the estimates of prior probabilities and likelihoods.

493 We do not believe more sophisticated probability aggregation would have added significant value in
494 the present case, but this is something that could be considered in the future. For the first
495 advantage to materialize, the participants in probability estimation would need to be calibrated as to
496 their prediction reliability as described above. For the second advantage, data redundancy between
497 the participants would also need to have been assessed as to their individual areas and depths of
498 expertise, something that is possible, though could be complicated by the confidentiality of personal
499 data. Redundancy between different types of data should be a more tractable issue, requiring

500 research to generate a table of dependencies between data types that could be built in to the
501 selected probability aggregation algorithm.

502 With any future improvements to the process, it is crucial that any complex calculations are kept
503 “behind the scenes” and do not impact the enthusiasm and focus of the subsurface team or the flow
504 of the workshops used to implement the process. Unless the process is seen as simple, it will
505 probably not be used at all.

506

507 **Conclusions**

508 Statistical techniques such as sequential Bayesian updating may seem intimidating for non-
509 mathematicians, a possible reason why it has not been widely adopted by subsurface teams. This
510 paper demonstrates a technique that applies Bayesian logic in a practical manner that is visual,
511 rather than being overtly mathematical, and is thus easily engaged with by subsurface teams. The
512 process frees teams to imagine a wide range of subsurface scenarios covering the full range of
513 possible Earth realities, in the knowledge that these can subsequently be systematically reduced to a
514 more manageable set of scenarios that are constrained objectively by evidence. After assigning
515 prior probabilities to each scenario based on current knowledge and professional judgement, the
516 sequential Bayesian updating method is easily applied in a team setting using a qualitative traffic-
517 light approach to indicate likelihoods for the data (probability that the scenario could have
518 generated the observed evidence). These can subsequently be converted to a quantitative scale by
519 assigning numerical values to each traffic light colour. The likelihoods are multiplied by the prior
520 probabilities and renormalized to sum to one across all of the scenarios to generate posterior
521 probabilities. This process is iterated for many types of evidence (21 in the case study presented), at
522 each iteration the posterior from the previous iteration becoming the prior for the next. The final
523 posterior probabilities for each scenario are strongly constrained by the available evidence, making
524 maximal use of all the available data, and being insensitive to the initial prior probability
525 assessments. The product of the likelihoods for each piece of evidence is a measure of their
526 usefulness, a useful input to value-of-information studies.

527 This process is proposed as a practical, consistent and objective process to prioritize subsurface
528 scenarios to take forward for subsequent more detailed static and dynamic reservoir modelling.

529

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531 BP and the anonymous case study field partners are thanked for permission to publish.

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590 28.

591 **Authors**

592 **Craig Smalley** has worked in petroleum geology for over 30 years in various technical and senior
593 advisory roles. He developed and led BP's global subsurface uncertainty and risk management
594 community of practice. He now consults in field appraisal and development, reservoir
595 compartmentalization, risk management and decision making. He has visiting academic positions at
596 Imperial College London and Oxford University.

597 **Chris Walker** received a PhD in Earth and Environmental Science from Columbia University and a
598 MEd from Oxford University. He joined BP in 2006 and has worked a variety of Production,
599 Development and Technology roles primarily assessing fault seal and interpretation uncertainty. He
600 currently works as a Structural Geologist in the Western Hemisphere Exploration Technology Center.

601 **Paul Belvedere** has 28 years of industry experience as a Petroleum Geologist. He spent his early
602 career at ARCO and Vastar, working projects from Exploration to Production in the mid-continent
603 region. Since joining BP, Paul has been primarily involved in the Gulf of Mexico, currently as a
604 Development and Production geologist on deepwater assets, and serves part time as BP Production
605 Geoscience Advisor for the Western Hemisphere. He holds a BS in Geology from Midwestern State
606 University and MS in Geology from the University of Tulsa.

607

608 **Tables**
609

Group	Scenario	Prior probability
1. Slumps	1a. Slumps off bathymetric high	0.231
	1b. Undercut regressive slope failure	0.202
	1c. Thrusts caused by gravity slide	0.116
	1d. Local subsidence of unstable substrate	0.169
2. Faults	2a. Large but un-imaged faults	0.116
	2b. Smaller scale deformation	0.012
	2c. Tar-filled fractures	0.012
3. Sedimentologic and stratigraphic	3a. Zone of amalgamation	0.029
	3b. Compensation lobes with continuous shale drapes	0.029
	3c. Paleotopography	0.058
4. Diagenesis	4a. Cemented aquifer	0.012
	4b. Differential diagenesis	0.012

610


611 Table 1. Scenarios imagined to explain the observed reservoir compartmentalization, and their
612 assigned prior probabilities.

613

Evidence	Product of likelihoods
New seismic data: scoop shaped detachment	5E-10
New seismic data: arcuate low reflectivity zone	2E-08
Pressure: inter-well baffling	2E-02
OWC	3E-02
Uniform stratigraphy	8E-02
Basin boundary	1E-01
Faults above reservoir	1E-01
Amplitude dim	1E-01
Shale correlation	1E-01
High curvature	2E-01
Previous faults missed	2E-01
Sub-regional isochore	2E-01
Local isopach map	2E-01
Uncharged clayey interval	2E-01
Tar presence	3E-01
Field analogues	3E-01
Analogue fault style	5E-01
Missing section	5E-01
Tar conduits	5E-01
Deformation in fast-track seismic data	1E+00
Pressure ramp; overpressured shales	1E+00

614


615 Table 2. Products of likelihoods across all 12 scenarios, sorted from lowest to highest. The evidence
616 with the lowest values have the greatest constraints on the posterior probability of the scenarios.



619

620 Figure 1. Reservoir structure map showing interpretation prior to appraisal drilling results. The map
621 shows major seismically-visible faults (heave gaps shown as brown), with compartments coloured by
622 pore fluid: green is known oil, blue is known water. In the area being appraised the colors follow a
623 common risk segment map convention: yellow is moderate risk of encountering water, red is a high
624 risk of encountering water. Grey denotes probable water below the sub-regional oil-water contact.
625 The blue circle is a water penetration. The shade of colour relates to reservoir depth; darker shades
626 are deeper. The contour interval is 500 ft (150 m). The scale bar is 1km (0.62 mile).

627




629

630 Figure 2. Reservoir structure map showing an interpretation after the appraisal drilling results, but
631 before the current study was performed. Legend as for Figure 1. The appraisal penetrations are
632 shown: black square is wellhead, black circles are bottomhole locations of the original hole (OH) and
633 sidetracks 2 and 3, black lines are well paths. The contour interval is 500 ft (150 m). The scale bar is
634 1km (0.62 mile).

635

636

637 Figure 3




638

639 Figure 3. Cross section, roughly NNW-SSE, through the bottomhole locations of the three appraisal
640 penetrations (OH = original hole, ST2 = sidetrack 2, ST3 = sidetrack 3), showing encountered fluid
641 type (green is oil, blue is water, hatched green is unknown). HKW = highest known water; LKO =
642 lowest known oil.

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
645 Figure 4



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
647 Figure 4. Cartoons illustrating the possible conceptual subsurface scenarios related to slumping. (A)
648 Slumps off a bathymetric high; (B) Undercut regressive slope failure; (C) Thrusts caused by gravity
649 slide; (D) Local subsidence of unstable substrate.

650




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653 Figure 5. Cartoons illustrating the subsurface scenarios related to faulting. (A) Large but un-imaged
654 faults; (B) Smaller scale deformation; (C) Tar-filled fractures. Well trajectories shown in red.



656

657 Figure 6. Cartoons of subsurface scenarios related to deposition. (A) Zones of amalgamation; (B)
658 Compensation lobes with continuous shale drapes; (C) Paleotopography.



660

661 Figure 7. Cartoons of subsurface scenarios related to diagenesis. (A) Cemented aquifer; (B)
662 Differential diagenesis.

663

664

665 Figure 8

Scenario	1a	1b	1c	1d	2a	2b	2c	3a	3b	3c	4a	4b
Evidence	Slump off bathymetric high	Regressive slope failure	Thrusts caused by gravity slide	Local subsidence	Large faults	Smaller scale deformation	Tar-filled fractures	Zone of amalgamation	Shale drapes	Paleotopography	Cemented aquifer	Differential diagenesis
1 Subregional isochores	1	1	0.7	0.7	1	1	1	0.7	0.7	1	1	1
2 Local isopach map	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.7	0.7	0.7	1	1	0.7
3 Deformation in fast-track seismic	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
4 Pressure: inter-well baffling	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.1	0.7
5 Pressure ramp; overpressured shales	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
6 Basin boundary	0.7	0.7	1	0.7	1	1	1	0.7	1	1	0.7	0.7
7 Uniform strat	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	1	1	1	0.7	1	0.7	1	0.7
8 Oil-water contact	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.7	0.7	1	0.1	0.7
9 High curvature	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.7
10 Analog fault style	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.7	1	1	1	1	0.7
11 Faults above reservoir	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	1	1	0.7	1	1	1	1	0.7
12 Missing section	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.7	1	1	1	1	0.7
13 Previous faults missed	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.7
14 Tar conduits	1	1	1	1	1	0.7	1	1	1	1	1	0.7
15 Tar presence	1	1	1	1	0.7	0.7	1	1	1	1	1	0.7
16 Uncharged clayey interval	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
17 Amplitude dim	1	1	1	1	1	0.7	0.7	0.7	1	0.7	0.7	0.7
18 Shale correlation	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	1	0.7	1	0.7	1	1	1	1
19 Field analogues	1	1	1	0.7	1	1	1	1	0.7	1	0.7	1
20 New seismic data: scoop shaped detachment	0.7	1	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
21 New seismic data: arcuate low-reflectivity zone	1	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.1	0.1


666

667 Figure 8. Matrix showing the subsurface scenarios (columns) and pieces of evidence (rows). The
 668 colours relate to the traffic light scores initially assigned (green – evidence highly likely from
 669 scenario; yellow – evidence fairly likely; red – evidence unlikely; grey – evidence contains no
 670 information related to the scenario). The numbers are the scores that were later assigned to the
 671 traffic light colours. Items 20 and 21 were derived from reprocessed seismic data sometime later
 672 than the other evidence.

673

674

675 Figure 9




676

677 Figure 9. The probability of each subsurface scenario, showing how the view of their probability
678 evolves when considering each individual piece of evidence, and applying the likelihoods shown in
679 Figure 8, in the same order. The initial probabilities (at step 0) are the prior probabilities for each
680 scenario assigned by the subsurface team.

681

682 Figure 10



683

684 Figure 10. The probability of each subsurface scenario, showing how the view of their probability
685 evolves when considering each individual piece of evidence, and applying the likelihoods shown in
686 Figure 8. This differs from Figure 9 in that the initial probabilities (at step 0) are here assumed to be
687 equal for each scenario (i.e. assuming no prior information). The results after 21 iterations compare
688 closely with those of Figure 9.

689